El Bayesianismo y la Justificación de la Inducción
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2002 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/16955 |
Resumo: | The appearance of Bayesian inductive logic has prompted a renewed optimism about the possibility of justification of inductive rules The justifying argument for the 'rides of such a logic is the famous Dutch Book Argument (Ramsey-de Finetti’s theorem) The issue winch divides the theoreticians of induction concerns the question of whether this argument can indeed legitimize Bayesian conditionalization rides Here I will be firstly interested in showing that the Ramsey de Finetti's argument cannot establish that the use of the mentioned conditionalization rides is the best option against Dutch Book betting strategies except in special circum stances I suggest secondly that some presuppositions of the Ramsey de Finetti’s theorem (for instance, the principle of maximization of expected utility) themselves demand a justification. |
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El Bayesianismo y la Justificación de la InducciónEl Bayesianismo y la Justificación de la InducciónThe appearance of Bayesian inductive logic has prompted a renewed optimism about the possibility of justification of inductive rules The justifying argument for the 'rides of such a logic is the famous Dutch Book Argument (Ramsey-de Finetti’s theorem) The issue winch divides the theoreticians of induction concerns the question of whether this argument can indeed legitimize Bayesian conditionalization rides Here I will be firstly interested in showing that the Ramsey de Finetti's argument cannot establish that the use of the mentioned conditionalization rides is the best option against Dutch Book betting strategies except in special circum stances I suggest secondly that some presuppositions of the Ramsey de Finetti’s theorem (for instance, the principle of maximization of expected utility) themselves demand a justification.The appearance of Bayesicin inductive logic lias prompted a renewed op tirrusm about the posstbdity of justification of tnductwe rules The justifying argument for the 'rides of such a logic is the famous Dutch Book Argument (Ramsey-de Finettes theorent) The issue winch divides the theoreticians of induction concerns the question of whether this argument can indeed legitimize Bayesian conditmalization rides Here I will be firstly interested in showing that the Ramsey de Finetti's argument cannot establish that the use of the rnentioned conditionalization rides is the best option against Dutch Book betting strategnes except in special circum stances I suggest secondly that some presuppositicms of the Ramsey de Finetti s theorem (for instance, the principie of maximizaticrn of expected utility) themselves demand a justtfication.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2002-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1695510.5007/%xPrincipia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 6 No. 2 (2002); 231-248Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 6 Núm. 2 (2002); 231-248Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 6 n. 2 (2002); 231-2481808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCporhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/16955/15513Copyright (c) 2021 Sílvio Pintohttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessPinto, Sílvio2016-01-02T12:17:21Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/16955Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2016-01-02T12:17:21Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
El Bayesianismo y la Justificación de la Inducción El Bayesianismo y la Justificación de la Inducción |
title |
El Bayesianismo y la Justificación de la Inducción |
spellingShingle |
El Bayesianismo y la Justificación de la Inducción Pinto, Sílvio |
title_short |
El Bayesianismo y la Justificación de la Inducción |
title_full |
El Bayesianismo y la Justificación de la Inducción |
title_fullStr |
El Bayesianismo y la Justificación de la Inducción |
title_full_unstemmed |
El Bayesianismo y la Justificación de la Inducción |
title_sort |
El Bayesianismo y la Justificación de la Inducción |
author |
Pinto, Sílvio |
author_facet |
Pinto, Sílvio |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Pinto, Sílvio |
description |
The appearance of Bayesian inductive logic has prompted a renewed optimism about the possibility of justification of inductive rules The justifying argument for the 'rides of such a logic is the famous Dutch Book Argument (Ramsey-de Finetti’s theorem) The issue winch divides the theoreticians of induction concerns the question of whether this argument can indeed legitimize Bayesian conditionalization rides Here I will be firstly interested in showing that the Ramsey de Finetti's argument cannot establish that the use of the mentioned conditionalization rides is the best option against Dutch Book betting strategies except in special circum stances I suggest secondly that some presuppositions of the Ramsey de Finetti’s theorem (for instance, the principle of maximization of expected utility) themselves demand a justification. |
publishDate |
2002 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2002-01-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/16955 10.5007/%x |
url |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/16955 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.5007/%x |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/16955/15513 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Sílvio Pinto http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Sílvio Pinto http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 6 No. 2 (2002); 231-248 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 6 Núm. 2 (2002); 231-248 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 6 n. 2 (2002); 231-248 1808-1711 1414-4247 reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) instacron:UFSC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
instacron_str |
UFSC |
institution |
UFSC |
reponame_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
collection |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br |
_version_ |
1789435110287736832 |