NEGOCIAÇÕES ENTRE A GRÉCIA E SEUS CREDORES À LUZ DA TEORIA DOS JOGOS
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2017 |
Outros Autores: | , |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Economic Analysis of law Review |
Texto Completo: | https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/6803 |
Resumo: | This work aims to analyze the rounds of negotiations between Greece and the Creditors in an attempt to get new loan installments to the scroll of the arrears and ensure the stability of the Eurozone. To accomplish the goals, we used two tools of game theory, they are: the Nash Equilibrium in Perfect Subgames and the Chicken Game. It was found that Greece and the Creditors are willing to avoid at any cost, a Greek exit from the Eurozone, because if this were to leave, would bring negative effects not only for Greece but also for the entire Eurozone and the European Union. Thus, it became clear that the best result achieved in the negotiations between Greece and the Creditors, is that there is an agreement and that it is not full of economic policy of austerity. |
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Economic Analysis of law Review |
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NEGOCIAÇÕES ENTRE A GRÉCIA E SEUS CREDORES À LUZ DA TEORIA DOS JOGOSGreece Creditors Game Theory.This work aims to analyze the rounds of negotiations between Greece and the Creditors in an attempt to get new loan installments to the scroll of the arrears and ensure the stability of the Eurozone. To accomplish the goals, we used two tools of game theory, they are: the Nash Equilibrium in Perfect Subgames and the Chicken Game. It was found that Greece and the Creditors are willing to avoid at any cost, a Greek exit from the Eurozone, because if this were to leave, would bring negative effects not only for Greece but also for the entire Eurozone and the European Union. Thus, it became clear that the best result achieved in the negotiations between Greece and the Creditors, is that there is an agreement and that it is not full of economic policy of austerity.Universidade Católica de Brasília2017-01-27info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionAvaliado por Pares; Peer ReviewedPesquisa Empíricaapplication/pdfhttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/680310.31501/ealr.v7i2.6803Economic Analysis of Law Review; Vol. 7 No. 2 (2016): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 510-529Economic Analysis of Law Review ; Vol. 7 Núm. 2 (2016): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 510-529Economic Analysis of Law Review; v. 7 n. 2 (2016): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 510-5292178-0587reponame:Economic Analysis of law Reviewinstname:Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)instacron:UCBporhttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/6803/4759Copyright (c) 2017 Economic Analysis of Law Reviewinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessGomes, Carlos EduardoSilva, Claudeci daParré, José Luiz2017-04-27T11:16:11Zoai:ojs.portalrevistas.ucb.br:article/6803Revistahttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/ealrONGhttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/oaieditor.ealr@gmail.com||sdi@ucb.br||benjaminm.tabak@gmail.com2178-05872178-0587opendoar:2017-04-27T11:16:11Economic Analysis of law Review - Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
NEGOCIAÇÕES ENTRE A GRÉCIA E SEUS CREDORES À LUZ DA TEORIA DOS JOGOS |
title |
NEGOCIAÇÕES ENTRE A GRÉCIA E SEUS CREDORES À LUZ DA TEORIA DOS JOGOS |
spellingShingle |
NEGOCIAÇÕES ENTRE A GRÉCIA E SEUS CREDORES À LUZ DA TEORIA DOS JOGOS Gomes, Carlos Eduardo Greece Creditors Game Theory. |
title_short |
NEGOCIAÇÕES ENTRE A GRÉCIA E SEUS CREDORES À LUZ DA TEORIA DOS JOGOS |
title_full |
NEGOCIAÇÕES ENTRE A GRÉCIA E SEUS CREDORES À LUZ DA TEORIA DOS JOGOS |
title_fullStr |
NEGOCIAÇÕES ENTRE A GRÉCIA E SEUS CREDORES À LUZ DA TEORIA DOS JOGOS |
title_full_unstemmed |
NEGOCIAÇÕES ENTRE A GRÉCIA E SEUS CREDORES À LUZ DA TEORIA DOS JOGOS |
title_sort |
NEGOCIAÇÕES ENTRE A GRÉCIA E SEUS CREDORES À LUZ DA TEORIA DOS JOGOS |
author |
Gomes, Carlos Eduardo |
author_facet |
Gomes, Carlos Eduardo Silva, Claudeci da Parré, José Luiz |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Silva, Claudeci da Parré, José Luiz |
author2_role |
author author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Gomes, Carlos Eduardo Silva, Claudeci da Parré, José Luiz |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Greece Creditors Game Theory. |
topic |
Greece Creditors Game Theory. |
description |
This work aims to analyze the rounds of negotiations between Greece and the Creditors in an attempt to get new loan installments to the scroll of the arrears and ensure the stability of the Eurozone. To accomplish the goals, we used two tools of game theory, they are: the Nash Equilibrium in Perfect Subgames and the Chicken Game. It was found that Greece and the Creditors are willing to avoid at any cost, a Greek exit from the Eurozone, because if this were to leave, would bring negative effects not only for Greece but also for the entire Eurozone and the European Union. Thus, it became clear that the best result achieved in the negotiations between Greece and the Creditors, is that there is an agreement and that it is not full of economic policy of austerity. |
publishDate |
2017 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2017-01-27 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Avaliado por Pares; Peer Reviewed Pesquisa Empírica |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/6803 10.31501/ealr.v7i2.6803 |
url |
https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/6803 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.31501/ealr.v7i2.6803 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/6803/4759 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2017 Economic Analysis of Law Review info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2017 Economic Analysis of Law Review |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Católica de Brasília |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Católica de Brasília |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Economic Analysis of Law Review; Vol. 7 No. 2 (2016): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 510-529 Economic Analysis of Law Review ; Vol. 7 Núm. 2 (2016): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 510-529 Economic Analysis of Law Review; v. 7 n. 2 (2016): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 510-529 2178-0587 reponame:Economic Analysis of law Review instname:Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB) instacron:UCB |
instname_str |
Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB) |
instacron_str |
UCB |
institution |
UCB |
reponame_str |
Economic Analysis of law Review |
collection |
Economic Analysis of law Review |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Economic Analysis of law Review - Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
editor.ealr@gmail.com||sdi@ucb.br||benjaminm.tabak@gmail.com |
_version_ |
1798675422943117312 |