Five Challenges for Theories of Law

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Lima, Flávio
Data de Publicação: 2019
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Teoria Jurídica Contemporânea
Texto Completo: https://revistas.ufrj.br/index.php/rjur/article/view/19655
Resumo: RESUMO:Neste artigo, enuncio cinco desafios intuitivos a serem enfrentados por uma teoria do direito. Na sequência, argumento que a ideia tipicamente positivista de que as atribuições jurídicas possam estar assentadas exclusivamente em fatos descritivos parece conflitar com três deles. Concluo, assim, que a despeito de tanto o interpretativismo quanto o descritivismo serem nalguma medida teorias contraintuitivas, é sobre o segundo que recai um maior ônus argumentativo.  ABSTRACT:In this paper, I introduce five intuitive challenges that should be dealt with by theories of law. Then, I argue that the typically positivist idea that the legal ascriptions of a given legal system may be grounded exclusively on descriptive facts seems to conflict with three of those challenges. I conclude that in spite of the fact that both interpretivism and descriptivism are counterintuitive theories about law, it is the latter that has a greater argumentative burden. 
id UFRJ-22_86f6cd5c2ae26badffcee7ac351801e6
oai_identifier_str oai:www.revistas.ufrj.br:article/19655
network_acronym_str UFRJ-22
network_name_str Teoria Jurídica Contemporânea
repository_id_str
spelling Five Challenges for Theories of LawCinco desafios para uma teoria do direitoGrounding; Supervenience; Law as factGrounding; Superveniência; Direito como fatoRESUMO:Neste artigo, enuncio cinco desafios intuitivos a serem enfrentados por uma teoria do direito. Na sequência, argumento que a ideia tipicamente positivista de que as atribuições jurídicas possam estar assentadas exclusivamente em fatos descritivos parece conflitar com três deles. Concluo, assim, que a despeito de tanto o interpretativismo quanto o descritivismo serem nalguma medida teorias contraintuitivas, é sobre o segundo que recai um maior ônus argumentativo.  ABSTRACT:In this paper, I introduce five intuitive challenges that should be dealt with by theories of law. Then, I argue that the typically positivist idea that the legal ascriptions of a given legal system may be grounded exclusively on descriptive facts seems to conflict with three of those challenges. I conclude that in spite of the fact that both interpretivism and descriptivism are counterintuitive theories about law, it is the latter that has a greater argumentative burden. RESUMO:Neste artigo, enuncio cinco desafios intuitivos a serem enfrentados por uma teoria do direito. Na sequência, argumento que a ideia tipicamente positivista de que as atribuições jurídicas possam estar assentadas exclusivamente em fatos descritivos parece conflitar com três deles. Concluo, assim, que a despeito de tanto o interpretativismo quanto o descritivismo serem nalguma medida teorias contraintuitivas, é sobre o segundo que recai um maior ônus argumentativo.  ABSTRACT:In this paper, I introduce five intuitive challenges that should be dealt with by theories of law. Then, I argue that the typically positivist idea that the legal ascriptions of a given legal system may be grounded exclusively on descriptive facts seems to conflict with three of those challenges. I conclude that in spite of the fact that both interpretivism and descriptivism are counterintuitive theories about law, it is the latter that has a greater argumentative burden. Programa de Posgrado en Derecho de la Universidad Federal de Rio de JaneiroLima, Flávio2019-05-20info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionAvaliado pelos paresapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.ufrj.br/index.php/rjur/article/view/1965510.21875/tjc.v3i2.19655Teoria Jurídica Contemporânea; v. 3, n. 2 (2018); 49-72Teoria Jurídica Contemporânea; v. 3, n. 2 (2018); 49-72Teoria Jurídica Contemporânea; v. 3, n. 2 (2018); 49-722526-046410.21875/tjc.v3i2reponame:Teoria Jurídica Contemporâneainstname:Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ)instacron:UFRJporhttps://revistas.ufrj.br/index.php/rjur/article/view/19655/13809/*ref*/BENNETT, K. Making Things Up. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017./*ref*/BROZEK, B.; ROTOLO, A.; STELMACH, J. (ed.). Supervenience and Normativity. Switzerland: Springer, 2017. DICKSON, J. Evaluation and Legal Theory. Oxford: Hart, 2001./*ref*/DWORKIN, R. Law’s Empire. