Qualified majority versus unanimity: making decisions easier?

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Guia, Luís Manuel Claro
Data de Publicação: 2017
Tipo de documento: Dissertação
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10362/22195
Resumo: In this paper, we will investigate if there is the counterintuitive possibility that decisions under unanimity in the Council of the European Union may result in approval of proposals of the Commission with higher simplicity when compared to the voting system of qualified majority. The focus will be not only on the underlying interpretation of the abstention, but also on the quorum required to allow formal voting to take place. Moreover, bearing in mind different interpretations of abstention, we will also find the necessary proportion of favorable actual voters for each level of participation to ensure that the concepts of Condorcet Consistency and Representation are respected.
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spelling Qualified majority versus unanimity: making decisions easier?European UnionCollective decision makingAbstentionCondorcet consistencyDomínio/Área Científica::Ciências Sociais::Economia e GestãoIn this paper, we will investigate if there is the counterintuitive possibility that decisions under unanimity in the Council of the European Union may result in approval of proposals of the Commission with higher simplicity when compared to the voting system of qualified majority. The focus will be not only on the underlying interpretation of the abstention, but also on the quorum required to allow formal voting to take place. Moreover, bearing in mind different interpretations of abstention, we will also find the necessary proportion of favorable actual voters for each level of participation to ensure that the concepts of Condorcet Consistency and Representation are respected.Real, Paulo Pamplona CorteRUNGuia, Luís Manuel Claro2020-01-20T01:30:27Z2017-01-202017-01-20T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10362/22195TID:201715325enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-03-11T04:09:34Zoai:run.unl.pt:10362/22195Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-20T03:27:11.231212Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Qualified majority versus unanimity: making decisions easier?
title Qualified majority versus unanimity: making decisions easier?
spellingShingle Qualified majority versus unanimity: making decisions easier?
Guia, Luís Manuel Claro
European Union
Collective decision making
Abstention
Condorcet consistency
Domínio/Área Científica::Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão
title_short Qualified majority versus unanimity: making decisions easier?
title_full Qualified majority versus unanimity: making decisions easier?
title_fullStr Qualified majority versus unanimity: making decisions easier?
title_full_unstemmed Qualified majority versus unanimity: making decisions easier?
title_sort Qualified majority versus unanimity: making decisions easier?
author Guia, Luís Manuel Claro
author_facet Guia, Luís Manuel Claro
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Real, Paulo Pamplona Corte
RUN
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Guia, Luís Manuel Claro
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv European Union
Collective decision making
Abstention
Condorcet consistency
Domínio/Área Científica::Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão
topic European Union
Collective decision making
Abstention
Condorcet consistency
Domínio/Área Científica::Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão
description In this paper, we will investigate if there is the counterintuitive possibility that decisions under unanimity in the Council of the European Union may result in approval of proposals of the Commission with higher simplicity when compared to the voting system of qualified majority. The focus will be not only on the underlying interpretation of the abstention, but also on the quorum required to allow formal voting to take place. Moreover, bearing in mind different interpretations of abstention, we will also find the necessary proportion of favorable actual voters for each level of participation to ensure that the concepts of Condorcet Consistency and Representation are respected.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017-01-20
2017-01-20T00:00:00Z
2020-01-20T01:30:27Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis
format masterThesis
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10362/22195
TID:201715325
url http://hdl.handle.net/10362/22195
identifier_str_mv TID:201715325
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess
eu_rights_str_mv embargoedAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron:RCAAP
instname_str Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron_str RCAAP
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reponame_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
collection Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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