SPS and TBT agreements and international agricultural trade: retaliation or cooperation?
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2011 |
Outros Autores: | , |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | LOCUS Repositório Institucional da UFV |
Texto Completo: | https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1574-0862.2011.00570.x http://www.locus.ufv.br/handle/123456789/21458 |
Resumo: | In this article, we investigate whether the Brazilian notifications to the TBT and SPS agreements are characterized as retaliation or as cooperation in international agricultural trade in the period 1996–2008. A Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) model is used to estimate game models of bilateral trade between Brazil and its major partners (United States, European Union, and Japan). From the viewpoint of strategic games, the results suggest that the Brazilian notifications are forms of retaliation against the United States, and, regarding the European Union, the best result for Brazil was conciliation. On the other hand, if the results are interpreted as equilibria of bargaining games, they suggest that Brazil has great bargaining power in trade with the United States and that cooperation characterized agricultural trade between Brazil and the European Union in the period analyzed. In the case of agricultural trade between Brazil and Japan, only Japan has characteristics of a country with significant bargaining power. |
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Almeida, Fernanda Maria deVieira, Wilson da CruzSilva, Orlando Monteiro da2018-08-28T11:07:50Z2018-08-28T11:07:50Z2011-12-1915740862https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1574-0862.2011.00570.xhttp://www.locus.ufv.br/handle/123456789/21458In this article, we investigate whether the Brazilian notifications to the TBT and SPS agreements are characterized as retaliation or as cooperation in international agricultural trade in the period 1996–2008. A Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) model is used to estimate game models of bilateral trade between Brazil and its major partners (United States, European Union, and Japan). From the viewpoint of strategic games, the results suggest that the Brazilian notifications are forms of retaliation against the United States, and, regarding the European Union, the best result for Brazil was conciliation. On the other hand, if the results are interpreted as equilibria of bargaining games, they suggest that Brazil has great bargaining power in trade with the United States and that cooperation characterized agricultural trade between Brazil and the European Union in the period analyzed. In the case of agricultural trade between Brazil and Japan, only Japan has characteristics of a country with significant bargaining power.engAgricultural Economicsv. 43, n. 2, p. 125- 132, march 2012International Association of Agricultural Economistsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessAgricultural productsBilateral tradeBargaining gamesTBTSPSSPS and TBT agreements and international agricultural trade: retaliation or cooperation?info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfreponame:LOCUS Repositório Institucional da UFVinstname:Universidade Federal de Viçosa (UFV)instacron:UFVORIGINALartigo.pdfartigo.pdfTexto completoapplication/pdf564732https://locus.ufv.br//bitstream/123456789/21458/1/artigo.pdf1df147b287499045c027fb895aef9535MD51LICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain; charset=utf-81748https://locus.ufv.br//bitstream/123456789/21458/2/license.txt8a4605be74aa9ea9d79846c1fba20a33MD52THUMBNAILartigo.pdf.jpgartigo.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg1887https://locus.ufv.br//bitstream/123456789/21458/3/artigo.pdf.jpgc62f977c0559f93a8a5f278355d6a4c5MD53123456789/214582018-08-28 23:00:35.724oai:locus.ufv.br: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Repositório InstitucionalPUBhttps://www.locus.ufv.br/oai/requestfabiojreis@ufv.bropendoar:21452018-08-29T02:00:35LOCUS Repositório Institucional da UFV - Universidade Federal de Viçosa (UFV)false |
dc.title.en.fl_str_mv |
SPS and TBT agreements and international agricultural trade: retaliation or cooperation? |
title |
SPS and TBT agreements and international agricultural trade: retaliation or cooperation? |
spellingShingle |
SPS and TBT agreements and international agricultural trade: retaliation or cooperation? Almeida, Fernanda Maria de Agricultural products Bilateral trade Bargaining games TBT SPS |
title_short |
SPS and TBT agreements and international agricultural trade: retaliation or cooperation? |
title_full |
SPS and TBT agreements and international agricultural trade: retaliation or cooperation? |
title_fullStr |
SPS and TBT agreements and international agricultural trade: retaliation or cooperation? |
title_full_unstemmed |
SPS and TBT agreements and international agricultural trade: retaliation or cooperation? |
title_sort |
SPS and TBT agreements and international agricultural trade: retaliation or cooperation? |
author |
Almeida, Fernanda Maria de |
author_facet |
Almeida, Fernanda Maria de Vieira, Wilson da Cruz Silva, Orlando Monteiro da |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Vieira, Wilson da Cruz Silva, Orlando Monteiro da |
author2_role |
author author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Almeida, Fernanda Maria de Vieira, Wilson da Cruz Silva, Orlando Monteiro da |
dc.subject.pt-BR.fl_str_mv |
Agricultural products Bilateral trade Bargaining games TBT SPS |
topic |
Agricultural products Bilateral trade Bargaining games TBT SPS |
description |
In this article, we investigate whether the Brazilian notifications to the TBT and SPS agreements are characterized as retaliation or as cooperation in international agricultural trade in the period 1996–2008. A Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) model is used to estimate game models of bilateral trade between Brazil and its major partners (United States, European Union, and Japan). From the viewpoint of strategic games, the results suggest that the Brazilian notifications are forms of retaliation against the United States, and, regarding the European Union, the best result for Brazil was conciliation. On the other hand, if the results are interpreted as equilibria of bargaining games, they suggest that Brazil has great bargaining power in trade with the United States and that cooperation characterized agricultural trade between Brazil and the European Union in the period analyzed. In the case of agricultural trade between Brazil and Japan, only Japan has characteristics of a country with significant bargaining power. |
publishDate |
2011 |
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv |
2011-12-19 |
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv |
2018-08-28T11:07:50Z |
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv |
2018-08-28T11:07:50Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1574-0862.2011.00570.x http://www.locus.ufv.br/handle/123456789/21458 |
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv |
15740862 |
identifier_str_mv |
15740862 |
url |
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1574-0862.2011.00570.x http://www.locus.ufv.br/handle/123456789/21458 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.ispartofseries.pt-BR.fl_str_mv |
v. 43, n. 2, p. 125- 132, march 2012 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
International Association of Agricultural Economists info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
International Association of Agricultural Economists |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Agricultural Economics |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Agricultural Economics |
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LOCUS Repositório Institucional da UFV |
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