A modal-causal argument for a concrete necessary object

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Alvarado, José Tomás
Data de Publicação: 2022
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8668929
Resumo: Suppose that it is metaphysically possible that the mereological fusion of all contingent states of affairs has a cause. Whatever the nature of the state of affairs that causes such mereological fusion, it should be metaphysically necessary because, otherwise, it could be part of the mereological fusion it causes. It is possible, then, that there is at least one necessary state of affairs. This state of affairs is a causal relatum, so it must include at least one concrete necessary object. But if something is possibly necessary, then it is necessary because it is not metaphysically contingent whether something is necessary or doesn't. Then, it results that it is metaphysically necessary that there is, at least, a concrete necessary object. This work presents and discusses this argument.
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spelling A modal-causal argument for a concrete necessary objectCosmological argumentOntological argumentCausationModalitySuppose that it is metaphysically possible that the mereological fusion of all contingent states of affairs has a cause. Whatever the nature of the state of affairs that causes such mereological fusion, it should be metaphysically necessary because, otherwise, it could be part of the mereological fusion it causes. It is possible, then, that there is at least one necessary state of affairs. This state of affairs is a causal relatum, so it must include at least one concrete necessary object. But if something is possibly necessary, then it is necessary because it is not metaphysically contingent whether something is necessary or doesn't. Then, it results that it is metaphysically necessary that there is, at least, a concrete necessary object. This work presents and discusses this argument.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2022-04-05info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/otherapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8668929Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 44 n. 4 (2021): out./dez.; 374-417Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 44 No. 4 (2021): out./dez.; 374-417Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 44 Núm. 4 (2021): out./dez.; 374-4172317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8668929/28260Brazil; ContemporaryCopyright (c) 2021 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofiahttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessAlvarado, José Tomás 2022-04-05T17:14:15Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8668929Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2022-04-05T17:14:15Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv A modal-causal argument for a concrete necessary object
title A modal-causal argument for a concrete necessary object
spellingShingle A modal-causal argument for a concrete necessary object
Alvarado, José Tomás
Cosmological argument
Ontological argument
Causation
Modality
title_short A modal-causal argument for a concrete necessary object
title_full A modal-causal argument for a concrete necessary object
title_fullStr A modal-causal argument for a concrete necessary object
title_full_unstemmed A modal-causal argument for a concrete necessary object
title_sort A modal-causal argument for a concrete necessary object
author Alvarado, José Tomás
author_facet Alvarado, José Tomás
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Alvarado, José Tomás
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Cosmological argument
Ontological argument
Causation
Modality
topic Cosmological argument
Ontological argument
Causation
Modality
description Suppose that it is metaphysically possible that the mereological fusion of all contingent states of affairs has a cause. Whatever the nature of the state of affairs that causes such mereological fusion, it should be metaphysically necessary because, otherwise, it could be part of the mereological fusion it causes. It is possible, then, that there is at least one necessary state of affairs. This state of affairs is a causal relatum, so it must include at least one concrete necessary object. But if something is possibly necessary, then it is necessary because it is not metaphysically contingent whether something is necessary or doesn't. Then, it results that it is metaphysically necessary that there is, at least, a concrete necessary object. This work presents and discusses this argument.
publishDate 2022
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2022-04-05
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
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dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8668929
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dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8668929/28260
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv Brazil; Contemporary
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 44 n. 4 (2021): out./dez.; 374-417
Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 44 No. 4 (2021): out./dez.; 374-417
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 44 Núm. 4 (2021): out./dez.; 374-417
2317-630X
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