Descubrimiento, justificación e inferencia a la mejor explicación

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Gaeta, Rodolfo
Data de Publicação: 2008
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2008v12n2p193
Resumo: In this paper I claim that the bias to pass from the acknowledgement of the explanatory virtues of a hypothesis to the belief that it is true or approximate to the truth is so strong that scientific realists can hardly elude that temptation. For that reason, some philosophers, like McMullin and Okasha, following Peirce and Hanson, participate of the conviction that the skill of founding scientific explanations bears the ability of founding true theories. But, this way, they pass the limits that they themselves had fixed and their attempt to overcome objections like the one which was formulated by van Fraassen against the inference to the best explanation fails.
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spelling Descubrimiento, justificación e inferencia a la mejor explicaciónIn this paper I claim that the bias to pass from the acknowledgement of the explanatory virtues of a hypothesis to the belief that it is true or approximate to the truth is so strong that scientific realists can hardly elude that temptation. For that reason, some philosophers, like McMullin and Okasha, following Peirce and Hanson, participate of the conviction that the skill of founding scientific explanations bears the ability of founding true theories. But, this way, they pass the limits that they themselves had fixed and their attempt to overcome objections like the one which was formulated by van Fraassen against the inference to the best explanation fails.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2008-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2008v12n2p19310.5007/1808-1711.2008v12n2p193Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 12 No. 2 (2008); 193-202Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 12 Núm. 2 (2008); 193-202Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 12 n. 2 (2008); 193-2021808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCporhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2008v12n2p193/14517Copyright (c) 2021 Rodolfo Gaetainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessGaeta, Rodolfo2019-09-12T10:18:44Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/16015Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2019-09-12T10:18:44Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Descubrimiento, justificación e inferencia a la mejor explicación
title Descubrimiento, justificación e inferencia a la mejor explicación
spellingShingle Descubrimiento, justificación e inferencia a la mejor explicación
Gaeta, Rodolfo
title_short Descubrimiento, justificación e inferencia a la mejor explicación
title_full Descubrimiento, justificación e inferencia a la mejor explicación
title_fullStr Descubrimiento, justificación e inferencia a la mejor explicación
title_full_unstemmed Descubrimiento, justificación e inferencia a la mejor explicación
title_sort Descubrimiento, justificación e inferencia a la mejor explicación
author Gaeta, Rodolfo
author_facet Gaeta, Rodolfo
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Gaeta, Rodolfo
description In this paper I claim that the bias to pass from the acknowledgement of the explanatory virtues of a hypothesis to the belief that it is true or approximate to the truth is so strong that scientific realists can hardly elude that temptation. For that reason, some philosophers, like McMullin and Okasha, following Peirce and Hanson, participate of the conviction that the skill of founding scientific explanations bears the ability of founding true theories. But, this way, they pass the limits that they themselves had fixed and their attempt to overcome objections like the one which was formulated by van Fraassen against the inference to the best explanation fails.
publishDate 2008
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2008-01-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
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dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2008v12n2p193
10.5007/1808-1711.2008v12n2p193
url https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2008v12n2p193
identifier_str_mv 10.5007/1808-1711.2008v12n2p193
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2008v12n2p193/14517
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Rodolfo Gaeta
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Rodolfo Gaeta
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 12 No. 2 (2008); 193-202
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 12 Núm. 2 (2008); 193-202
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 12 n. 2 (2008); 193-202
1808-1711
1414-4247
reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron:UFSC
instname_str Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
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institution UFSC
reponame_str Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
collection Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br
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