NEGOCIAÇÕES ENTRE A GRÉCIA E SEUS CREDORES À LUZ DA TEORIA DOS JOGOS

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Gomes, Carlos Eduardo
Data de Publicação: 2017
Outros Autores: Silva, Claudeci da, Parré, José Luiz
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Economic Analysis of law Review
Texto Completo: https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/6803
Resumo: This work aims to analyze the rounds of negotiations between Greece and the Creditors in an attempt to get new loan installments to the scroll of the arrears and ensure the stability of the Eurozone. To accomplish the goals, we used two tools of game theory, they are: the Nash Equilibrium in Perfect Subgames and the Chicken Game. It was found that Greece and the Creditors are willing to avoid at any cost, a Greek exit from the Eurozone, because if this were to leave, would bring negative effects not only for Greece but also for the entire Eurozone and the European Union. Thus, it became clear that the best result achieved in the negotiations between Greece and the Creditors, is that there is an agreement and that it is not full of economic policy of austerity.
id UCB-6_c8bda446fe8a7909e292a54766a39765
oai_identifier_str oai:ojs.portalrevistas.ucb.br:article/6803
network_acronym_str UCB-6
network_name_str Economic Analysis of law Review
repository_id_str
spelling NEGOCIAÇÕES ENTRE A GRÉCIA E SEUS CREDORES À LUZ DA TEORIA DOS JOGOSGreece Creditors Game Theory.This work aims to analyze the rounds of negotiations between Greece and the Creditors in an attempt to get new loan installments to the scroll of the arrears and ensure the stability of the Eurozone. To accomplish the goals, we used two tools of game theory, they are: the Nash Equilibrium in Perfect Subgames and the Chicken Game. It was found that Greece and the Creditors are willing to avoid at any cost, a Greek exit from the Eurozone, because if this were to leave, would bring negative effects not only for Greece but also for the entire Eurozone and the European Union. Thus, it became clear that the best result achieved in the negotiations between Greece and the Creditors, is that there is an agreement and that it is not full of economic policy of austerity.Universidade Católica de Brasília2017-01-27info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionAvaliado por Pares; Peer ReviewedPesquisa Empíricaapplication/pdfhttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/680310.31501/ealr.v7i2.6803Economic Analysis of Law Review; Vol. 7 No. 2 (2016): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 510-529Economic Analysis of Law Review ; Vol. 7 Núm. 2 (2016): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 510-529Economic Analysis of Law Review; v. 7 n. 2 (2016): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 510-5292178-0587reponame:Economic Analysis of law Reviewinstname:Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)instacron:UCBporhttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/6803/4759Copyright (c) 2017 Economic Analysis of Law Reviewinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessGomes, Carlos EduardoSilva, Claudeci daParré, José Luiz2017-04-27T11:16:11Zoai:ojs.portalrevistas.ucb.br:article/6803Revistahttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/ealrONGhttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/oaieditor.ealr@gmail.com||sdi@ucb.br||benjaminm.tabak@gmail.com2178-05872178-0587opendoar:2017-04-27T11:16:11Economic Analysis of law Review - Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv NEGOCIAÇÕES ENTRE A GRÉCIA E SEUS CREDORES À LUZ DA TEORIA DOS JOGOS
title NEGOCIAÇÕES ENTRE A GRÉCIA E SEUS CREDORES À LUZ DA TEORIA DOS JOGOS
spellingShingle NEGOCIAÇÕES ENTRE A GRÉCIA E SEUS CREDORES À LUZ DA TEORIA DOS JOGOS
Gomes, Carlos Eduardo
Greece
Creditors
Game Theory.
title_short NEGOCIAÇÕES ENTRE A GRÉCIA E SEUS CREDORES À LUZ DA TEORIA DOS JOGOS
title_full NEGOCIAÇÕES ENTRE A GRÉCIA E SEUS CREDORES À LUZ DA TEORIA DOS JOGOS
title_fullStr NEGOCIAÇÕES ENTRE A GRÉCIA E SEUS CREDORES À LUZ DA TEORIA DOS JOGOS
title_full_unstemmed NEGOCIAÇÕES ENTRE A GRÉCIA E SEUS CREDORES À LUZ DA TEORIA DOS JOGOS
title_sort NEGOCIAÇÕES ENTRE A GRÉCIA E SEUS CREDORES À LUZ DA TEORIA DOS JOGOS
author Gomes, Carlos Eduardo
author_facet Gomes, Carlos Eduardo
Silva, Claudeci da
Parré, José Luiz
author_role author
author2 Silva, Claudeci da
Parré, José Luiz
author2_role author
author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Gomes, Carlos Eduardo
Silva, Claudeci da
Parré, José Luiz
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Greece
Creditors
Game Theory.
topic Greece
Creditors
Game Theory.
description This work aims to analyze the rounds of negotiations between Greece and the Creditors in an attempt to get new loan installments to the scroll of the arrears and ensure the stability of the Eurozone. To accomplish the goals, we used two tools of game theory, they are: the Nash Equilibrium in Perfect Subgames and the Chicken Game. It was found that Greece and the Creditors are willing to avoid at any cost, a Greek exit from the Eurozone, because if this were to leave, would bring negative effects not only for Greece but also for the entire Eurozone and the European Union. Thus, it became clear that the best result achieved in the negotiations between Greece and the Creditors, is that there is an agreement and that it is not full of economic policy of austerity.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017-01-27
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Avaliado por Pares; Peer Reviewed
Pesquisa Empírica
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/6803
10.31501/ealr.v7i2.6803
url https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/6803
identifier_str_mv 10.31501/ealr.v7i2.6803
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/6803/4759
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2017 Economic Analysis of Law Review
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2017 Economic Analysis of Law Review
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Católica de Brasília
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Católica de Brasília
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Economic Analysis of Law Review; Vol. 7 No. 2 (2016): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 510-529
Economic Analysis of Law Review ; Vol. 7 Núm. 2 (2016): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 510-529
Economic Analysis of Law Review; v. 7 n. 2 (2016): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 510-529
2178-0587
reponame:Economic Analysis of law Review
instname:Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)
instacron:UCB
instname_str Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)
instacron_str UCB
institution UCB
reponame_str Economic Analysis of law Review
collection Economic Analysis of law Review
repository.name.fl_str_mv Economic Analysis of law Review - Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv editor.ealr@gmail.com||sdi@ucb.br||benjaminm.tabak@gmail.com
_version_ 1798675422943117312