Hare sobre a falácia naturalista
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2009 |
Tipo de documento: | Dissertação |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSM |
dARK ID: | ark:/26339/001300000r37b |
Texto Completo: | http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/9068 |
Resumo: | The aim of this dissertation is to present the criticism of Hare to ethical theories who commit the "naturalistic fallacy". These theories, according to the author, search for a "definition" of value words - words that underpin the majority of moral theories. Hare doubts the possibility of a definition of words like "good", "right, "fair", because he believes that such terms are used to recommend, or not, certain acts, to judge certain acts. In order to examine this fallacy, the author proposes the logical study of value words involved in moral judgments, seeking, reflexively, to clarify the role of words like "good" within the moral discourse. The discussion of the Harean metaethics is divided in three chapters. The first deals with the origin of the term "naturalistic fallacy", expressed initially by Moore, where the author firms its position on the undefinability of "good" and exposes the fallacy committed in the identification of good with natural objects. This chapter has, also, an analysis of the relationship between the definitional problem proposed by Moore and the inference problem of the "Law of Hume." The second chapter is a critique of Hare to naturalistic theories and his defense of the applicability of logic to moral discourse - which he believes is essentially prescriptive - through a review of sentences. In the third chapter criticisms to the vision of Hare on the naturalist theories are exposed, and an analysis of these criticisms is elaborated. After this presentation of the subject, I conclude that Hare has good reason to reject naturalism. |
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Hare sobre a falácia naturalistaHare on the naturalistic fallacyÉticaFalácia naturalistaPrescritivismo lógicoEthicsNaturalistic fallacyLogical prescritivismCNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIAThe aim of this dissertation is to present the criticism of Hare to ethical theories who commit the "naturalistic fallacy". These theories, according to the author, search for a "definition" of value words - words that underpin the majority of moral theories. Hare doubts the possibility of a definition of words like "good", "right, "fair", because he believes that such terms are used to recommend, or not, certain acts, to judge certain acts. In order to examine this fallacy, the author proposes the logical study of value words involved in moral judgments, seeking, reflexively, to clarify the role of words like "good" within the moral discourse. The discussion of the Harean metaethics is divided in three chapters. The first deals with the origin of the term "naturalistic fallacy", expressed initially by Moore, where the author firms its position on the undefinability of "good" and exposes the fallacy committed in the identification of good with natural objects. This chapter has, also, an analysis of the relationship between the definitional problem proposed by Moore and the inference problem of the "Law of Hume." The second chapter is a critique of Hare to naturalistic theories and his defense of the applicability of logic to moral discourse - which he believes is essentially prescriptive - through a review of sentences. In the third chapter criticisms to the vision of Hare on the naturalist theories are exposed, and an analysis of these criticisms is elaborated. After this presentation of the subject, I conclude that Hare has good reason to reject naturalism.Este trabalho tem por objetivo apresentar a crítica de Hare às teorias éticas que cometem a chamada falácia naturalista . Estas teorias, segundo o autor, buscam uma definição para as palavras de valor palavras que alicerçam a maioria das teorias morais. Hare duvida da possibilidade de definição de palavras como bom , certo , justo , pois acredita que tais termos são usados para recomendar, ou não, certas atitudes, para julgar certos atos. Para analisar esta falácia, o autor propõe o estudo lógico das palavras de valor envolvidas nos julgamentos morais, procurando, reflexivamente, esclarecer o papel de palavras como bom dentro do discurso moral. A discussão da proposta metaética hareana está dividida, neste trabalho, em três capítulos. O primeiro trata da origem do termo falácia naturalista , expresso inicialmente por Moore, onde este firma sua posição sobre a indefinibilidade do termo bom e sobre a falácia cometida ao identificá-lo com objetos naturais. Ainda neste capítulo há uma análise da relação ente o problema definicional proposto por Moore e o problema inferencial da Lei de Hume . No segundo capítulo está a crítica de Hare às teorias naturalistas e sua defesa da aplicabilidade da lógica ao discurso moral que ele acredita ser essencialmente prescritivo através de uma reformulação de sentenças. No terceiro capítulo estão expostas as críticas feitas à visão hareana das teorias naturalistas, bem como uma análise destas críticas. Esta breve apresentação do tema permite chegar ao entendimento que Hare tem boas razões para rejeitar o naturalismo.Universidade Federal de Santa MariaBRFilosofiaUFSMPrograma de Pós-Graduação em FilosofiaSautter, Frank Thomashttp://lattes.cnpq.br/2804652028967760Sartori, Carlos Augustohttp://lattes.cnpq.br/6830220445412069Casanave, Abel Lassallehttp://lattes.cnpq.br/3869411334990282Prola, Lucas Henrique Tentler2009-10-192009-10-192009-08-25info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisapplication/pdfapplication/pdfPROLA, Lucas Henrique Tentler. Hare on the naturalistic fallacy. 