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1986./*ref*/GREENBERG, M. How facts make law. Legal Theory, Cambrige, n. 10, 2004, p. 157–98./*ref*/JACKSON, F. From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defense of Conceptual Analysis. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998./*ref*/JACKSON, F. 2017. In Defense of Reductionism in Ethics. In: SINGER, P. (ed.). Does Anything Really Matter? Essays on Parfit on Objectivity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 195–211./*ref*/HART, H. L. A. The Concept of Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994./*ref*/KIM, J. Postscripts on Supervenience. In Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 161-171./*ref*/LIMA, F. On the-Law Property Ascriptions to the Facts. Ratio Juris: An International Journal of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, v. 31, n. 2, 2018, p. 231-50./*ref*/PLUNKET, D. A Positive Route For Explaining How Facts Make Law. Legal Theory, n.18, 2012, p. 139-207./*ref*/RAZ, J. Kelsen’s Theory of the Basic Norm. American Journal of Jurisprudence, v.19, n. 1, 1974, p. 94-111./*ref*/RAZ, J. Between Authority and Interpretation: On the Theory of Law and Practical Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009./*ref*/ROSEN, G. Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction. In: HALE, B. HOFFMAN, A (ed.). Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, p.109-136./*ref*/SCHAUER, F. Law as a Malleable Artifact. In: BURAZIN, L. HIMMA. K. ROVERSI. C (ed.). Law as an Artifact. Oxford: Oxford university Press, 2018, p. 29-43./*ref*/SHAPIRO, S. J. The “Hart-Dworkin” Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed. University of Michigan Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper, n. 77, 2007. Disponível em: https://doi. org/10.2139/ssrn.968657./*ref*/SHAPIRO, S. J. What Is Law (and Why Should We Care)? In: Legality. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 2011./*ref*/TAMANAHA, B. Necessary and Universal Truths about Law? Ratio Juris: An International Journal of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, v. 30, n. 1, 2017, p. 3-24./*ref*/TROGDON, K. An Introduction to Grounding. In: Varieties of Dependence. In: HOELTJE, M., SCHNIEDER, B. STEINBERG, A. (ed.). Philosophia Verlag, 2013, p. 97-122.Direitos autorais 2019 Flávio Limainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2019-05-21T02:23:55Zoai:www.revistas.ufrj.br:article/19655Revistahttps://revistas.ufrj.br/index.php/rjur/indexPUBhttps://revistas.ufrj.br/index.php/rjur/oaitjc.ppgd.ufrj@gmail.com || rodrigocarelli@direito.ufrj.br || maysasdeandrade@gmail.com2526-04642526-0464opendoar:2019-05-21T02:23:55Teoria Jurídica Contemporânea - Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Five Challenges for Theories of Law
Cinco desafios para uma teoria do direito
title Five Challenges for Theories of Law
spellingShingle Five Challenges for Theories of Law
Lima, Flávio
Grounding; Supervenience; Law as fact
Grounding; Superveniência; Direito como fato
title_short Five Challenges for Theories of Law
title_full Five Challenges for Theories of Law
title_fullStr Five Challenges for Theories of Law
title_full_unstemmed Five Challenges for Theories of Law
title_sort Five Challenges for Theories of Law
author Lima, Flávio
author_facet Lima, Flávio
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv

dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Lima, Flávio
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv



dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Grounding; Supervenience; Law as fact
Grounding; Superveniência; Direito como fato
topic Grounding; Supervenience; Law as fact
Grounding; Superveniência; Direito como fato
description RESUMO:Neste artigo, enuncio cinco desafios intuitivos a serem enfrentados por uma teoria do direito. Na sequência, argumento que a ideia tipicamente positivista de que as atribuições jurídicas possam estar assentadas exclusivamente em fatos descritivos parece conflitar com três deles. Concluo, assim, que a despeito de tanto o interpretativismo quanto o descritivismo serem nalguma medida teorias contraintuitivas, é sobre o segundo que recai um maior ônus argumentativo.  ABSTRACT:In this paper, I introduce five intuitive challenges that should be dealt with by theories of law. Then, I argue that the typically positivist idea that the legal ascriptions of a given legal system may be grounded exclusively on descriptive facts seems to conflict with three of those challenges. I conclude that in spite of the fact that both interpretivism and descriptivism are counterintuitive theories about law, it is the latter that has a greater argumentative burden. 
