A MODAL-CAUSAL ARGUMENT FOR A CONCRETE NECESSARY OBJECT

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: ALVARADO,JOSÉ TOMÁS
Data de Publicação: 2021
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
Texto Completo: http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452021000400374
Resumo: Abstract Suppose that it is metaphysically possible that the mereological fusion of all contingent states of affairs has a cause. Whatever the nature of the state of affairs that causes such mereological fusion, it should be metaphysically necessary because, otherwise, it could be part of the mereological fusion it causes. It is possible, then, that there is at least one necessary state of affairs. This state of affairs is a causal relatum, so it must include at least one concrete necessary object. But if something is possibly necessary, then it is necessary because it is not metaphysically contingent whether something is necessary or doesn't. Then, it results that it is metaphysically necessary that there is, at least, a concrete necessary object. This work presents and discusses this argument.
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spelling A MODAL-CAUSAL ARGUMENT FOR A CONCRETE NECESSARY OBJECTCosmological ArgumentOntological ArgumentCausationModalityAbstract Suppose that it is metaphysically possible that the mereological fusion of all contingent states of affairs has a cause. Whatever the nature of the state of affairs that causes such mereological fusion, it should be metaphysically necessary because, otherwise, it could be part of the mereological fusion it causes. It is possible, then, that there is at least one necessary state of affairs. This state of affairs is a causal relatum, so it must include at least one concrete necessary object. But if something is possibly necessary, then it is necessary because it is not metaphysically contingent whether something is necessary or doesn't. Then, it results that it is metaphysically necessary that there is, at least, a concrete necessary object. This work presents and discusses this argument.UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência2021-12-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452021000400374Manuscrito v.44 n.4 2021reponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMP10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n4.jainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessALVARADO,JOSÉ TOMÁSeng2021-12-08T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S0100-60452021000400374Revistahttp://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_serial&pid=0100-6045&lng=pt&nrm=isoPUBhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.phpmwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2021-12-08T00:00Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv A MODAL-CAUSAL ARGUMENT FOR A CONCRETE NECESSARY OBJECT
title A MODAL-CAUSAL ARGUMENT FOR A CONCRETE NECESSARY OBJECT
spellingShingle A MODAL-CAUSAL ARGUMENT FOR A CONCRETE NECESSARY OBJECT
ALVARADO,JOSÉ TOMÁS
Cosmological Argument
Ontological Argument
Causation
Modality
title_short A MODAL-CAUSAL ARGUMENT FOR A CONCRETE NECESSARY OBJECT
title_full A MODAL-CAUSAL ARGUMENT FOR A CONCRETE NECESSARY OBJECT
title_fullStr A MODAL-CAUSAL ARGUMENT FOR A CONCRETE NECESSARY OBJECT
title_full_unstemmed A MODAL-CAUSAL ARGUMENT FOR A CONCRETE NECESSARY OBJECT
title_sort A MODAL-CAUSAL ARGUMENT FOR A CONCRETE NECESSARY OBJECT
author ALVARADO,JOSÉ TOMÁS
author_facet ALVARADO,JOSÉ TOMÁS
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv ALVARADO,JOSÉ TOMÁS
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Cosmological Argument
Ontological Argument
Causation
Modality
topic Cosmological Argument
Ontological Argument
Causation
Modality
description Abstract Suppose that it is metaphysically possible that the mereological fusion of all contingent states of affairs has a cause. Whatever the nature of the state of affairs that causes such mereological fusion, it should be metaphysically necessary because, otherwise, it could be part of the mereological fusion it causes. It is possible, then, that there is at least one necessary state of affairs. This state of affairs is a causal relatum, so it must include at least one concrete necessary object. But if something is possibly necessary, then it is necessary because it is not metaphysically contingent whether something is necessary or doesn't. Then, it results that it is metaphysically necessary that there is, at least, a concrete necessary object. This work presents and discusses this argument.
publishDate 2021
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2021-12-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452021000400374
url http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452021000400374
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n4.ja
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv text/html
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência
publisher.none.fl_str_mv UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Manuscrito v.44 n.4 2021
reponame:Manuscrito (Online)
instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron:UNICAMP
instname_str Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron_str UNICAMP
institution UNICAMP
reponame_str Manuscrito (Online)
collection Manuscrito (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br
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