ECOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM AND THE CAUSAL ARGUMENT

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Carvalho, Eros Moreira de
Data de Publicação: 2021
Tipo de documento: preprint
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: SciELO Preprints
Texto Completo: https://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/preprint/view/3256
Resumo: (This article is part of a project by Trans/Form/Ação: Unesp Philosophy Journal. It is the  Authorial Philosophy Dossier, to be published in 2022.) In this paper I argue that the ecological approach to perception provides resources to overcome the causal argument against disjunctivism. According to the causal argument, since the brain states that proximally cause the perceptual experience and the corresponding hallucinatory one can be of the same type, there would be no good reason to reject that the perceptual experience and the corresponding hallucinatory experience have fundamentally the same nature. Disjunctivism in respect to the nature of the experience would then be false. I identify three assumptions that support the causal argument: the indistinguishability assumption, the linearity assumption and the duplication assumption. According to the ecological approach to disjunctivism, these assumptions should be rejected, opening up room for a version of disjunctivism that I call ‘Ecological Disjunctivism’. Perceptual episodes are extended over time and supervenient to the organism-environment system. They can be distinguished from the ‘corresponding’ hallucinations because the former result from a controlled process of attunement to the environment, whereas hallucinations are passive and insensible to the exploratory activities of the perceptual system. Finally, the ecological disjunctivism, inasmuch as it is immune to the causal argument, is more advantageous in relation to the negative and positive disjunctivisms.
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spelling ECOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM AND THE CAUSAL ARGUMENTO DISJUNTIVISMO ECOLÓGICO E O ARGUMENTO CAUSALDisjuntivismo ecológicoargumento causalindistinguibilidaderetroalimentação dinâmicapsicologia ecológicaEcological disjunctivismcausal argumentindistinguishabilitydynamical feedbackecological psychology(This article is part of a project by Trans/Form/Ação: Unesp Philosophy Journal. It is the  Authorial Philosophy Dossier, to be published in 2022.) In this paper I argue that the ecological approach to perception provides resources to overcome the causal argument against disjunctivism. According to the causal argument, since the brain states that proximally cause the perceptual experience and the corresponding hallucinatory one can be of the same type, there would be no good reason to reject that the perceptual experience and the corresponding hallucinatory experience have fundamentally the same nature. Disjunctivism in respect to the nature of the experience would then be false. I identify three assumptions that support the causal argument: the indistinguishability assumption, the linearity assumption and the duplication assumption. According to the ecological approach to disjunctivism, these assumptions should be rejected, opening up room for a version of disjunctivism that I call ‘Ecological Disjunctivism’. Perceptual episodes are extended over time and supervenient to the organism-environment system. They can be distinguished from the ‘corresponding’ hallucinations because the former result from a controlled process of attunement to the environment, whereas hallucinations are passive and insensible to the exploratory activities of the perceptual system. Finally, the ecological disjunctivism, inasmuch as it is immune to the causal argument, is more advantageous in relation to the negative and positive disjunctivisms.(Este artigo faz parte de um projeto da Trans/Form/Ação: revista de filosofia da Unesp. Trata-se do Dossiê Filosofia Autoral, a ser publicado em 2022.) Neste artigo, argumento que a abordagem ecológica da percepção oferece recursos para desarmar o argumento causal contra o disjuntivismo. Segundo o argumento causal, como os estados cerebrais que proximamente antecedem a experiência perceptiva e a experiência alucinatória correspondente podem ser do mesmo tipo, não haveria portanto uma boa razão para rejeitar que a experiência perceptiva e a experiência alucinatória correspondente tenham fundamentalmente a mesma natureza. O disjuntivismo com respeito à natureza da experiência seria assim falso. Identifico três suposições que apoiam o argumento causal: a suposição da indistinguibilidade, a suposição da linearidade e a suposição da duplicação. De acordo com a abordagem ecológica da percepção, essas suposições não se sustentam, abrindo espaço para a defesa de uma versão ecológica do disjuntivismo. Episódios perceptivos se estendem ao longo do tempo e são supervenientes ao sistema organismo-ambiente. Eles também podem ser distinguidos dos 'correspondentes' episódios de alucinação por serem o resultado de um processo controlado de sintonização, ao passo que