Abilism Ascendant?

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Meeker, Kevin
Data de Publicação: 2022
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2022.e80667
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/80667
Resumo: John Turri has recently called for a major shift in how the vast majority of philosophers think of knowledge. Instead of maintaining that knowledge must proceed from reliable processes, he urges epistemologists to move toward an “abilist” view that allows knowledge to proceed from abilities that are not truth-conducive. More strongly, he claims to have provided conclusive reasons for abandoning the idea that knowledge requires reliability. In this paper I explain why Turri has failed to make the case for preferring abilism.
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spelling Abilism Ascendant?Abilism Ascendant?abilismabductionachievementreliabilismvirtue epistemologyJohn Turri has recently called for a major shift in how the vast majority of philosophers think of knowledge. Instead of maintaining that knowledge must proceed from reliable processes, he urges epistemologists to move toward an “abilist” view that allows knowledge to proceed from abilities that are not truth-conducive. More strongly, he claims to have provided conclusive reasons for abandoning the idea that knowledge requires reliability. In this paper I explain why Turri has failed to make the case for preferring abilism.John Turri has recently called for a major shift in how the vast majority of philosophers think of knowledge. Instead of maintaining that knowledge must proceed from reliable processes, he urges epistemologists to move toward an “abilist” view that allows knowledge to proceed from abilities that are not truth-conducive. More strongly, he claims to have provided conclusive reasons for abandoning the idea that knowledge requires reliability. In this paper I explain why Turri has failed to make the case for preferring abilism.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2022-08-19info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/8066710.5007/1808-1711.2022.e80667Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 26 No. 2 (2022); 257–276Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 26 Núm. 2 (2022); 257–276Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 26 n. 2 (2022); 257–2761808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCenghttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/80667/51421Copyright (c) 2022 Kevin Meekerhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessMeeker, Kevin2023-09-01T16:22:07Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/80667Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2023-09-01T16:22:07Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Abilism Ascendant?
Abilism Ascendant?
title Abilism Ascendant?
spellingShingle Abilism Ascendant?
Abilism Ascendant?
Meeker, Kevin
abilism
abduction
achievement
reliabilism
virtue epistemology
Meeker, Kevin
abilism
abduction
achievement
reliabilism
virtue epistemology
title_short Abilism Ascendant?
title_full Abilism Ascendant?
title_fullStr Abilism Ascendant?
Abilism Ascendant?
title_full_unstemmed Abilism Ascendant?
Abilism Ascendant?
title_sort Abilism Ascendant?
author Meeker, Kevin
author_facet Meeker, Kevin
Meeker, Kevin
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Meeker, Kevin
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv abilism
abduction
achievement
reliabilism
virtue epistemology
topic abilism
abduction
achievement
reliabilism
virtue epistemology
description John Turri has recently called for a major shift in how the vast majority of philosophers think of knowledge. Instead of maintaining that knowledge must proceed from reliable processes, he urges epistemologists to move toward an “abilist” view that allows knowledge to proceed from abilities that are not truth-conducive. More strongly, he claims to have provided conclusive reasons for abandoning the idea that knowledge requires reliability. In this paper I explain why Turri has failed to make the case for preferring abilism.
publishDate 2022
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2022-08-19
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/80667
10.5007/1808-1711.2022.e80667
url https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/80667
identifier_str_mv 10.5007/1808-1711.2022.e80667
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/80667/51421
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2022 Kevin Meeker
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2022 Kevin Meeker
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 26 No. 2 (2022); 257–276
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 26 Núm. 2 (2022); 257–276
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 26 n. 2 (2022); 257–276
1808-1711
1414-4247
reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron:UFSC
instname_str Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron_str UFSC
institution UFSC
reponame_str Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
collection Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br
_version_ 1822179220956119040
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv 10.5007/1808-1711.2022.e80667

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