Efficiency in public procurement: an approach based on compatibility of interests

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Libório, Matheus Pereira
Data de Publicação: 2024
Outros Autores: Bernardes, Patrícia, Y. Ekel, Petr, Machado-Coelho, Thiago Melo, Gomes, Luiz Flavio Autran Monteiro, Gico Júnior, Ivo Teixeira, Soares, Gustavo Luis
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Economic Analysis of law Review
Texto Completo: https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/13069
Resumo: This research analyzes the efficiency of incentives granted to Small and Micro Enterprises (SMEs) in public contracts. Through the Particle Swarm Optimization and the K-means algorithm, SMEs' performance with different financial capacities was simulated. The results show that SMEs can increase their profits by up to 1.42 times by adopting a trading selection strategy compatible with their financial capacity. The results also show that the profile of the auctions in which SMEs participate are incompatible with the auction portfolio that interests them. These results suggest that the law that divides the trading session into lots is not as efficient as suggested, but that the adjustment of that law may make the interest of the buyer-public and SMEs compatible. This research's fundamental contribution is to reveal that the legislation must seek to reconcile the private interest to the public interest so that laws and regulations are indeed effective.
id UCB-6_f468dbc7ba168d552001a8f3a5df93d6
oai_identifier_str oai:ojs.portalrevistas.ucb.br:article/13069
network_acronym_str UCB-6
network_name_str Economic Analysis of law Review
repository_id_str
spelling Efficiency in public procurement: an approach based on compatibility of interestsEficiência nas contratações públicas: uma abordagem baseada na compatibilização de interessescontratações públicas pregão eletrônico análise econômica do direito otimização por enxame de partículas k-média análise de componentes principaisThis research analyzes the efficiency of incentives granted to Small and Micro Enterprises (SMEs) in public contracts. Through the Particle Swarm Optimization and the K-means algorithm, SMEs' performance with different financial capacities was simulated. The results show that SMEs can increase their profits by up to 1.42 times by adopting a trading selection strategy compatible with their financial capacity. The results also show that the profile of the auctions in which SMEs participate are incompatible with the auction portfolio that interests them. These results suggest that the law that divides the trading session into lots is not as efficient as suggested, but that the adjustment of that law may make the interest of the buyer-public and SMEs compatible. This research's fundamental contribution is to reveal that the legislation must seek to reconcile the private interest to the public interest so that laws and regulations are indeed effective.Esta pesquisa analisa a eficiência de incentivos concedidos às Pequenas e Microempresas (PMEs) em contratações públicas. Por meio do Particle Swarm Optimization e do algoritmo K-médias simulou-se a atuação de PMEs com diferentes capacidades financeiras. Os resultados mostram que as PMEs podem elevar seus lucros em até 1,42 vezes ao adotar uma estratégia de seleção de pregões compatível com sua capacidade financeira. Os resultados também mostram que o perfil dos pregões que as PMEs participam são incompatíveis com o portfólio de pregões que lhes interessa. Esses resultados sugerem que a lei que divide o pregão em lotes não é tão eficiente como se sugere, mas que o ajuste dessa lei pode compatibilizar o interesse do comprador-público e das PMEs. A contribuição fundamental desta pesquisa está em revelar que a legislação deve buscar compatibilizar o interesse privado ao interesse público para que leis e normas sejam de fato eficientes.Universidade Católica de Brasília2024-02-29info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionAvaliado por Pares; Peer Reviewedsimulaçãoapplication/pdfhttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/1306910.31501/ealr.v14i3.13069Economic Analysis of Law Review; Vol. 14 No. 3 (2023): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 1-19Economic Analysis of Law Review ; Vol. 14 Núm. 3 (2023): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 1-19Economic Analysis of Law Review; v. 14 n. 3 (2023): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 1-192178-0587reponame:Economic Analysis of law Reviewinstname:Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)instacron:UCBenghttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/13069/11758Copyright (c) 2024 Economic Analysis of Law Reviewinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessLibório, Matheus PereiraBernardes, PatríciaY. Ekel, PetrMachado-Coelho, Thiago MeloGomes, Luiz Flavio Autran MonteiroGico Júnior, Ivo TeixeiraSoares, Gustavo Luis2024-02-29T18:19:46Zoai:ojs.portalrevistas.ucb.br:article/13069Revistahttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/ealrONGhttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/oaieditor.ealr@gmail.com||sdi@ucb.br||benjaminm.tabak@gmail.com2178-05872178-0587opendoar:2024-02-29T18:19:46Economic Analysis of law Review - Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Efficiency in public procurement: an approach based on compatibility of interests
