Much Sweat, Much Pay - Less Sweat, Less Pay? Evidence of "Cronyism" in the Determination of the Remuneration of Brazilian Executives
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2019 |
Outros Autores: | , , , |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng por |
Título da fonte: | Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança |
Texto Completo: | https://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/article/view/1984 |
Resumo: | Objective: This study verifies the relationship between the remuneration of the board of directors and the remuneration of executives, as well as the relationship between these remunerations, and the economic and financial performance of Brazilian publicly-held companies.Method: The work promotes the analysis by estimating two regression models with panel data, pooled independent cross-sections and fixed effects.Originality/Relevance: Scientific studies on remuneration in Brazil have focused on the relationship of remuneration with the economic-financial performance of companies and/or with the characteristics of corporate governance. However, there is still room to investigate possible mechanisms of reciprocity between salary increase of statutory directors and the remuneration increase among members of the boards of directors.Results: The results indicate that the remuneration of the board of directors is positively related to the remuneration of executives; that these remunerations do not present a significant relation with the economic-financial performance of the companies; and that cash flow risk is negatively related to executive compensation.Theoretical/Methodological Contributions: The study provides evidence of a synchronism between remuneration of executives and directors, a fact that may explain why the remuneration of these agents is not related to the economic-financial performance of the companies. Also, it shows that executive compensation packages contribute to reducing the risk of the cash flows to which companies are exposed. |
id |
UNB-21_d51bb68357fa649168e491635f0a61d6 |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:oai.jamg.cloud:article/1984 |
network_acronym_str |
UNB-21 |
network_name_str |
Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança |
repository_id_str |
|
spelling |
Much Sweat, Much Pay - Less Sweat, Less Pay? Evidence of "Cronyism" in the Determination of the Remuneration of Brazilian ExecutivesMuch Sweat, Much Pay - Less Sweat, Less Pay? Evidências de “Coleguismo” na Determinação da Remuneração dos Executivos BrasileirosPerformance of the CompanyExecutive CompensationBoard of Directors.Desempenho da EmpresaRemuneração ExecutivaConselho de AdministrativoObjective: This study verifies the relationship between the remuneration of the board of directors and the remuneration of executives, as well as the relationship between these remunerations, and the economic and financial performance of Brazilian publicly-held companies.Method: The work promotes the analysis by estimating two regression models with panel data, pooled independent cross-sections and fixed effects.Originality/Relevance: Scientific studies on remuneration in Brazil have focused on the relationship of remuneration with the economic-financial performance of companies and/or with the characteristics of corporate governance. However, there is still room to investigate possible mechanisms of reciprocity between salary increase of statutory directors and the remuneration increase among members of the boards of directors.Results: The results indicate that the remuneration of the board of directors is positively related to the remuneration of executives; that these remunerations do not present a significant relation with the economic-financial performance of the companies; and that cash flow risk is negatively related to executive compensation.Theoretical/Methodological Contributions: The study provides evidence of a synchronism between remuneration of executives and directors, a fact that may explain why the remuneration of these agents is not related to the economic-financial performance of the companies. Also, it shows that executive compensation packages contribute to reducing the risk of the cash flows to which companies are exposed.Objetivo: Este estudo verifica a relação existente entre a remuneração do conselho administrativo e a remuneração dos executivos, bem como analisa a relação destas remunerações com o desempenho econômico-financeiro das empresas brasileiras de capital aberto.Método: O trabalho promove as análises por meio da estimação de dois modelos de regressão com dados em painel, o pooled independent cross-sections e o de efeitos fixos. Originalidade/Relevância: Estudos científicos sobre remuneração no Brasil têm focado na relação da remuneração com o desempenho econômico-financeiro das empresas e/ou com as características da governança corporativa. Entretanto, ainda há espaço para investigar possíveis mecanismos de reciprocidade entre aumento salarial dos diretores estatutários e o aumento da remuneração dos membros dos conselhos de administração.Resultados: Os resultados indicam que a remuneração do conselho administrativo está positivamente relacionada à remuneração dos executivos; que essas remunerações não apresentam relação significativa com o desempenho econômico-financeiro das empresas; e que o risco dos fluxos de caixa está negativamente relacionado à remuneração dos executivos.Contribuições teóricas/metodológicas: O estudo fornece evidências de sincronismo entre a remuneração dos executivos e a remuneração dos conselheiros, fato que pode explicar por que a remuneração desses agentes não está relacionada ao desempenho econômico-financeiro das empresas. Além disso, evidencia que os pacotes remuneratórios dos executivos contribuem para reduzir o risco dos fluxos de caixa ao qual as empresas estão expostas.Contabilidade Gestão e Governança2019-08-31info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttps://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/article/view/198410.51341/1984-3925_2019v22n2a2Contabilidade Gestão e Governança; v. 22 n. 2 (2019); 171-1871984-39251984-3925reponame:Contabilidade, Gestão e Governançainstname:Universidade de Brasília (UnB)instacron:UNBengporhttps://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/article/view/1984/pdfhttps://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/article/view/1984/pdf_1Copyright (c) 2019 Revista Contabilidade, Gestão e Governançainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessde Sena Veloso, Cleber RobertoSantos, Thaisa Renata dosPimenta, Daiana PaulaCunha, Moisés Ferreira daCruz, Aletheia Ferreira da2019-12-10T06:14:23Zoai:oai.jamg.cloud:article/1984Revistahttp://www.revistacgg.org/index.php/contabilPUBhttps://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/oaijamg.cgg@gmail.com1516-70111984-3925opendoar:2019-12-10T06:14:23Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança - Universidade de Brasília (UnB)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Much Sweat, Much Pay - Less Sweat, Less Pay? Evidence of "Cronyism" in the Determination of the Remuneration of Brazilian Executives Much Sweat, Much Pay - Less Sweat, Less Pay? Evidências de “Coleguismo” na Determinação da Remuneração dos Executivos Brasileiros |
title |
Much Sweat, Much Pay - Less Sweat, Less Pay? Evidence of "Cronyism" in the Determination of the Remuneration of Brazilian Executives |
spellingShingle |
Much Sweat, Much Pay - Less Sweat, Less Pay? Evidence of "Cronyism" in the Determination of the Remuneration of Brazilian Executives de Sena Veloso, Cleber Roberto Performance of the Company Executive Compensation Board of Directors. Desempenho da Empresa Remuneração Executiva Conselho de Administrativo |
title_short |
Much Sweat, Much Pay - Less Sweat, Less Pay? Evidence of "Cronyism" in the Determination of the Remuneration of Brazilian Executives |
title_full |
Much Sweat, Much Pay - Less Sweat, Less Pay? Evidence of "Cronyism" in the Determination of the Remuneration of Brazilian Executives |
title_fullStr |
Much Sweat, Much Pay - Less Sweat, Less Pay? Evidence of "Cronyism" in the Determination of the Remuneration of Brazilian Executives |
title_full_unstemmed |
Much Sweat, Much Pay - Less Sweat, Less Pay? Evidence of "Cronyism" in the Determination of the Remuneration of Brazilian Executives |
title_sort |
Much Sweat, Much Pay - Less Sweat, Less Pay? Evidence of "Cronyism" in the Determination of the Remuneration of Brazilian Executives |
author |
de Sena Veloso, Cleber Roberto |
author_facet |
de Sena Veloso, Cleber Roberto Santos, Thaisa Renata dos Pimenta, Daiana Paula Cunha, Moisés Ferreira da Cruz, Aletheia Ferreira da |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Santos, Thaisa Renata dos Pimenta, Daiana Paula Cunha, Moisés Ferreira da Cruz, Aletheia Ferreira da |
author2_role |
author author author author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
de Sena Veloso, Cleber Roberto Santos, Thaisa Renata dos Pimenta, Daiana Paula Cunha, Moisés Ferreira da Cruz, Aletheia Ferreira da |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Performance of the Company Executive Compensation Board of Directors. Desempenho da Empresa Remuneração Executiva Conselho de Administrativo |
topic |
Performance of the Company Executive Compensation Board of Directors. Desempenho da Empresa Remuneração Executiva Conselho de Administrativo |
description |
Objective: This study verifies the relationship between the remuneration of the board of directors and the remuneration of executives, as well as the relationship between these remunerations, and the economic and financial performance of Brazilian publicly-held companies.Method: The work promotes the analysis by estimating two regression models with panel data, pooled independent cross-sections and fixed effects.Originality/Relevance: Scientific studies on remuneration in Brazil have focused on the relationship of remuneration with the economic-financial performance of companies and/or with the characteristics of corporate governance. However, there is still room to investigate possible mechanisms of reciprocity between salary increase of statutory directors and the remuneration increase among members of the boards of directors.Results: The results indicate that the remuneration of the board of directors is positively related to the remuneration of executives; that these remunerations do not present a significant relation with the economic-financial performance of the companies; and that cash flow risk is negatively related to executive compensation.Theoretical/Methodological Contributions: The study provides evidence of a synchronism between remuneration of executives and directors, a fact that may explain why the remuneration of these agents is not related to the economic-financial performance of the companies. Also, it shows that executive compensation packages contribute to reducing the risk of the cash flows to which companies are exposed. |
publishDate |
2019 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2019-08-31 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/article/view/1984 10.51341/1984-3925_2019v22n2a2 |
url |
https://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/article/view/1984 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.51341/1984-3925_2019v22n2a2 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng por |
language |
eng por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/article/view/1984/pdf https://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/article/view/1984/pdf_1 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2019 Revista Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2019 Revista Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Contabilidade Gestão e Governança |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Contabilidade Gestão e Governança |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Contabilidade Gestão e Governança; v. 22 n. 2 (2019); 171-187 1984-3925 1984-3925 reponame:Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança instname:Universidade de Brasília (UnB) instacron:UNB |
instname_str |
Universidade de Brasília (UnB) |
instacron_str |
UNB |
institution |
UNB |
reponame_str |
Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança |
collection |
Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança - Universidade de Brasília (UnB) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
jamg.cgg@gmail.com |
_version_ |
1798315268124966912 |