Much Sweat, Much Pay - Less Sweat, Less Pay? Evidence of "Cronyism" in the Determination of the Remuneration of Brazilian Executives

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: de Sena Veloso, Cleber Roberto
Data de Publicação: 2019
Outros Autores: Santos, Thaisa Renata dos, Pimenta, Daiana Paula, Cunha, Moisés Ferreira da, Cruz, Aletheia Ferreira da
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
por
Título da fonte: Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança
Texto Completo: https://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/article/view/1984
Resumo: Objective: This study verifies the relationship between the remuneration of the board of directors and the remuneration of executives, as well as the relationship between these remunerations, and the economic and financial performance of Brazilian publicly-held companies.Method: The work promotes the analysis by estimating two regression models with panel data, pooled independent cross-sections and fixed effects.Originality/Relevance: Scientific studies on remuneration in Brazil have focused on the relationship of remuneration with the economic-financial performance of companies and/or with the characteristics of corporate governance. However, there is still room to investigate possible mechanisms of reciprocity between salary increase of statutory directors and the remuneration increase among members of the boards of directors.Results: The results indicate that the remuneration of the board of directors is positively related to the remuneration of executives; that these remunerations do not present a significant relation with the economic-financial performance of the companies; and that cash flow risk is negatively related to executive compensation.Theoretical/Methodological Contributions: The study provides evidence of a synchronism between remuneration of executives and  directors, a fact that may explain why the remuneration of these agents is not related to the economic-financial performance of the companies. Also, it shows that executive compensation packages contribute to reducing the risk of the cash flows to which companies are exposed.
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spelling Much Sweat, Much Pay - Less Sweat, Less Pay? Evidence of "Cronyism" in the Determination of the Remuneration of Brazilian ExecutivesMuch Sweat, Much Pay - Less Sweat, Less Pay? Evidências de “Coleguismo” na Determinação da Remuneração dos Executivos BrasileirosPerformance of the CompanyExecutive CompensationBoard of Directors.Desempenho da EmpresaRemuneração ExecutivaConselho de AdministrativoObjective: This study verifies the relationship between the remuneration of the board of directors and the remuneration of executives, as well as the relationship between these remunerations, and the economic and financial performance of Brazilian publicly-held companies.Method: The work promotes the analysis by estimating two regression models with panel data, pooled independent cross-sections and fixed effects.Originality/Relevance: Scientific studies on remuneration in Brazil have focused on the relationship of remuneration with the economic-financial performance of companies and/or with the characteristics of corporate governance. However, there is still room to investigate possible mechanisms of reciprocity between salary increase of statutory directors and the remuneration increase among members of the boards of directors.Results: The results indicate that the remuneration of the board of directors is positively related to the remuneration of executives; that these remunerations do not present a significant relation with the economic-financial performance of the companies; and that cash flow risk is negatively related to executive compensation.Theoretical/Methodological Contributions: The study provides evidence of a synchronism between remuneration of executives and  directors, a fact that may explain why the remuneration of these agents is not related to the economic-financial performance of the companies. Also, it shows that executive compensation packages contribute to reducing the risk of the cash flows to which companies are exposed.Objetivo: Este estudo verifica a relação existente entre a remuneração do conselho administrativo e a remuneração dos executivos, bem como analisa a relação destas remunerações com o desempenho econômico-financeiro das empresas brasileiras de capital aberto.Método: O trabalho promove as análises por meio da estimação de dois modelos de regressão com dados em painel, o pooled independent cross-sections e o de efeitos fixos. Originalidade/Relevância: Estudos científicos sobre remuneração no Brasil têm focado na relação da remuneração com o desempenho econômico-financeiro das empresas e/ou com as características da governança corporativa. Entretanto, ainda há espaço para investigar possíveis mecanismos de reciprocidade entre aumento salarial dos diretores estatutários e o aumento da remuneração dos membros dos conselhos de administração.Resultados: Os resultados indicam que a remuneração do conselho administrativo está positivamente relacionada à remuneração dos executivos; que essas remunerações não apresentam relação significativa com o desempenho econômico-financeiro das empresas; e que o risco dos fluxos de caixa está negativamente relacionado à remuneração dos executivos.Contribuições teóricas/metodológicas: O estudo fornece evidências de sincronismo entre a remuneração dos executivos e a remuneração dos conselheiros, fato que pode explicar por que a remuneração desses agentes não está relacionada ao desempenho econômico-financeiro das empresas. Além disso, evidencia que os pacotes remuneratórios dos executivos contribuem para reduzir o risco dos fluxos de caixa ao qual as empresas estão expostas.Contabilidade Gestão e Governança2019-08-31info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttps://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/article/view/198410.51341/1984-3925_2019v22n2a2Contabilidade Gestão e Governança; v. 22 n. 2 (2019); 171-1871984-39251984-3925reponame:Contabilidade, Gestão e Governançainstname:Universidade de Brasília (UnB)instacron:UNBengporhttps://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/article/view/1984/pdfhttps://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/article/view/1984/pdf_1Copyright (c) 2019 Revista Contabilidade, Gestão e Governançainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessde Sena Veloso, Cleber RobertoSantos, Thaisa Renata dosPimenta, Daiana PaulaCunha, Moisés Ferreira daCruz, Aletheia Ferreira da2019-12-10T06:14:23Zoai:oai.jamg.cloud:article/1984Revistahttp://www.revistacgg.org/index.php/contabilPUBhttps://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/oaijamg.cgg@gmail.com1516-70111984-3925opendoar:2019-12-10T06:14:23Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança - Universidade de Brasília (UnB)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Much Sweat, Much Pay - Less Sweat, Less Pay? Evidence of "Cronyism" in the Determination of the Remuneration of Brazilian Executives
Much Sweat, Much Pay - Less Sweat, Less Pay? Evidências de “Coleguismo” na Determinação da Remuneração dos Executivos Brasileiros
title Much Sweat, Much Pay - Less Sweat, Less Pay? Evidence of "Cronyism" in the Determination of the Remuneration of Brazilian Executives
spellingShingle Much Sweat, Much Pay - Less Sweat, Less Pay? Evidence of "Cronyism" in the Determination of the Remuneration of Brazilian Executives
de Sena Veloso, Cleber Roberto
Performance of the Company
Executive Compensation
Board of Directors.