Eficiência nas contratações públicas: uma abordagem baseada na compatibilização de interesses
title Efficiency in public procurement: an approach based on compatibility of interests
spellingShingle Efficiency in public procurement: an approach based on compatibility of interests
Libório, Matheus Pereira
contratações públicas
pregão eletrônico
análise econômica do direito
otimização por enxame de partículas
k-média
análise de componentes principais
title_short Efficiency in public procurement: an approach based on compatibility of interests
title_full Efficiency in public procurement: an approach based on compatibility of interests
title_fullStr Efficiency in public procurement: an approach based on compatibility of interests
title_full_unstemmed Efficiency in public procurement: an approach based on compatibility of interests
title_sort Efficiency in public procurement: an approach based on compatibility of interests
author Libório, Matheus Pereira
author_facet Libório, Matheus Pereira
Bernardes, Patrícia
Y. Ekel, Petr
Machado-Coelho, Thiago Melo
Gomes, Luiz Flavio Autran Monteiro
Gico Júnior, Ivo Teixeira
Soares, Gustavo Luis
author_role author
author2 Bernardes, Patrícia
Y. Ekel, Petr
Machado-Coelho, Thiago Melo
Gomes, Luiz Flavio Autran Monteiro
Gico Júnior, Ivo Teixeira
Soares, Gustavo Luis
author2_role author
author
author
author
author
author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Libório, Matheus Pereira
Bernardes, Patrícia
Y. Ekel, Petr
Machado-Coelho, Thiago Melo
Gomes, Luiz Flavio Autran Monteiro
Gico Júnior, Ivo Teixeira
Soares, Gustavo Luis
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv contratações públicas
pregão eletrônico
análise econômica do direito
otimização por enxame de partículas
k-média
análise de componentes principais
topic contratações públicas
pregão eletrônico
análise econômica do direito
otimização por enxame de partículas
k-média
análise de componentes principais
description This research analyzes the efficiency of incentives granted to Small and Micro Enterprises (SMEs) in public contracts. Through the Particle Swarm Optimization and the K-means algorithm, SMEs' performance with different financial capacities was simulated. The results show that SMEs can increase their profits by up to 1.42 times by adopting a trading selection strategy compatible with their financial capacity. The results also show that the profile of the auctions in which SMEs participate are incompatible with the auction portfolio that interests them. These results suggest that the law that divides the trading session into lots is not as efficient as suggested, but that the adjustment of that law may make the interest of the buyer-public and SMEs compatible. This research's fundamental contribution is to reveal that the legislation must seek to reconcile the private interest to the public interest so that laws and regulations are indeed effective.
publishDate 2024
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2024-02-29
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Avaliado por Pares; Peer Reviewed
simulação
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/13069
10.31501/ealr.v14i3.13069
url https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/13069
identifier_str_mv 10.31501/ealr.v14i3.13069
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/13069/11758
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2024 Economic Analysis of Law Review
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2024 Economic Analysis of Law Review
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Católica de Brasília
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Católica de Brasília
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Economic Analysis of Law Review; Vol. 14 No. 3 (2023): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 1-19
Economic Analysis of Law Review ; Vol. 14 Núm. 3 (2023): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 1-19
Economic Analysis of Law Review; v. 14 n. 3 (2023): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 1-19
2178-0587
reponame:Economic Analysis of law Review
instname:Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)
instacron:UCB
instname_str Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)
instacron_str UCB
institution UCB
reponame_str Economic Analysis of law Review
collection Economic Analysis of law Review
repository.name.fl_str_mv Economic Analysis of law Review - Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv editor.ealr@gmail.com||sdi@ucb.br||benjaminm.tabak@gmail.com
_version_ 1798675421102866432

Registros relacionados