Artificiality and insufficiency of Kant's classification regarding theistics arguments

• Autor(a) principal: Souza, Luís Eduardo Ramos de
• Data de Publicação: 2024
• Outros Autores: Santos, Arthur Henrique Soares dos
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Aufklärung (João Pessoa. Online)
• Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufpb.br/index.php/arf/article/view/67634
• topic: ontological argument; cosmological argument; physical-theological argument; Kant; argumento ontológico; argumento cosmológico; argumento físico-teológico; Kant

In the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason (1787), Kant argues for the impossibility of theistic arguments, namely the ontological, cosmological, and physico-theological arguments. However, his objection relies on his classification of theistic arguments, which has been criticized by analytical philosophers of religion such as Plantinga (2012) and Swinburne (2019). Therefore, this paper aims to critically investigate two problems related to this classification: the systematic criteria of its classification and the historical sufficiency of its three theistic proofs. Regarding the first problem, it will be argued that it is possible to recognize a certain systematic artificiality in Kant's classification of theistic proofs, given the criticisms of Strawson (1966) and Hegel (1812, 1830), as well as the internal critique developed by the authors of this work. Regarding the second problem, it will be argued that it is possible to indicate a certain historical insufficiency in Kant's classification of the three theistic proofs, based on brief critiques focused on some classical theologians such as Anselm, Aquinas, and Al-Ghazali. Finally, once it is justified that Kant's objection depends on this possibly artificial and insufficient classification, it will be briefly indicated that Kant does not seem as justified as he intended in his objection to theistic arguments.