Humeanism and Exceptions in the Fundamental Laws of Physics
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2018 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2017v21n3p317 |
Resumo: | It has been argued that the fundamental laws of physics do not face a ‘problem of provisos’ equivalent to that found in other scientific disciplines (Earman, Roberts and Smith 2002) and there is only the appearance of exceptions to physical laws if they are confused with differential equations of evolution type (Smith 2002). In this paper I argue that even if this is true, fundamental laws in physics still pose a major challenge to standard Humean approaches to lawhood, as they are not in any obvious sense about regularities in behaviour. A Humean approach to physical laws with exceptions is possible, however, if we adopt a view of laws that takes them to be the algorithms in the algorithmic compressions of empirical data. When this is supplemented with a distinction between lossy and lossless compression, we can explain exceptions in terms of compression artefacts present in the application of the lossy laws. |
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Humeanism and Exceptions in the Fundamental Laws of PhysicsHumeanism and Exceptions in the Fundamental Laws of PhysicsIt has been argued that the fundamental laws of physics do not face a ‘problem of provisos’ equivalent to that found in other scientific disciplines (Earman, Roberts and Smith 2002) and there is only the appearance of exceptions to physical laws if they are confused with differential equations of evolution type (Smith 2002). In this paper I argue that even if this is true, fundamental laws in physics still pose a major challenge to standard Humean approaches to lawhood, as they are not in any obvious sense about regularities in behaviour. A Humean approach to physical laws with exceptions is possible, however, if we adopt a view of laws that takes them to be the algorithms in the algorithmic compressions of empirical data. When this is supplemented with a distinction between lossy and lossless compression, we can explain exceptions in terms of compression artefacts present in the application of the lossy laws.It has been argued that the fundamental laws of physics do not face a ‘problem of provisos’ equivalent to that found in other scientific disciplines (Earman, Roberts and Smith 2002) and there is only the appearance of exceptions to physical laws if they are confused with differential equations of evolution type (Smith 2002). In this paper I argue that even if this is true, fundamental laws in physics still pose a major challenge to standard Humean approaches to lawhood, as they are not in any obvious sense about regularities in behaviour. A Humean approach to physical laws with exceptions is possible, however, if we adopt a view of laws that takes them to be the algorithms in the algorithmic compressions of empirical data. When this is supplemented with a distinction between lossy and lossless compression, we can explain exceptions in terms of compression artefacts present in the application of the lossy laws.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2018-05-07info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2017v21n3p31710.5007/1808-1711.2017v21n3p317Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 21 No. 3 (2017); 317-337Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 21 Núm. 3 (2017); 317-337Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 21 n. 3 (2017); 317-3371808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCenghttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2017v21n3p317/pdfCopyright (c) 2021 Billy Wheelerinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessWheeler, Billy2018-05-07T14:02:03Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/51572Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2018-05-07T14:02:03Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Humeanism and Exceptions in the Fundamental Laws of Physics Humeanism and Exceptions in the Fundamental Laws of Physics |
title |
Humeanism and Exceptions in the Fundamental Laws of Physics |
spellingShingle |
Humeanism and Exceptions in the Fundamental Laws of Physics Wheeler, Billy |
title_short |
Humeanism and Exceptions in the Fundamental Laws of Physics |
title_full |
Humeanism and Exceptions in the Fundamental Laws of Physics |
title_fullStr |
Humeanism and Exceptions in the Fundamental Laws of Physics |
title_full_unstemmed |
Humeanism and Exceptions in the Fundamental Laws of Physics |
title_sort |
Humeanism and Exceptions in the Fundamental Laws of Physics |
author |
Wheeler, Billy |
author_facet |
Wheeler, Billy |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Wheeler, Billy |
description |
It has been argued that the fundamental laws of physics do not face a ‘problem of provisos’ equivalent to that found in other scientific disciplines (Earman, Roberts and Smith 2002) and there is only the appearance of exceptions to physical laws if they are confused with differential equations of evolution type (Smith 2002). In this paper I argue that even if this is true, fundamental laws in physics still pose a major challenge to standard Humean approaches to lawhood, as they are not in any obvious sense about regularities in behaviour. A Humean approach to physical laws with exceptions is possible, however, if we adopt a view of laws that takes them to be the algorithms in the algorithmic compressions of empirical data. When this is supplemented with a distinction between lossy and lossless compression, we can explain exceptions in terms of compression artefacts present in the application of the lossy laws. |
publishDate |
2018 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-05-07 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2017v21n3p317 10.5007/1808-1711.2017v21n3p317 |
url |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2017v21n3p317 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.5007/1808-1711.2017v21n3p317 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2017v21n3p317/pdf |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Billy Wheeler info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Billy Wheeler |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 21 No. 3 (2017); 317-337 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 21 Núm. 3 (2017); 317-337 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 21 n. 3 (2017); 317-337 1808-1711 1414-4247 reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) instacron:UFSC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
instacron_str |
UFSC |
institution |
UFSC |
reponame_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
collection |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br |
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1789435107632742400 |