2009. 84 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Filosofia) - Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, Santa Maria, 2009.http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/9068ark:/26339/001300000r37bporinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSMinstname:Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM)instacron:UFSM2022-08-25T12:00:18Zoai:repositorio.ufsm.br:1/9068Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertaçõeshttps://repositorio.ufsm.br/ONGhttps://repositorio.ufsm.br/oai/requestatendimento.sib@ufsm.br||tedebc@gmail.comopendoar:2022-08-25T12:00:18Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSM - Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Hare sobre a falácia naturalista Hare on the naturalistic fallacy |
title |
Hare sobre a falácia naturalista |
spellingShingle |
Hare sobre a falácia naturalista Prola, Lucas Henrique Tentler Ética Falácia naturalista Prescritivismo lógico Ethics Naturalistic fallacy Logical prescritivism CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA |
title_short |
Hare sobre a falácia naturalista |
title_full |
Hare sobre a falácia naturalista |
title_fullStr |
Hare sobre a falácia naturalista |
title_full_unstemmed |
Hare sobre a falácia naturalista |
title_sort |
Hare sobre a falácia naturalista |
author |
Prola, Lucas Henrique Tentler |
author_facet |
Prola, Lucas Henrique Tentler |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Sautter, Frank Thomas http://lattes.cnpq.br/2804652028967760 Sartori, Carlos Augusto http://lattes.cnpq.br/6830220445412069 Casanave, Abel Lassalle http://lattes.cnpq.br/3869411334990282 |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Prola, Lucas Henrique Tentler |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Ética Falácia naturalista Prescritivismo lógico Ethics Naturalistic fallacy Logical prescritivism CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA |
topic |
Ética Falácia naturalista Prescritivismo lógico Ethics Naturalistic fallacy Logical prescritivism CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA |
description |
The aim of this dissertation is to present the criticism of Hare to ethical theories who commit the "naturalistic fallacy". These theories, according to the author, search for a "definition" of value words - words that underpin the majority of moral theories. Hare doubts the possibility of a definition of words like "good", "right, "fair", because he believes that such terms are used to recommend, or not, certain acts, to judge certain acts. In order to examine this fallacy, the author proposes the logical study of value words involved in moral judgments, seeking, reflexively, to clarify the role of words like "good" within the moral discourse. The discussion of the Harean metaethics is divided in three chapters. The first deals with the origin of the term "naturalistic fallacy", expressed initially by Moore, where the author firms its position on the undefinability of "good" and exposes the fallacy committed in the identification of good with natural objects. This chapter has, also, an analysis of the relationship between the definitional problem proposed by Moore and the inference problem of the "Law of Hume." The second chapter is a critique of Hare to naturalistic theories and his defense of the applicability of logic to moral discourse - which he believes is essentially prescriptive - through a review of sentences. In the third chapter criticisms to the vision of Hare on the naturalist theories are exposed, and an analysis of these criticisms is elaborated. After this presentation of the subject, I conclude that Hare has good reason to reject naturalism. |
publishDate |
2009 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2009-10-19 2009-10-19 2009-08-25 |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis |
format |
masterThesis |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
PROLA, Lucas Henrique Tentler. Hare on the naturalistic fallacy. 2009. 84 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Filosofia) - Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, Santa Maria, 2009. http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/9068 |
dc.identifier.dark.fl_str_mv |
ark:/26339/001300000r37b |
identifier_str_mv |
PROLA, Lucas Henrique Tentler. Hare on the naturalistic fallacy. 2009. 84 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Filosofia) - Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, Santa Maria, 2009. ark:/26339/001300000r37b |
url |
http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/9068 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal de Santa Maria BR Filosofia UFSM Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal de Santa Maria BR Filosofia UFSM Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSM instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM) instacron:UFSM |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM) |
instacron_str |
UFSM |
institution |
UFSM |
reponame_str |
Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSM |
collection |
Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSM |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSM - Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
atendimento.sib@ufsm.br||tedebc@gmail.com |
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1815172382381309952 |