MORALITY, LEGALITY AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION: THE HART-FULLER DEBATE

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Amato, Lucas Fucci
Data de Publicação: 2019
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Revista de Direito
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufv.br/revistadir/article/view/6368
Resumo: The paper approaches the debate on the conceptual linkage between law and morals that has taken place since 1958 between two great exponents of jurisprudence in the 20th century: H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller. Two controversies are here focused. On the one hand, Fuller defended the thesis that some principles of legality compose a morality inherent to the law, with a formal and procedural nature. Hart argued that these were only technical rules, without moral character. On the other hand, the Hartian theory of the rule of recognition as a social rule has been put into play. If, for Hart, it was a form of self-definition of the legal system as a union of primary and secondary rules, for Fuller there is no legal character, of a rule, involved, for example, in the political fact of the (revolutionary) transition from one legal system to another.
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spelling MORALITY, LEGALITY AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION: THE HART-FULLER DEBATEMoralidade, legalidade e institucionalização: o debate Hart-FullerLegal positivism. Morality of law. Legality.Positivismo jurídico. Moralidade do direito. Legalidade.The paper approaches the debate on the conceptual linkage between law and morals that has taken place since 1958 between two great exponents of jurisprudence in the 20th century: H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller. Two controversies are here focused. On the one hand, Fuller defended the thesis that some principles of legality compose a morality inherent to the law, with a formal and procedural nature. Hart argued that these were only technical rules, without moral character. On the other hand, the Hartian theory of the rule of recognition as a social rule has been put into play. If, for Hart, it was a form of self-definition of the legal system as a union of primary and secondary rules, for Fuller there is no legal character, of a rule, involved, for example, in the political fact of the (revolutionary) transition from one legal system to another.O artigo aborda o debate sobre o vínculo conceitual entre direito e moral travado a partir de 1958 entre dois grandes expoentes da teoria do direito no século XX: H. L. A. Hart e Lon Fuller. São focadas principalmente duas controvérsias. De um lado, Fuller defendeu a tese de que alguns princípios de legalidade compõem uma moralidade inerente ao direito, de caráter formal e procedimental. Hart argumentou que se tratava apenas de regras técnicas, sem caráter moral. De outra parte, foi colocada em jogo a teoria hartiana da regra de reconhecimento como uma regra social. Se, para Hart, tratava-se de uma forma de autodefinição do sistema jurídico como uma união de regras primárias e secundárias, para Fuller não há caráter jurídico, de regra, envolvido, por exemplo, no fato político da transição (revolucionária) de um sistema jurídico a outro.Universidade Federal de Viçosa2019-08-30info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionAvaliado pelos paresapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufv.br/revistadir/article/view/636810.32361/20191116368Revista de Direito; Vol. 11 No. 01 (2019); 335-360Revista de Direito; Vol. 11 Núm. 01 (2019); 335-360Revista de Direito; v. 11 n. 01 (2019); 335-3602527-03891806-8790reponame:Revista de Direitoinstname:Universidade Federal de Viçosa (UFV)instacron:UFVporhttps://periodicos.ufv.br/revistadir/article/view/6368/pdfAmato, Lucas Fucciinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2019-11-06T14:01:07Zoai:ojs.periodicos.ufv.br:article/6368Revistahttps://periodicos.ufv.br/revistadir/indexPUBhttps://periodicos.ufv.br/revistadir/oairevistadir@ufv.br2527-03891806-8790opendoar:2019-11-06T14:01:07Revista de Direito - Universidade Federal de Viçosa (UFV)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv MORALITY, LEGALITY AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION: THE HART-FULLER DEBATE
Moralidade, legalidade e institucionalização: o debate Hart-Fuller
title MORALITY, LEGALITY AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION: THE HART-FULLER DEBATE
spellingShingle MORALITY, LEGALITY AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION: THE HART-FULLER DEBATE
Amato, Lucas Fucci
Legal positivism. Morality of law. Legality.
Positivismo jurídico. Moralidade do direito. Legalidade.
title_short MORALITY, LEGALITY AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION: THE HART-FULLER DEBATE
title_full MORALITY, LEGALITY AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION: THE HART-FULLER DEBATE
title_fullStr MORALITY, LEGALITY AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION: THE HART-FULLER DEBATE
title_full_unstemmed MORALITY, LEGALITY AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION: THE HART-FULLER DEBATE
title_sort MORALITY, LEGALITY AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION: THE HART-FULLER DEBATE
author Amato, Lucas Fucci
author_facet Amato, Lucas Fucci
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Amato, Lucas Fucci
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Legal positivism. Morality of law. Legality.
Positivismo jurídico. Moralidade do direito. Legalidade.
topic Legal positivism. Morality of law. Legality.
Positivismo jurídico. Moralidade do direito. Legalidade.
description The paper approaches the debate on the conceptual linkage between law and morals that has taken place since 1958 between two great exponents of jurisprudence in the 20th century: H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller. Two controversies are here focused. On the one hand, Fuller defended the thesis that some principles of legality compose a morality inherent to the law, with a formal and procedural nature. Hart argued that these were only technical rules, without moral character. On the other hand, the Hartian theory of the rule of recognition as a social rule has been put into play. If, for Hart, it was a form of self-definition of the legal system as a union of primary and secondary rules, for Fuller there is no legal character, of a rule, involved, for example, in the political fact of the (revolutionary) transition from one legal system to another.
publishDate 2019
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2019-08-30
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Avaliado pelos pares
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufv.br/revistadir/article/view/6368
10.32361/20191116368
url https://periodicos.ufv.br/revistadir/article/view/6368
identifier_str_mv 10.32361/20191116368
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufv.br/revistadir/article/view/6368/pdf
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal de Viçosa
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal de Viçosa
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Revista de Direito; Vol. 11 No. 01 (2019); 335-360
Revista de Direito; Vol. 11 Núm. 01 (2019); 335-360
Revista de Direito; v. 11 n. 01 (2019); 335-360
2527-0389
1806-8790
reponame:Revista de Direito
instname:Universidade Federal de Viçosa (UFV)
instacron:UFV
instname_str Universidade Federal de Viçosa (UFV)
instacron_str UFV
institution UFV
reponame_str Revista de Direito
collection Revista de Direito
repository.name.fl_str_mv Revista de Direito - Universidade Federal de Viçosa (UFV)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv revistadir@ufv.br
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