ECOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM AND THE CAUSAL ARGUMENT
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2021 |
Tipo de documento: | preprint |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | SciELO Preprints |
Texto Completo: | https://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/preprint/view/3256 |
Resumo: | (This article is part of a project by Trans/Form/Ação: Unesp Philosophy Journal. It is the Authorial Philosophy Dossier, to be published in 2022.) In this paper I argue that the ecological approach to perception provides resources to overcome the causal argument against disjunctivism. According to the causal argument, since the brain states that proximally cause the perceptual experience and the corresponding hallucinatory one can be of the same type, there would be no good reason to reject that the perceptual experience and the corresponding hallucinatory experience have fundamentally the same nature. Disjunctivism in respect to the nature of the experience would then be false. I identify three assumptions that support the causal argument: the indistinguishability assumption, the linearity assumption and the duplication assumption. According to the ecological approach to disjunctivism, these assumptions should be rejected, opening up room for a version of disjunctivism that I call ‘Ecological Disjunctivism’. Perceptual episodes are extended over time and supervenient to the organism-environment system. They can be distinguished from the ‘corresponding’ hallucinations because the former result from a controlled process of attunement to the environment, whereas hallucinations are passive and insensible to the exploratory activities of the perceptual system. Finally, the ecological disjunctivism, inasmuch as it is immune to the causal argument, is more advantageous in relation to the negative and positive disjunctivisms. |
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ECOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM AND THE CAUSAL ARGUMENTO DISJUNTIVISMO ECOLÓGICO E O ARGUMENTO CAUSALDisjuntivismo ecológicoargumento causalindistinguibilidaderetroalimentação dinâmicapsicologia ecológicaEcological disjunctivismcausal argumentindistinguishabilitydynamical feedbackecological psychology(This article is part of a project by Trans/Form/Ação: Unesp Philosophy Journal. It is the Authorial Philosophy Dossier, to be published in 2022.) In this paper I argue that the ecological approach to perception provides resources to overcome the causal argument against disjunctivism. According to the causal argument, since the brain states that proximally cause the perceptual experience and the corresponding hallucinatory one can be of the same type, there would be no good reason to reject that the perceptual experience and the corresponding hallucinatory experience have fundamentally the same nature. Disjunctivism in respect to the nature of the experience would then be false. I identify three assumptions that support the causal argument: the indistinguishability assumption, the linearity assumption and the duplication assumption. According to the ecological approach to disjunctivism, these assumptions should be rejected, opening up room for a version of disjunctivism that I call ‘Ecological Disjunctivism’. Perceptual episodes are extended over time and supervenient to the organism-environment system. They can be distinguished from the ‘corresponding’ hallucinations because the former result from a controlled process of attunement to the environment, whereas hallucinations are passive and insensible to the exploratory activities of the perceptual system. Finally, the ecological disjunctivism, inasmuch as it is immune to the causal argument, is more advantageous in relation to the negative and positive disjunctivisms.(Este artigo faz parte de um projeto da Trans/Form/Ação: revista de filosofia da Unesp. Trata-se do Dossiê Filosofia Autoral, a ser publicado em 2022.) Neste artigo, argumento que a abordagem ecológica da percepção oferece recursos para desarmar o argumento causal contra o disjuntivismo. Segundo o argumento causal, como os estados cerebrais que proximamente antecedem a experiência perceptiva e a experiência alucinatória correspondente podem ser do mesmo tipo, não haveria portanto uma boa razão para rejeitar que a experiência perceptiva e a experiência alucinatória correspondente tenham fundamentalmente a mesma natureza. O disjuntivismo com respeito à natureza da experiência seria assim falso. Identifico três suposições que apoiam o argumento causal: a suposição da indistinguibilidade, a suposição da linearidade e a suposição da duplicação. De acordo com a abordagem ecológica da percepção, essas suposições não se sustentam, abrindo espaço para a defesa de uma versão ecológica do disjuntivismo. Episódios perceptivos se estendem ao longo do tempo e são supervenientes ao sistema organismo-ambiente. Eles também podem ser distinguidos dos 'correspondentes' episódios de alucinação por serem o resultado de um processo controlado de sintonização, ao passo que as alucinações são passivas e refratárias às atividades de exploração e sintonização. Por fim, o disjuntivismo ecológico, na medida em que é imune ao argumento causal, se mostra vantajoso em relação aos disjuntivismos negativo e positivo.SciELO PreprintsSciELO PreprintsSciELO Preprints2021-12-02info:eu-repo/semantics/preprintinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/preprint/view/325610.1590/SciELOPreprints.3256porhttps://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/article/view/3256/5956Copyright (c) 2021 Eros Moreira de Carvalhohttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessCarvalho, Eros Moreira dereponame:SciELO Preprintsinstname:SciELOinstacron:SCI2021-11-22T22:05:50Zoai:ops.preprints.scielo.org:preprint/3256Servidor de preprintshttps://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scieloONGhttps://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/oaiscielo.submission@scielo.orgopendoar:2021-11-22T22:05:50SciELO Preprints - SciELOfalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
ECOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM AND THE CAUSAL ARGUMENT O DISJUNTIVISMO ECOLÓGICO E O ARGUMENTO CAUSAL |
title |
ECOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM AND THE CAUSAL ARGUMENT |
spellingShingle |
ECOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM AND THE CAUSAL ARGUMENT Carvalho, Eros Moreira de Disjuntivismo ecológico argumento causal indistinguibilidade retroalimentação dinâmica psicologia ecológica Ecological disjunctivism causal argument indistinguishability dynamical feedback ecological psychology |
title_short |
ECOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM AND THE CAUSAL ARGUMENT |
title_full |
ECOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM AND THE CAUSAL ARGUMENT |
title_fullStr |
ECOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM AND THE CAUSAL ARGUMENT |
title_full_unstemmed |
ECOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM AND THE CAUSAL ARGUMENT |
title_sort |
ECOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM AND THE CAUSAL ARGUMENT |
author |
Carvalho, Eros Moreira de |
author_facet |
Carvalho, Eros Moreira de |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Carvalho, Eros Moreira de |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Disjuntivismo ecológico argumento causal indistinguibilidade retroalimentação dinâmica psicologia ecológica Ecological disjunctivism causal argument indistinguishability dynamical feedback ecological psychology |
topic |
Disjuntivismo ecológico argumento causal indistinguibilidade retroalimentação dinâmica psicologia ecológica Ecological disjunctivism causal argument indistinguishability dynamical feedback ecological psychology |
description |
(This article is part of a project by Trans/Form/Ação: Unesp Philosophy Journal. It is the Authorial Philosophy Dossier, to be published in 2022.) In this paper I argue that the ecological approach to perception provides resources to overcome the causal argument against disjunctivism. According to the causal argument, since the brain states that proximally cause the perceptual experience and the corresponding hallucinatory one can be of the same type, there would be no good reason to reject that the perceptual experience and the corresponding hallucinatory experience have fundamentally the same nature. Disjunctivism in respect to the nature of the experience would then be false. I identify three assumptions that support the causal argument: the indistinguishability assumption, the linearity assumption and the duplication assumption. According to the ecological approach to disjunctivism, these assumptions should be rejected, opening up room for a version of disjunctivism that I call ‘Ecological Disjunctivism’. Perceptual episodes are extended over time and supervenient to the organism-environment system. They can be distinguished from the ‘corresponding’ hallucinations because the former result from a controlled process of attunement to the environment, whereas hallucinations are passive and insensible to the exploratory activities of the perceptual system. Finally, the ecological disjunctivism, inasmuch as it is immune to the causal argument, is more advantageous in relation to the negative and positive disjunctivisms. |
publishDate |
2021 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2021-12-02 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/preprint info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
preprint |
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publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/preprint/view/3256 10.1590/SciELOPreprints.3256 |
url |
https://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/preprint/view/3256 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.1590/SciELOPreprints.3256 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/article/view/3256/5956 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Eros Moreira de Carvalho https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Eros Moreira de Carvalho https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
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application/pdf |
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SciELO Preprints SciELO Preprints SciELO Preprints |
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SciELO Preprints SciELO Preprints SciELO Preprints |
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SciELO |
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SciELO Preprints |
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SciELO Preprints |
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SciELO Preprints - SciELO |
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