Random matching in the college admissions problem

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Pais, Joana
Data de Publicação: 2006
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/2630
Resumo: In the college admissions problem, we consider the incentives confronting agents who face the prospect of being matched by a random stable mechanism. We provide a fairly complete characterization of ordinal equilbria. Namely, every ordinal equilibrium yields a degenerate probability distribution. Furthermore, individual rationality is a necessary and sufficient condition for an equilibrium outcome, while stability is guaranteed in ordinal equilibrium where firms act straightforwardly. Finally, we relate equilibrium behavior in random and in deterministic mechanisms.
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spelling Random matching in the college admissions problemMatchingCollege Admissions ProblemStabilityRandom MechanismIn the college admissions problem, we consider the incentives confronting agents who face the prospect of being matched by a random stable mechanism. We provide a fairly complete characterization of ordinal equilbria. Namely, every ordinal equilibrium yields a degenerate probability distribution. Furthermore, individual rationality is a necessary and sufficient condition for an equilibrium outcome, while stability is guaranteed in ordinal equilibrium where firms act straightforwardly. Finally, we relate equilibrium behavior in random and in deterministic mechanisms.Financial support from the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia under grant SFRH/BD/5308/2001 and from the spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnologia under research grant BEC2002-02130.ISEG – Departamento de EconomiaRepositório da Universidade de LisboaPais, Joana2010-12-09T11:50:32Z20062006-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/2630engPais, Joana. 2006. "Random matching in the college admissions problem". Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão - DE Working papers nº 13-2006/DE/UECE0874-4548info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-03-06T14:33:49Zoai:www.repository.utl.pt:10400.5/2630Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T16:50:36.346775Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Random matching in the college admissions problem
title Random matching in the college admissions problem
spellingShingle Random matching in the college admissions problem
Pais, Joana
Matching
College Admissions Problem
Stability
Random Mechanism
title_short Random matching in the college admissions problem
title_full Random matching in the college admissions problem
title_fullStr Random matching in the college admissions problem
title_full_unstemmed Random matching in the college admissions problem
title_sort Random matching in the college admissions problem
author Pais, Joana
author_facet Pais, Joana
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Pais, Joana
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Matching
College Admissions Problem
Stability
Random Mechanism
topic Matching
College Admissions Problem
Stability
Random Mechanism
description In the college admissions problem, we consider the incentives confronting agents who face the prospect of being matched by a random stable mechanism. We provide a fairly complete characterization of ordinal equilbria. Namely, every ordinal equilibrium yields a degenerate probability distribution. Furthermore, individual rationality is a necessary and sufficient condition for an equilibrium outcome, while stability is guaranteed in ordinal equilibrium where firms act straightforwardly. Finally, we relate equilibrium behavior in random and in deterministic mechanisms.
publishDate 2006
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2006
2006-01-01T00:00:00Z
2010-12-09T11:50:32Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/2630
url http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/2630
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Pais, Joana. 2006. "Random matching in the college admissions problem". Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão - DE Working papers nº 13-2006/DE/UECE
0874-4548
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv ISEG – Departamento de Economia
publisher.none.fl_str_mv ISEG – Departamento de Economia
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron:RCAAP
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instacron_str RCAAP
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collection Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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