Davidson's Criticism of the proximal theory of meaning

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Greimann, Dirk
Data de Publicação: 2005
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14598
Resumo: According to the proximal theory of meaning, which is to be found in Quine’s early writings, meaning is determined completely by the correlation of sentences with sensory stimulations. Davidson tried to show that this theory is untenable because it leads to a radical form of skepticism. The present paper aims to show, first, that Davidson’s criticism is not sound, and, second, that nonetheless the proximal theory is untenable because it has a very similar and equally unacceptable consequence: it implies that the truth-value of ordinary sentences like ‘Snow is white’ is completely determined by the properties of the speaker, not by the properties of the objects to which these sentences refer.
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spelling Davidson's Criticism of the proximal theory of meaningDavidson's Criticism of the Proximal Theory of MeaningAccording to the proximal theory of meaning, which is to be found in Quine’s early writings, meaning is determined completely by the correlation of sentences with sensory stimulations. Davidson tried to show that this theory is untenable because it leads to a radical form of skepticism. The present paper aims to show, first, that Davidson’s criticism is not sound, and, second, that nonetheless the proximal theory is untenable because it has a very similar and equally unacceptable consequence: it implies that the truth-value of ordinary sentences like ‘Snow is white’ is completely determined by the properties of the speaker, not by the properties of the objects to which these sentences refer.Segundo a teoria proximal do significado, que pode ser encontrada nos primeiros escritos de Quine, o significado é completamente determinado pela correlação de sentenças com estimulações sensoriais. Davidson tentou mostrar que essa teoria é insustentável porque conduz a uma forma radical de ceticismo. O presente artigo objetiva mostrar, primeiro, que a crítica de Davidson não é legítima e, segundo, que a teoria proximal é, não obstante, insustentável porque tem uma conseqüência muito similar e igualmente inaceitável: implica que o valor de verdade de sentenças ordinárias como ‘a neve é branca’ é completamente determinado pelas propriedades do falante, não pelas propriedades dos objetos a que essas sentenças se referem.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2005-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1459810.5007/%xPrincipia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 9 No. 1-2 (2005); 73-86Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 9 Núm. 1-2 (2005); 73-86Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 9 n. 1-2 (2005); 73-861808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCporhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14598/13350Copyright (c) 2021 Dirk Greimannhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessGreimann, Dirk2016-01-02T12:15:36Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/14598Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2016-01-02T12:15:36Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Davidson's Criticism of the proximal theory of meaning
Davidson's Criticism of the Proximal Theory of Meaning
title Davidson's Criticism of the proximal theory of meaning
spellingShingle Davidson's Criticism of the proximal theory of meaning
Greimann, Dirk
title_short Davidson's Criticism of the proximal theory of meaning
title_full Davidson's Criticism of the proximal theory of meaning
title_fullStr Davidson's Criticism of the proximal theory of meaning
title_full_unstemmed Davidson's Criticism of the proximal theory of meaning
title_sort Davidson's Criticism of the proximal theory of meaning
author Greimann, Dirk
author_facet Greimann, Dirk
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Greimann, Dirk
description According to the proximal theory of meaning, which is to be found in Quine’s early writings, meaning is determined completely by the correlation of sentences with sensory stimulations. Davidson tried to show that this theory is untenable because it leads to a radical form of skepticism. The present paper aims to show, first, that Davidson’s criticism is not sound, and, second, that nonetheless the proximal theory is untenable because it has a very similar and equally unacceptable consequence: it implies that the truth-value of ordinary sentences like ‘Snow is white’ is completely determined by the properties of the speaker, not by the properties of the objects to which these sentences refer.
publishDate 2005
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2005-01-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14598
10.5007/%x
url https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14598
identifier_str_mv 10.5007/%x
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14598/13350
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Dirk Greimann
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Dirk Greimann
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 9 No. 1-2 (2005); 73-86
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 9 Núm. 1-2 (2005); 73-86
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 9 n. 1-2 (2005); 73-86
1808-1711
1414-4247
reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron:UFSC
instname_str Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron_str UFSC
institution UFSC
reponame_str Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
collection Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br
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