A relação mente-corpo: entre o dualismo substancial e o monismo reducionista

• Autor(a) principal: Alves, Marcos Antonio
• Data de Publicação: 2023
• Outros Autores: Almeida, Heder da Silva
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Princípios (Natal. Online)
• Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/29573
• topic: Mind-body problem; Substantial dualism; Reductionism; Thomas Nagel; Dual Aspect Theory; Relação mente-corpo; Dualismo substancial; Reducionismo; Thomas Nagel; Teoria do aspecto dual

The problem of the mind-body relationship is part of the agenda of philosophy. In modern times, René Descartes was one of those who addressed the issue, with many supporters and critics. The French philosopher advocated a substantial dualistic approach, according to which the mind is something substantially distinct from the body. A contrary view is taken by reductionist physicalist views, according to which, in general, reality is, or can be, reduced to the physical. Both views are controversial. The Cartesian dualist, by asserting that the mind belongs to a metaphysical plane, cannot explain how it would be possible for an immaterial entity to interact with a material one. The physicalist perspective, by asserting that reality must be explained by physical concepts, often cannot account for subjective mental processes, on account of the difficulty of reducing them to physical terms. Another perspective, called dual aspect theory, aims to be a middle ground between physicalism and dualism. In this article, we analyze some of the main thought currents of the philosophy of mind, trying to present, in a simple way, how plural are the perspectives that deal with the same object of investigation, which is the mind.