as alucinações são passivas e refratárias às atividades de exploração e sintonização. Por fim, o disjuntivismo ecológico, na medida em que é imune ao argumento causal, se mostra vantajoso em relação aos disjuntivismos negativo e positivo.SciELO PreprintsSciELO PreprintsSciELO Preprints2021-12-02info:eu-repo/semantics/preprintinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/preprint/view/325610.1590/SciELOPreprints.3256porhttps://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/article/view/3256/5956Copyright (c) 2021 Eros Moreira de Carvalhohttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessCarvalho, Eros Moreira dereponame:SciELO Preprintsinstname:SciELOinstacron:SCI2021-11-22T22:05:50Zoai:ops.preprints.scielo.org:preprint/3256Servidor de preprintshttps://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scieloONGhttps://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/oaiscielo.submission@scielo.orgopendoar:2021-11-22T22:05:50SciELO Preprints - SciELOfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv ECOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM AND THE CAUSAL ARGUMENT
O DISJUNTIVISMO ECOLÓGICO E O ARGUMENTO CAUSAL
title ECOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM AND THE CAUSAL ARGUMENT
spellingShingle ECOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM AND THE CAUSAL ARGUMENT
Carvalho, Eros Moreira de
Disjuntivismo ecológico
argumento causal
indistinguibilidade
retroalimentação dinâmica
psicologia ecológica
Ecological disjunctivism
causal argument
indistinguishability
dynamical feedback
ecological psychology
title_short ECOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM AND THE CAUSAL ARGUMENT
title_full ECOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM AND THE CAUSAL ARGUMENT
title_fullStr ECOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM AND THE CAUSAL ARGUMENT
title_full_unstemmed ECOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM AND THE CAUSAL ARGUMENT
title_sort ECOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM AND THE CAUSAL ARGUMENT
author Carvalho, Eros Moreira de
author_facet Carvalho, Eros Moreira de
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Carvalho, Eros Moreira de
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Disjuntivismo ecológico
argumento causal
indistinguibilidade
retroalimentação dinâmica
psicologia ecológica
Ecological disjunctivism
causal argument
indistinguishability
dynamical feedback
ecological psychology
topic Disjuntivismo ecológico
argumento causal
indistinguibilidade
retroalimentação dinâmica
psicologia ecológica
Ecological disjunctivism
causal argument
indistinguishability
dynamical feedback
ecological psychology
description (This article is part of a project by Trans/Form/Ação: Unesp Philosophy Journal. It is the  Authorial Philosophy Dossier, to be published in 2022.) In this paper I argue that the ecological approach to perception provides resources to overcome the causal argument against disjunctivism. According to the causal argument, since the brain states that proximally cause the perceptual experience and the corresponding hallucinatory one can be of the same type, there would be no good reason to reject that the perceptual experience and the corresponding hallucinatory experience have fundamentally the same nature. Disjunctivism in respect to the nature of the experience would then be false. I identify three assumptions that support the causal argument: the indistinguishability assumption, the linearity assumption and the duplication assumption. According to the ecological approach to disjunctivism, these assumptions should be rejected, opening up room for a version of disjunctivism that I call ‘Ecological Disjunctivism’. Perceptual episodes are extended over time and supervenient to the organism-environment system. They can be distinguished from the ‘corresponding’ hallucinations because the former result from a controlled process of attunement to the environment, whereas hallucinations are passive and insensible to the exploratory activities of the perceptual system. Finally, the ecological disjunctivism, inasmuch as it is immune to the causal argument, is more advantageous in relation to the negative and positive disjunctivisms.
publishDate 2021
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2021-12-02
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10.1590/SciELOPreprints.3256
url https://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/preprint/view/3256
identifier_str_mv 10.1590/SciELOPreprints.3256
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/article/view/3256/5956
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Eros Moreira de Carvalho
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Eros Moreira de Carvalho
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv SciELO Preprints
SciELO Preprints
SciELO Preprints
publisher.none.fl_str_mv SciELO Preprints
SciELO Preprints
SciELO Preprints
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repository.mail.fl_str_mv scielo.submission@scielo.org
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