A relação mente-corpo: entre o dualismo substancial e o monismo reducionista
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2023 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Princípios (Natal. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/29573 |
Resumo: | The problem of the mind-body relationship is part of the agenda of philosophy. In modern times, René Descartes was one of those who addressed the issue, with many supporters and critics. The French philosopher advocated a substantial dualistic approach, according to which the mind is something substantially distinct from the body. A contrary view is taken by reductionist physicalist views, according to which, in general, reality is, or can be, reduced to the physical. Both views are controversial. The Cartesian dualist, by asserting that the mind belongs to a metaphysical plane, cannot explain how it would be possible for an immaterial entity to interact with a material one. The physicalist perspective, by asserting that reality must be explained by physical concepts, often cannot account for subjective mental processes, on account of the difficulty of reducing them to physical terms. Another perspective, called dual aspect theory, aims to be a middle ground between physicalism and dualism. In this article, we analyze some of the main thought currents of the philosophy of mind, trying to present, in a simple way, how plural are the perspectives that deal with the same object of investigation, which is the mind. |
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A relação mente-corpo: entre o dualismo substancial e o monismo reducionistaMind-body problemSubstantial dualismReductionismThomas NagelDual Aspect TheoryRelação mente-corpoDualismo substancialReducionismoThomas NagelTeoria do aspecto dualThe problem of the mind-body relationship is part of the agenda of philosophy. In modern times, René Descartes was one of those who addressed the issue, with many supporters and critics. The French philosopher advocated a substantial dualistic approach, according to which the mind is something substantially distinct from the body. A contrary view is taken by reductionist physicalist views, according to which, in general, reality is, or can be, reduced to the physical. Both views are controversial. The Cartesian dualist, by asserting that the mind belongs to a metaphysical plane, cannot explain how it would be possible for an immaterial entity to interact with a material one. The physicalist perspective, by asserting that reality must be explained by physical concepts, often cannot account for subjective mental processes, on account of the difficulty of reducing them to physical terms. Another perspective, called dual aspect theory, aims to be a middle ground between physicalism and dualism. In this article, we analyze some of the main thought currents of the philosophy of mind, trying to present, in a simple way, how plural are the perspectives that deal with the same object of investigation, which is the mind.A relação mente-corpo é um dos problemas componentes da agenda da filosofia. Na modernidade, Renê Descartes foi um dos que trataram da questão, adquirindo bastantes adeptos e críticos. Ele defende uma abordagem dualista substancial, segundo a qual mente e corpo são entes substancialmente distintos. Uma visão oposta a essa é defendida pelas perspectivas fisicalistas reducionistas, segundo as quais, de modo geral, toda a realidade é ou pode ser reduzida, ontológica e/ou epistemologicamente ao físico, de modo a dissolver o problema da relação mente-corpo. Ambas as visões apresentam controvérsias. A dualista cartesiana, por afirmar que a mente pertence a um plano metafísico, não consegue explicar como seria possível a interação entre uma entidade imaterial e uma material. As de cunho fisicalista, com frequência, desconsideram processos mentais subjetivos, dada a dificuldade de sua redução aos termos físicos. Outra perspectiva explicativa do mental, denominada teoria do aspecto dual, pretende ser um meio termo entre os fisicalismos e o dualismo substancial. Analisamos algumas das principais correntes de pensamentos dentro da filosofia da mente buscando apresentar, de maneira simples, o quão plural são as perspectivas que tratam do mesmo objeto de pesquisa, qual, seja a mente, tratando em particular da relação entre a mente o corpo.EDUFRN2023-09-26info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionAvaliado pelos paresapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/2957310.21680/1983-2109.2023v30n62ID29573Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN); v. 30 n. 62 (2023): Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN)1983-21090104-869410.21680/1983-2109.2023v30n62reponame:Princípios (Natal. Online)instname:Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN)instacron:UFRNporhttps://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/29573/17505Copyright (c) 2023 Marcos Antonio Alves, Heder da Silva Almeidahttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessAlves, Marcos AntonioAlmeida, Heder da Silva2023-09-26T12:04:54Zoai:periodicos.ufrn.br:article/29573Revistahttps://periodicos.ufrn.br/principiosPUBhttps://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/oai||principios@cchla.ufrn.br1983-21090104-8694opendoar:2023-09-26T12:04:54Princípios (Natal. Online) - Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