Desempenho da Empresa
Remuneração Executiva
Conselho de Administrativo
title_short Much Sweat, Much Pay - Less Sweat, Less Pay? Evidence of "Cronyism" in the Determination of the Remuneration of Brazilian Executives
title_full Much Sweat, Much Pay - Less Sweat, Less Pay? Evidence of "Cronyism" in the Determination of the Remuneration of Brazilian Executives
title_fullStr Much Sweat, Much Pay - Less Sweat, Less Pay? Evidence of "Cronyism" in the Determination of the Remuneration of Brazilian Executives
title_full_unstemmed Much Sweat, Much Pay - Less Sweat, Less Pay? Evidence of "Cronyism" in the Determination of the Remuneration of Brazilian Executives
title_sort Much Sweat, Much Pay - Less Sweat, Less Pay? Evidence of "Cronyism" in the Determination of the Remuneration of Brazilian Executives
author de Sena Veloso, Cleber Roberto
author_facet de Sena Veloso, Cleber Roberto
Santos, Thaisa Renata dos
Pimenta, Daiana Paula
Cunha, Moisés Ferreira da
Cruz, Aletheia Ferreira da
author_role author
author2 Santos, Thaisa Renata dos
Pimenta, Daiana Paula
Cunha, Moisés Ferreira da
Cruz, Aletheia Ferreira da
author2_role author
author
author
author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv de Sena Veloso, Cleber Roberto
Santos, Thaisa Renata dos
Pimenta, Daiana Paula
Cunha, Moisés Ferreira da
Cruz, Aletheia Ferreira da
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Performance of the Company
Executive Compensation
Board of Directors.
Desempenho da Empresa
Remuneração Executiva
Conselho de Administrativo
topic Performance of the Company
Executive Compensation
Board of Directors.
Desempenho da Empresa
Remuneração Executiva
Conselho de Administrativo
description Objective: This study verifies the relationship between the remuneration of the board of directors and the remuneration of executives, as well as the relationship between these remunerations, and the economic and financial performance of Brazilian publicly-held companies.Method: The work promotes the analysis by estimating two regression models with panel data, pooled independent cross-sections and fixed effects.Originality/Relevance: Scientific studies on remuneration in Brazil have focused on the relationship of remuneration with the economic-financial performance of companies and/or with the characteristics of corporate governance. However, there is still room to investigate possible mechanisms of reciprocity between salary increase of statutory directors and the remuneration increase among members of the boards of directors.Results: The results indicate that the remuneration of the board of directors is positively related to the remuneration of executives; that these remunerations do not present a significant relation with the economic-financial performance of the companies; and that cash flow risk is negatively related to executive compensation.Theoretical/Methodological Contributions: The study provides evidence of a synchronism between remuneration of executives and  directors, a fact that may explain why the remuneration of these agents is not related to the economic-financial performance of the companies. Also, it shows that executive compensation packages contribute to reducing the risk of the cash flows to which companies are exposed.
publishDate 2019
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2019-08-31
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/article/view/1984
10.51341/1984-3925_2019v22n2a2
url https://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/article/view/1984
identifier_str_mv 10.51341/1984-3925_2019v22n2a2
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
por
language eng
por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/article/view/1984/pdf
https://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/article/view/1984/pdf_1
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2019 Revista Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2019 Revista Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Contabilidade Gestão e Governança
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Contabilidade Gestão e Governança
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Contabilidade Gestão e Governança; v. 22 n. 2 (2019); 171-187
1984-3925
1984-3925
reponame:Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança
instname:Universidade de Brasília (UnB)
instacron:UNB
instname_str Universidade de Brasília (UnB)
instacron_str UNB
institution UNB
reponame_str Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança
collection Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança
repository.name.fl_str_mv Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança - Universidade de Brasília (UnB)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv jamg.cgg@gmail.com
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