Remedios para el vértigo
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2006 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Institucional da UFRGS |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10183/185148 |
Resumo: | General agreement with Carlos Pereda’s approach to the issues surrounding the so-called “first person perspective” is qualified in three respects. First, it is suggested that consciousness of one’s own identity as persisting in time is a language-independent capacity, and that philosophical discussions of self-consciousness would gain in perspicuousness by taking that explicitly into account. Second, a qualm is expressed about the significance of arguments from inconceivability, specifically as they feature in Pereda’s discussion of what he describes as three sorts of “vertiginous reasoning” prompted by philosophical perplexity about the self. Third, it is suggested that the view of personal identity as being at least in part a construction (as in what is often called “narrativism”) is an inescapable consequence of the acknowledgment that the intentional content of an action is essentially description-relative. |
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Faria, Paulo Francisco Estrella2018-11-28T02:45:27Z20060185-2450http://hdl.handle.net/10183/185148000646188General agreement with Carlos Pereda’s approach to the issues surrounding the so-called “first person perspective” is qualified in three respects. First, it is suggested that consciousness of one’s own identity as persisting in time is a language-independent capacity, and that philosophical discussions of self-consciousness would gain in perspicuousness by taking that explicitly into account. Second, a qualm is expressed about the significance of arguments from inconceivability, specifically as they feature in Pereda’s discussion of what he describes as three sorts of “vertiginous reasoning” prompted by philosophical perplexity about the self. Third, it is suggested that the view of personal identity as being at least in part a construction (as in what is often called “narrativism”) is an inescapable consequence of the acknowledgment that the intentional content of an action is essentially description-relative.El acuerdo del autor con el enfoque de Carlos Pereda sobre las cuestiones que rodean a la llamada “perspectiva de primera persona” se matiza aquí señalando diferencias en tres aspectos. En primer lugar se plantea que la conciencia de la propia identidad como conciencia de algo que persiste a través del tiempo es una capacidad independiente del lenguaje, y que las discusiones filosóficas de la autoconciencia se volverían más perspicuas si explícitamente lo tomaran en cuenta. En segundo, se expresa una duda acerca de la significación de los argumentos basados en lo inconcebible, específicamente tal como aparecen en la discusión de Pereda sobre lo que él describe como tres especies de “razonamientos vertiginosos” provocados por la perplejidad filosófica con respecto al yo. En tercer lugar se plantea que la idea de la identidad personal como algo que por lo menos en parte es una construcción (como en lo que a menudo se llama “narrativismo”) constituye una consecuencia ineludible del reconocimiento de que el contenido intencional de una acción está relacionado esencialmente con su descripción.application/pdfporDianoia : anuario de filosofia. Mexico, D.F. Vol. 51, n. 57 (Nov. 2006), p. 173-188Identidade pessoalAutoconsciênciaSelf-consciousnessPersonal identityIntentionalityAutoconcienciaIdentidad personalIntencionalidadRemedios para el vértigoEstrangeiroinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Institucional da UFRGSinstname:Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS)instacron:UFRGSTEXT000646188.pdf.txt000646188.pdf.txtExtracted Texttext/plain43239http://www.lume.ufrgs.br/bitstream/10183/185148/2/000646188.pdf.txt021e6ff0e024e8dc90c4fe5b79f977eaMD52ORIGINAL000646188.pdfTexto completo (espanhol)application/pdf148221http://www.lume.ufrgs.br/bitstream/10183/185148/1/000646188.pdf107050af028d8e30832f6ca978e87b55MD5110183/1851482018-11-29 02:46:23.825539oai:www.lume.ufrgs.br:10183/185148Repositório de PublicaçõesPUBhttps://lume.ufrgs.br/oai/requestopendoar:2018-11-29T04:46:23Repositório Institucional da UFRGS - Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS)false |
dc.title.pt_BR.fl_str_mv |
Remedios para el vértigo |
title |
Remedios para el vértigo |
spellingShingle |
Remedios para el vértigo Faria, Paulo Francisco Estrella Identidade pessoal Autoconsciência Self-consciousness Personal identity Intentionality Autoconciencia Identidad personal Intencionalidad |
title_short |
Remedios para el vértigo |
title_full |
Remedios para el vértigo |
title_fullStr |
Remedios para el vértigo |
title_full_unstemmed |
Remedios para el vértigo |
title_sort |
Remedios para el vértigo |
author |
Faria, Paulo Francisco Estrella |
author_facet |
Faria, Paulo Francisco Estrella |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Faria, Paulo Francisco Estrella |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Identidade pessoal Autoconsciência |
topic |
Identidade pessoal Autoconsciência Self-consciousness Personal identity Intentionality Autoconciencia Identidad personal Intencionalidad |
dc.subject.eng.fl_str_mv |
Self-consciousness Personal identity Intentionality |
dc.subject.spa.fl_str_mv |
Autoconciencia Identidad personal Intencionalidad |
description |
General agreement with Carlos Pereda’s approach to the issues surrounding the so-called “first person perspective” is qualified in three respects. First, it is suggested that consciousness of one’s own identity as persisting in time is a language-independent capacity, and that philosophical discussions of self-consciousness would gain in perspicuousness by taking that explicitly into account. Second, a qualm is expressed about the significance of arguments from inconceivability, specifically as they feature in Pereda’s discussion of what he describes as three sorts of “vertiginous reasoning” prompted by philosophical perplexity about the self. Third, it is suggested that the view of personal identity as being at least in part a construction (as in what is often called “narrativism”) is an inescapable consequence of the acknowledgment that the intentional content of an action is essentially description-relative. |
publishDate |
2006 |
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv |
2006 |
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2018-11-28T02:45:27Z |
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http://hdl.handle.net/10183/185148 |
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Dianoia : anuario de filosofia. Mexico, D.F. Vol. 51, n. 57 (Nov. 2006), p. 173-188 |
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