A relação mente-corpo: entre o dualismo substancial e o monismo reducionista |
title |
A relação mente-corpo: entre o dualismo substancial e o monismo reducionista |
spellingShingle |
A relação mente-corpo: entre o dualismo substancial e o monismo reducionista Alves, Marcos Antonio Mind-body problem Substantial dualism Reductionism Thomas Nagel Dual Aspect Theory Relação mente-corpo Dualismo substancial Reducionismo Thomas Nagel Teoria do aspecto dual |
title_short |
A relação mente-corpo: entre o dualismo substancial e o monismo reducionista |
title_full |
A relação mente-corpo: entre o dualismo substancial e o monismo reducionista |
title_fullStr |
A relação mente-corpo: entre o dualismo substancial e o monismo reducionista |
title_full_unstemmed |
A relação mente-corpo: entre o dualismo substancial e o monismo reducionista |
title_sort |
A relação mente-corpo: entre o dualismo substancial e o monismo reducionista |
author |
Alves, Marcos Antonio |
author_facet |
Alves, Marcos Antonio Almeida, Heder da Silva |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Almeida, Heder da Silva |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Alves, Marcos Antonio Almeida, Heder da Silva |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Mind-body problem Substantial dualism Reductionism Thomas Nagel Dual Aspect Theory Relação mente-corpo Dualismo substancial Reducionismo Thomas Nagel Teoria do aspecto dual |
topic |
Mind-body problem Substantial dualism Reductionism Thomas Nagel Dual Aspect Theory Relação mente-corpo Dualismo substancial Reducionismo Thomas Nagel Teoria do aspecto dual |
description |
The problem of the mind-body relationship is part of the agenda of philosophy. In modern times, René Descartes was one of those who addressed the issue, with many supporters and critics. The French philosopher advocated a substantial dualistic approach, according to which the mind is something substantially distinct from the body. A contrary view is taken by reductionist physicalist views, according to which, in general, reality is, or can be, reduced to the physical. Both views are controversial. The Cartesian dualist, by asserting that the mind belongs to a metaphysical plane, cannot explain how it would be possible for an immaterial entity to interact with a material one. The physicalist perspective, by asserting that reality must be explained by physical concepts, often cannot account for subjective mental processes, on account of the difficulty of reducing them to physical terms. Another perspective, called dual aspect theory, aims to be a middle ground between physicalism and dualism. In this article, we analyze some of the main thought currents of the philosophy of mind, trying to present, in a simple way, how plural are the perspectives that deal with the same object of investigation, which is the mind. |
publishDate |
2023 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2023-09-26 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Avaliado pelos pares |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/29573 10.21680/1983-2109.2023v30n62ID29573 |
url |
https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/29573 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.21680/1983-2109.2023v30n62ID29573 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/29573/17505 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2023 Marcos Antonio Alves, Heder da Silva Almeida http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2023 Marcos Antonio Alves, Heder da Silva Almeida http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
EDUFRN |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
EDUFRN |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN); v. 30 n. 62 (2023): Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN) 1983-2109 0104-8694 10.21680/1983-2109.2023v30n62 reponame:Princípios (Natal. Online) instname:Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN) instacron:UFRN |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN) |
instacron_str |
UFRN |
institution |
UFRN |
reponame_str |
Princípios (Natal. Online) |
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Princípios (Natal. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Princípios (Natal. Online) - Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
||principios@cchla.ufrn.br |
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1799769976686510080 |