Freedom and Praxis in Plotinus’s Ennead 6.8.1-6
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Data de Publicação: | 2020 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Revista Archai (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/archai/article/view/34573 |
Resumo: | In this paper, I argue that Plotinus does not limit the sphere of free human agency simply to intellectual contemplation, but rather extends it all the way to human praxis. Plotinus’s goal in the first six chapters of Ennead 6.8 is, accordingly, to demarcate the space of freedom within human practical actions. He ultimately concludes that our external actions are free whenever they actualize, in unhindered fashion, the moral principles derived from intellectual contemplation. This raises the question of how the freedom of practical actions might relate to the freedom of intellectual contemplation. After considering two previously offered models ”“ a model of double activity, and an Aristotelian model of practical syllogism ”“ I offer a third alternative, namely a model of moral attunement, according to which our rational desires assume a kind of ‘care of the soul’ through active supervision. Practical life is thus imbued with freedom to the extent that the soul supervises its actions to conform to its will and choice of the good. |
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Freedom and Praxis in Plotinus’s Ennead 6.8.1-6PlotinusFreedomSoulActionPractical EthicsIn this paper, I argue that Plotinus does not limit the sphere of free human agency simply to intellectual contemplation, but rather extends it all the way to human praxis. Plotinus’s goal in the first six chapters of Ennead 6.8 is, accordingly, to demarcate the space of freedom within human practical actions. He ultimately concludes that our external actions are free whenever they actualize, in unhindered fashion, the moral principles derived from intellectual contemplation. This raises the question of how the freedom of practical actions might relate to the freedom of intellectual contemplation. After considering two previously offered models ”“ a model of double activity, and an Aristotelian model of practical syllogism ”“ I offer a third alternative, namely a model of moral attunement, according to which our rational desires assume a kind of ‘care of the soul’ through active supervision. Practical life is thus imbued with freedom to the extent that the soul supervises its actions to conform to its will and choice of the good.Cátedra UNESCO Archai (Universidade de Brasília); Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, Portugal; Annablume Editora, São Paulo, Brasil2020-10-04info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionArticlesArtigoshttps://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/archai/article/view/3457310.14195/1984-249X_30_31Revista Archai; No. 30 (2020): Archai 30 (2020 [3]); e03031Archai Journal; n. 30 (2020): Archai 30 (2020 [3]); e030311984-249X2179-496010.14195/1984-249X_30reponame:Revista Archai (Online)instname:Universidade de Brasília (UnB)instacron:UNBenghttps://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/archai/article/view/34573/27710Copyright (c) 2020 Bernardo Portilho Andradehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessAndrade, Bernardo Portilho2020-10-04T20:58:54Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/34573Revistahttps://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/archaiPUBhttps://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/archai/oai||archaijournal@unb.br|| cornelli@unb.br1984-249X1984-249Xopendoar:2020-10-04T20:58:54Revista Archai (Online) - Universidade de Brasília (UnB)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Freedom and Praxis in Plotinus’s Ennead 6.8.1-6 |
title |
Freedom and Praxis in Plotinus’s Ennead 6.8.1-6 |
spellingShingle |
Freedom and Praxis in Plotinus’s Ennead 6.8.1-6 Andrade, Bernardo Portilho Plotinus Freedom Soul Action Practical Ethics |
title_short |
Freedom and Praxis in Plotinus’s Ennead 6.8.1-6 |
title_full |
Freedom and Praxis in Plotinus’s Ennead 6.8.1-6 |
title_fullStr |
Freedom and Praxis in Plotinus’s Ennead 6.8.1-6 |
title_full_unstemmed |
Freedom and Praxis in Plotinus’s Ennead 6.8.1-6 |
title_sort |
Freedom and Praxis in Plotinus’s Ennead 6.8.1-6 |
author |
Andrade, Bernardo Portilho |
author_facet |
Andrade, Bernardo Portilho |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Andrade, Bernardo Portilho |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Plotinus Freedom Soul Action Practical Ethics |
topic |
Plotinus Freedom Soul Action Practical Ethics |
description |
In this paper, I argue that Plotinus does not limit the sphere of free human agency simply to intellectual contemplation, but rather extends it all the way to human praxis. Plotinus’s goal in the first six chapters of Ennead 6.8 is, accordingly, to demarcate the space of freedom within human practical actions. He ultimately concludes that our external actions are free whenever they actualize, in unhindered fashion, the moral principles derived from intellectual contemplation. This raises the question of how the freedom of practical actions might relate to the freedom of intellectual contemplation. After considering two previously offered models ”“ a model of double activity, and an Aristotelian model of practical syllogism ”“ I offer a third alternative, namely a model of moral attunement, according to which our rational desires assume a kind of ‘care of the soul’ through active supervision. Practical life is thus imbued with freedom to the extent that the soul supervises its actions to conform to its will and choice of the good. |
publishDate |
2020 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2020-10-04 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Articles Artigos |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/archai/article/view/34573 10.14195/1984-249X_30_31 |
url |
https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/archai/article/view/34573 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.14195/1984-249X_30_31 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/archai/article/view/34573/27710 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2020 Bernardo Portilho Andrade http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2020 Bernardo Portilho Andrade http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Cátedra UNESCO Archai (Universidade de Brasília); Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, Portugal; Annablume Editora, São Paulo, Brasil |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Cátedra UNESCO Archai (Universidade de Brasília); Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, Portugal; Annablume Editora, São Paulo, Brasil |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Revista Archai; No. 30 (2020): Archai 30 (2020 [3]); e03031 Archai Journal; n. 30 (2020): Archai 30 (2020 [3]); e03031 1984-249X 2179-4960 10.14195/1984-249X_30 reponame:Revista Archai (Online) instname:Universidade de Brasília (UnB) instacron:UNB |
instname_str |
Universidade de Brasília (UnB) |
instacron_str |
UNB |
institution |
UNB |
reponame_str |
Revista Archai (Online) |
collection |
Revista Archai (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Revista Archai (Online) - Universidade de Brasília (UnB) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
||archaijournal@unb.br|| cornelli@unb.br |
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1798319945644244992 |