Variations of the secretary problem via Game Theory and Linear Programming

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: de Carvalho, Melissa
Data de Publicação: 2008
Outros Autores: Chaves, Lucas Monteiro, Silva, Ricardo Martins de Abreu
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: INFOCOMP: Jornal de Ciência da Computação
Texto Completo: https://infocomp.dcc.ufla.br/index.php/infocomp/article/view/232
Resumo: This paper presents models for three variants of the secretary problem based on a strategic form of zero-sum finite games for two players. Based on the minimax theorem for finite games, the problem of maximizing the minimum average payoff of a player, in spite of the strategies of the other player, is represented by a linear programming model, which solution using the simplex method presents not only one optimum strategy to the player, but validates some strategies also as optimal.
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spelling Variations of the secretary problem via Game Theory and Linear ProgrammingSecretary Problem. Game Theory. Linear Programming.This paper presents models for three variants of the secretary problem based on a strategic form of zero-sum finite games for two players. Based on the minimax theorem for finite games, the problem of maximizing the minimum average payoff of a player, in spite of the strategies of the other player, is represented by a linear programming model, which solution using the simplex method presents not only one optimum strategy to the player, but validates some strategies also as optimal.Editora da UFLA2008-09-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://infocomp.dcc.ufla.br/index.php/infocomp/article/view/232INFOCOMP Journal of Computer Science; Vol. 7 No. 3 (2008): September, 2008; 78-821982-33631807-4545reponame:INFOCOMP: Jornal de Ciência da Computaçãoinstname:Universidade Federal de Lavras (UFLA)instacron:UFLAenghttps://infocomp.dcc.ufla.br/index.php/infocomp/article/view/232/217Copyright (c) 2016 INFOCOMP Journal of Computer Scienceinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessde Carvalho, MelissaChaves, Lucas MonteiroSilva, Ricardo Martins de Abreu2015-07-01T12:32:20Zoai:infocomp.dcc.ufla.br:article/232Revistahttps://infocomp.dcc.ufla.br/index.php/infocompPUBhttps://infocomp.dcc.ufla.br/index.php/infocomp/oaiinfocomp@dcc.ufla.br||apfreire@dcc.ufla.br1982-33631807-4545opendoar:2024-05-21T19:54:26.184276INFOCOMP: Jornal de Ciência da Computação - Universidade Federal de Lavras (UFLA)true
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Variations of the secretary problem via Game Theory and Linear Programming
title Variations of the secretary problem via Game Theory and Linear Programming
spellingShingle Variations of the secretary problem via Game Theory and Linear Programming
de Carvalho, Melissa
Secretary Problem. Game Theory. Linear Programming.
title_short Variations of the secretary problem via Game Theory and Linear Programming
title_full Variations of the secretary problem via Game Theory and Linear Programming
title_fullStr Variations of the secretary problem via Game Theory and Linear Programming
title_full_unstemmed Variations of the secretary problem via Game Theory and Linear Programming
title_sort Variations of the secretary problem via Game Theory and Linear Programming
author de Carvalho, Melissa
author_facet de Carvalho, Melissa
Chaves, Lucas Monteiro
Silva, Ricardo Martins de Abreu
author_role author
author2 Chaves, Lucas Monteiro
Silva, Ricardo Martins de Abreu
author2_role author
author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv de Carvalho, Melissa
Chaves, Lucas Monteiro
Silva, Ricardo Martins de Abreu
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Secretary Problem. Game Theory. Linear Programming.
topic Secretary Problem. Game Theory. Linear Programming.
description This paper presents models for three variants of the secretary problem based on a strategic form of zero-sum finite games for two players. Based on the minimax theorem for finite games, the problem of maximizing the minimum average payoff of a player, in spite of the strategies of the other player, is represented by a linear programming model, which solution using the simplex method presents not only one optimum strategy to the player, but validates some strategies also as optimal.
publishDate 2008
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2008-09-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://infocomp.dcc.ufla.br/index.php/infocomp/article/view/232
url https://infocomp.dcc.ufla.br/index.php/infocomp/article/view/232
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://infocomp.dcc.ufla.br/index.php/infocomp/article/view/232/217
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2016 INFOCOMP Journal of Computer Science
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2016 INFOCOMP Journal of Computer Science
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Editora da UFLA
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Editora da UFLA
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv INFOCOMP Journal of Computer Science; Vol. 7 No. 3 (2008): September, 2008; 78-82
1982-3363
1807-4545
reponame:INFOCOMP: Jornal de Ciência da Computação
instname:Universidade Federal de Lavras (UFLA)
instacron:UFLA
instname_str Universidade Federal de Lavras (UFLA)
instacron_str UFLA
institution UFLA
reponame_str INFOCOMP: Jornal de Ciência da Computação
collection INFOCOMP: Jornal de Ciência da Computação
repository.name.fl_str_mv INFOCOMP: Jornal de Ciência da Computação - Universidade Federal de Lavras (UFLA)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv infocomp@dcc.ufla.br||apfreire@dcc.ufla.br
_version_ 1799874740839514112

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