publishDate 2019
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2019-05-20
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Avaliado pelos pares
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://revistas.ufrj.br/index.php/rjur/article/view/19655
10.21875/tjc.v3i2.19655
url https://revistas.ufrj.br/index.php/rjur/article/view/19655
identifier_str_mv 10.21875/tjc.v3i2.19655
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://revistas.ufrj.br/index.php/rjur/article/view/19655/13809
/*ref*/BENNETT, K. Making Things Up. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
/*ref*/BROZEK, B.; ROTOLO, A.; STELMACH, J. (ed.). Supervenience and Normativity. Switzerland: Springer, 2017. DICKSON, J. Evaluation and Legal Theory. Oxford: Hart, 2001.
/*ref*/DWORKIN, R. Law’s Empire. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1986.
/*ref*/GREENBERG, M. How facts make law. Legal Theory, Cambrige, n. 10, 2004, p. 157–98.
/*ref*/JACKSON, F. From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defense of Conceptual Analysis. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.
/*ref*/JACKSON, F. 2017. In Defense of Reductionism in Ethics. In: SINGER, P. (ed.). Does Anything Really Matter? Essays on Parfit on Objectivity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 195–211.
/*ref*/HART, H. L. A. The Concept of Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.
/*ref*/KIM, J. Postscripts on Supervenience. In Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 161-171.
/*ref*/LIMA, F. On the-Law Property Ascriptions to the Facts. Ratio Juris: An International Journal of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, v. 31, n. 2, 2018, p. 231-50.
/*ref*/PLUNKET, D. A Positive Route For Explaining How Facts Make Law. Legal Theory, n.18, 2012, p. 139-207.
/*ref*/RAZ, J. Kelsen’s Theory of the Basic Norm. American Journal of Jurisprudence, v.19, n. 1, 1974, p. 94-111.
/*ref*/RAZ, J. Between Authority and Interpretation: On the Theory of Law and Practical Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
/*ref*/ROSEN, G. Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction. In: HALE, B. HOFFMAN, A (ed.). Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, p.109-136.
/*ref*/SCHAUER, F. Law as a Malleable Artifact. In: BURAZIN, L. HIMMA. K. ROVERSI. C (ed.). Law as an Artifact. Oxford: Oxford university Press, 2018, p. 29-43.
/*ref*/SHAPIRO, S. J. The “Hart-Dworkin” Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed. University of Michigan Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper, n. 77, 2007. Disponível em: https://doi. org/10.2139/ssrn.968657.
/*ref*/SHAPIRO, S. J. What Is Law (and Why Should We Care)? In: Legality. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 2011.
/*ref*/TAMANAHA, B. Necessary and Universal Truths about Law? Ratio Juris: An International Journal of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, v. 30, n. 1, 2017, p. 3-24.
/*ref*/TROGDON, K. An Introduction to Grounding. In: Varieties of Dependence. In: HOELTJE, M., SCHNIEDER, B. STEINBERG, A. (ed.). Philosophia Verlag, 2013, p. 97-122.
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Direitos autorais 2019 Flávio Lima
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Direitos autorais 2019 Flávio Lima
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Programa de Posgrado en Derecho de la Universidad Federal de Rio de Janeiro
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Programa de Posgrado en Derecho de la Universidad Federal de Rio de Janeiro
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Teoria Jurídica Contemporânea; v. 3, n. 2 (2018); 49-72
Teoria Jurídica Contemporânea; v. 3, n. 2 (2018); 49-72
Teoria Jurídica Contemporânea; v. 3, n. 2 (2018); 49-72
2526-0464
10.21875/tjc.v3i2
reponame:Teoria Jurídica Contemporânea
instname:Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ)
instacron:UFRJ
instname_str Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ)
instacron_str UFRJ
institution UFRJ
reponame_str Teoria Jurídica Contemporânea
collection Teoria Jurídica Contemporânea
repository.name.fl_str_mv Teoria Jurídica Contemporânea - Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv tjc.ppgd.ufrj@gmail.com || rodrigocarelli@direito.ufrj.br || maysasdeandrade@gmail.com
_version_ 1797042348500189184

Registros relacionados