Location choice under delivered pricing: a reinterpretation

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Pires, Cesaltina
Data de Publicação: 2009
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10174/2291
Resumo: This article reinterprets, under a common framework, previous results on location choice under delivered pricing. The paper clearly identifies the economic forces which explain why the socially optimal locations are an equilibrium of the location-price game in some models, and why they are not an equilibrium in other models. The paper shows that the rationale behind Hamilton et al. (Reg Sci Urban Econ 19:87–102, 1989) and Gupta’s (Reg Sci Urban Econ 24:265–272, 1994) nonoptimality results are very different. While the first result is explained by the social inefficiency of the price game, the second one is due to the existence of a strategic effect.
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spelling Location choice under delivered pricing: a reinterpretationLocation choiceDelivered pricingThis article reinterprets, under a common framework, previous results on location choice under delivered pricing. The paper clearly identifies the economic forces which explain why the socially optimal locations are an equilibrium of the location-price game in some models, and why they are not an equilibrium in other models. The paper shows that the rationale behind Hamilton et al. (Reg Sci Urban Econ 19:87–102, 1989) and Gupta’s (Reg Sci Urban Econ 24:265–272, 1994) nonoptimality results are very different. While the first result is explained by the social inefficiency of the price game, the second one is due to the existence of a strategic effect.Springer2010-12-13T10:17:38Z2010-12-132009-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/article37487 bytesapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10174/2291http://hdl.handle.net/10174/2291eng199–21343Annals of Regional SciencelivreDepartamento de Gestãocpires@uevora.pt639Pires, Cesaltinainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-01-03T18:38:39Zoai:dspace.uevora.pt:10174/2291Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-20T00:58:01.669102Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Location choice under delivered pricing: a reinterpretation
title Location choice under delivered pricing: a reinterpretation
spellingShingle Location choice under delivered pricing: a reinterpretation
Pires, Cesaltina
Location choice
Delivered pricing
title_short Location choice under delivered pricing: a reinterpretation
title_full Location choice under delivered pricing: a reinterpretation
title_fullStr Location choice under delivered pricing: a reinterpretation
title_full_unstemmed Location choice under delivered pricing: a reinterpretation
title_sort Location choice under delivered pricing: a reinterpretation
author Pires, Cesaltina
author_facet Pires, Cesaltina
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Pires, Cesaltina
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Location choice
Delivered pricing
topic Location choice
Delivered pricing
description This article reinterprets, under a common framework, previous results on location choice under delivered pricing. The paper clearly identifies the economic forces which explain why the socially optimal locations are an equilibrium of the location-price game in some models, and why they are not an equilibrium in other models. The paper shows that the rationale behind Hamilton et al. (Reg Sci Urban Econ 19:87–102, 1989) and Gupta’s (Reg Sci Urban Econ 24:265–272, 1994) nonoptimality results are very different. While the first result is explained by the social inefficiency of the price game, the second one is due to the existence of a strategic effect.
publishDate 2009
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2009-01-01T00:00:00Z
2010-12-13T10:17:38Z
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