Desacuerdos entre Pares Epistémicos. El Número Importa.
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2016 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | spa |
Título da fonte: | Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/808-1711.2016v20n3p325 |
Resumo: | The debate over the epistemology of desagreement is full of disagreements. However, both conciliationists and steadfasts agree on the following thesis: once I have taken into account the disagreement with an epistemic peer P1, that is, once I have revised my belief in light of my knowledge of such disagreement, finding a new disagreement with another peer, P2, does not require that I revise my belief again if P2 is epistemically dependent on P1. In short: the number of disagreements doesn’t matter when there is epistemic dependence. This article addresses the problem from a new perspective. First, I will briefly present my view concerning peer disagreement, which distinguishes between weak peer disagreements and strong peer disagreements. Then, I will argue that strong peer disagreements do not call for a doxastic revision, whether the new disagreeing peers are epistemically dependent or not. Second, I develop the idea of epistemic dependence. Finally, I contend that in the case of weak peer disagreements, when they are epistemically independent the discovery of disagreements with new epistemic peers calls for a doxastic revision. |
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Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
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Desacuerdos entre Pares Epistémicos. El Número Importa.The debate over the epistemology of desagreement is full of disagreements. However, both conciliationists and steadfasts agree on the following thesis: once I have taken into account the disagreement with an epistemic peer P1, that is, once I have revised my belief in light of my knowledge of such disagreement, finding a new disagreement with another peer, P2, does not require that I revise my belief again if P2 is epistemically dependent on P1. In short: the number of disagreements doesn’t matter when there is epistemic dependence. This article addresses the problem from a new perspective. First, I will briefly present my view concerning peer disagreement, which distinguishes between weak peer disagreements and strong peer disagreements. Then, I will argue that strong peer disagreements do not call for a doxastic revision, whether the new disagreeing peers are epistemically dependent or not. Second, I develop the idea of epistemic dependence. Finally, I contend that in the case of weak peer disagreements, when they are epistemically independent the discovery of disagreements with new epistemic peers calls for a doxastic revision.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2016-09-09info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/808-1711.2016v20n3p32510.5007/808-1711.2016v20n3p325Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 20 No. 3 (2016); 325-341Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 20 Núm. 3 (2016); 325-341Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 20 n. 3 (2016); 325-3411808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCspahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/808-1711.2016v20n3p325/33918Copyright (c) 2021 Nicolás Francisco Lo Guercioinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessLo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco2019-09-13T11:08:12Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/44557Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2019-09-13T11:08:12Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Desacuerdos entre Pares Epistémicos. El Número Importa. |
title |
Desacuerdos entre Pares Epistémicos. El Número Importa. |
spellingShingle |
Desacuerdos entre Pares Epistémicos. El Número Importa. Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco |
title_short |
Desacuerdos entre Pares Epistémicos. El Número Importa. |
title_full |
Desacuerdos entre Pares Epistémicos. El Número Importa. |
title_fullStr |
Desacuerdos entre Pares Epistémicos. El Número Importa. |
title_full_unstemmed |
Desacuerdos entre Pares Epistémicos. El Número Importa. |
title_sort |
Desacuerdos entre Pares Epistémicos. El Número Importa. |
author |
Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco |
author_facet |
Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco |
description |
The debate over the epistemology of desagreement is full of disagreements. However, both conciliationists and steadfasts agree on the following thesis: once I have taken into account the disagreement with an epistemic peer P1, that is, once I have revised my belief in light of my knowledge of such disagreement, finding a new disagreement with another peer, P2, does not require that I revise my belief again if P2 is epistemically dependent on P1. In short: the number of disagreements doesn’t matter when there is epistemic dependence. This article addresses the problem from a new perspective. First, I will briefly present my view concerning peer disagreement, which distinguishes between weak peer disagreements and strong peer disagreements. Then, I will argue that strong peer disagreements do not call for a doxastic revision, whether the new disagreeing peers are epistemically dependent or not. Second, I develop the idea of epistemic dependence. Finally, I contend that in the case of weak peer disagreements, when they are epistemically independent the discovery of disagreements with new epistemic peers calls for a doxastic revision. |
publishDate |
2016 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2016-09-09 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/808-1711.2016v20n3p325 10.5007/808-1711.2016v20n3p325 |
url |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/808-1711.2016v20n3p325 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.5007/808-1711.2016v20n3p325 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
spa |
language |
spa |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/808-1711.2016v20n3p325/33918 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Nicolás Francisco Lo Guercio info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Nicolás Francisco Lo Guercio |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 20 No. 3 (2016); 325-341 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 20 Núm. 3 (2016); 325-341 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 20 n. 3 (2016); 325-341 1808-1711 1414-4247 reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) instacron:UFSC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
instacron_str |
UFSC |
institution |
UFSC |
reponame_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
collection |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br |
_version_ |
1789435112615575552 |