A modal-causal argument for a concrete necessary object
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2022 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8668929 |
Resumo: | Suppose that it is metaphysically possible that the mereological fusion of all contingent states of affairs has a cause. Whatever the nature of the state of affairs that causes such mereological fusion, it should be metaphysically necessary because, otherwise, it could be part of the mereological fusion it causes. It is possible, then, that there is at least one necessary state of affairs. This state of affairs is a causal relatum, so it must include at least one concrete necessary object. But if something is possibly necessary, then it is necessary because it is not metaphysically contingent whether something is necessary or doesn't. Then, it results that it is metaphysically necessary that there is, at least, a concrete necessary object. This work presents and discusses this argument. |
id |
UNICAMP-17_f343e9fd7abf44195da2e2ddbfc6b626 |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8668929 |
network_acronym_str |
UNICAMP-17 |
network_name_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository_id_str |
|
spelling |
A modal-causal argument for a concrete necessary objectCosmological argumentOntological argumentCausationModalitySuppose that it is metaphysically possible that the mereological fusion of all contingent states of affairs has a cause. Whatever the nature of the state of affairs that causes such mereological fusion, it should be metaphysically necessary because, otherwise, it could be part of the mereological fusion it causes. It is possible, then, that there is at least one necessary state of affairs. This state of affairs is a causal relatum, so it must include at least one concrete necessary object. But if something is possibly necessary, then it is necessary because it is not metaphysically contingent whether something is necessary or doesn't. Then, it results that it is metaphysically necessary that there is, at least, a concrete necessary object. This work presents and discusses this argument.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2022-04-05info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/otherapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8668929Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 44 n. 4 (2021): out./dez.; 374-417Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 44 No. 4 (2021): out./dez.; 374-417Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 44 Núm. 4 (2021): out./dez.; 374-4172317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8668929/28260Brazil; ContemporaryCopyright (c) 2021 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofiahttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessAlvarado, José Tomás 2022-04-05T17:14:15Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8668929Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2022-04-05T17:14:15Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
A modal-causal argument for a concrete necessary object |
title |
A modal-causal argument for a concrete necessary object |
spellingShingle |
A modal-causal argument for a concrete necessary object Alvarado, José Tomás Cosmological argument Ontological argument Causation Modality |
title_short |
A modal-causal argument for a concrete necessary object |
title_full |
A modal-causal argument for a concrete necessary object |
title_fullStr |
A modal-causal argument for a concrete necessary object |
title_full_unstemmed |
A modal-causal argument for a concrete necessary object |
title_sort |
A modal-causal argument for a concrete necessary object |
author |
Alvarado, José Tomás |
author_facet |
Alvarado, José Tomás |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Alvarado, José Tomás |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Cosmological argument Ontological argument Causation Modality |
topic |
Cosmological argument Ontological argument Causation Modality |
description |
Suppose that it is metaphysically possible that the mereological fusion of all contingent states of affairs has a cause. Whatever the nature of the state of affairs that causes such mereological fusion, it should be metaphysically necessary because, otherwise, it could be part of the mereological fusion it causes. It is possible, then, that there is at least one necessary state of affairs. This state of affairs is a causal relatum, so it must include at least one concrete necessary object. But if something is possibly necessary, then it is necessary because it is not metaphysically contingent whether something is necessary or doesn't. Then, it results that it is metaphysically necessary that there is, at least, a concrete necessary object. This work presents and discusses this argument. |
publishDate |
2022 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2022-04-05 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion info:eu-repo/semantics/other |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8668929 |
url |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8668929 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8668929/28260 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv |
Brazil; Contemporary |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 44 n. 4 (2021): out./dez.; 374-417 Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 44 No. 4 (2021): out./dez.; 374-417 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 44 Núm. 4 (2021): out./dez.; 374-417 2317-630X reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
_version_ |
1800216568115757056 |