Antecipation and the Time-Consistency of Fiscal Policy

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Lang, Günther
Data de Publicação: 1994
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10362/87360
Resumo: This paper is concerned with the question of the existence of stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium in an overlapping generations growth model in the tradition of Diamond [19651, where in each period a government is in power, being interested in maximizing a social welfare function which consists of a weighted sum of utilities of those generations only who are alive in this period. This setting causes conflicts of interest between two succeeding governments and implies time-inconsistency of optimal plans made by myopic planners. If these planners are non-myopic, however, they will take into account the reaction of their successors. We will therefore ex-amine what game-theoretic concept can be applied, whether game equilibria exist. and what their properties are.
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spelling Antecipation and the Time-Consistency of Fiscal PolicyGame Equilibrium GrowthStationary Markov-Perfect EquilibriumTime-ConsistencyThis paper is concerned with the question of the existence of stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium in an overlapping generations growth model in the tradition of Diamond [19651, where in each period a government is in power, being interested in maximizing a social welfare function which consists of a weighted sum of utilities of those generations only who are alive in this period. This setting causes conflicts of interest between two succeeding governments and implies time-inconsistency of optimal plans made by myopic planners. If these planners are non-myopic, however, they will take into account the reaction of their successors. We will therefore ex-amine what game-theoretic concept can be applied, whether game equilibria exist. and what their properties are.Nova SBERUNLang, Günther2019-11-15T15:48:14Z1994-06-201994-06-20T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10362/87360engLang, Gunther, Antecipation and the Time-Consistency of Fiscal Policy (June, 1994). FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 224info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-03-11T04:38:59Zoai:run.unl.pt:10362/87360Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-20T03:36:45.016234Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Antecipation and the Time-Consistency of Fiscal Policy
title Antecipation and the Time-Consistency of Fiscal Policy
spellingShingle Antecipation and the Time-Consistency of Fiscal Policy
Lang, Günther
Game Equilibrium Growth
Stationary Markov-Perfect Equilibrium
Time-Consistency
title_short Antecipation and the Time-Consistency of Fiscal Policy
title_full Antecipation and the Time-Consistency of Fiscal Policy
title_fullStr Antecipation and the Time-Consistency of Fiscal Policy
title_full_unstemmed Antecipation and the Time-Consistency of Fiscal Policy
title_sort Antecipation and the Time-Consistency of Fiscal Policy
author Lang, Günther
author_facet Lang, Günther
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv RUN
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Lang, Günther
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Game Equilibrium Growth
Stationary Markov-Perfect Equilibrium
Time-Consistency
topic Game Equilibrium Growth
Stationary Markov-Perfect Equilibrium
Time-Consistency
description This paper is concerned with the question of the existence of stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium in an overlapping generations growth model in the tradition of Diamond [19651, where in each period a government is in power, being interested in maximizing a social welfare function which consists of a weighted sum of utilities of those generations only who are alive in this period. This setting causes conflicts of interest between two succeeding governments and implies time-inconsistency of optimal plans made by myopic planners. If these planners are non-myopic, however, they will take into account the reaction of their successors. We will therefore ex-amine what game-theoretic concept can be applied, whether game equilibria exist. and what their properties are.
publishDate 1994
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 1994-06-20
1994-06-20T00:00:00Z
2019-11-15T15:48:14Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
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status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10362/87360
url http://hdl.handle.net/10362/87360
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Lang, Gunther, Antecipation and the Time-Consistency of Fiscal Policy (June, 1994). FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 224
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Nova SBE
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Nova SBE
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