Abordagem informacional da política externa brasileira : a participação da CREDN (1995-2011)

• Autor(a) principal: Santos, Claudia Teixeira dos
• Data de Publicação: 2011
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UERJ
• Texto Completo: http://www.bdtd.uerj.br/handle/1/12500
• topic: Foreign policy; Federal chamber; Federal deputy; CREDN; Itamaraty; Executive; Legislative; International acts; Opposition; Informational rationality; Política externa; Câmara federal; Deputados federais; CREDN; Itamaraty; Executivo; Legislativo; Atos Internacionais; Oposição; Racionalidade informacional; CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::CIENCIA POLITICA

The study presented has the objective to analyze the influence of deputies in Brazilian foreign policy, specifically members of the Committee of Foreign Relations and National Defense. The idea is not to create a new paradigm of influence, but to raise ideas about different ways that the legislative may participate on the conduction of this policy in Brazil. Contrary to the analysis that said that the legislative have low participation in decision-making and focus the performance on the approval (or not), of the international agreements sended by the Executive. Therefore, we aim to go beyond this traditional approach, expanding to other forms of participation of the federal deputies in the Brazilian foreign policy. The politicization of foreign policy and the most active role of the Committee on Foreign Relations and National Defense (CREDN) have led to greater performance of the legislative on these issues. Mainly, because of the increased focus of opposition on the foreign policy issues. Foreign policy was regarded as the most insulated public policy from the political debate. But now, the federal deputies have participated and are increasingly interested in these issues. Congress has been using their institutional instruments to monitor the conduction of foreign policy. Therefore, we investigated the role of CREDN as a mechanism for information acquisition, in order to inform the median legislator in terms of foreign policy. The study starts from the information model, to find answers about the incentive that legislators would have to collect information (costly) about foreign policy. Thus, we seek to analyze the incentive for legislators to turn that policy on the floor (Santos and Almeida, 2009; Martin, 2000). In an increasingly extensive and supervisory way, adding information to the policies formulated by the Executive (Almeida & Santos, 2008)