Values, Truth and Inquiry: a pragmatist alternative to Russell’s non-cognitivism

• Autor(a) principal: da Cunha, Ivan Ferreira
• Data de Publicação: 2022
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Trans/Form/Ação (Online)
• Texto Completo: https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/8629
• topic: Epistemology; Social Philosophy; Dystopia; Russell; Pragmatism; Dewey; Lewis; Epistemologia; Filosofia social; Distopia; Russell; Pragmatismo; Dewey; Lewis

This article presents a pragmatist framework to understand the epistemic status of the valuation produced upon reflection on social consequences of scientific and technological proposals. The problem is set following Bertrand Russell’s considerations on the impact of science on society. Russell argues that valuating social arrangements falls beyond the limits of knowledge, because valuations cannot be true or false in the sense of correspondence. This leads social thought to a deadlock, since one cannot know that a given social arrangement would be undesirable or inadequate. This article sketches an alternative from Clarence Irving Lewis’s works on valuation taken in continuity with John Dewey’s theory of inquiry. This alternative framework assumes epistemic notions of truth and justification, allowing that valuations can be construed in contexts of inquiry and thus as objects of knowledge.