The projective theory of consciousness: from neuroscience to philosophical psychology
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2023 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Trans/Form/Ação (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/8298 |
Resumo: | The development of the interdisciplinary areas of cognitive, affective and action neurosciences contributes to the identification of neurobiological bases of conscious experience. The structure of consciousness was philosophically conceived a century ago (HUSSERL, 1913) as consisting of a subjective pole, the bearer of experiences, and an objective pole composed of experienced contents. In more recent formulations, Nagel (1974) refers to a “point of view”, in which qualitative experiences are anchored, while Velmans (1990, 1993, 2009, 2017) understands that phenomenal content is composed of mental representations “projected” to the space external to the brains that construct them. In Freudian psychology, the conscious mind contains a tension between the Id and the Ego (FREUD, 1913). How to relate this bipolar structure with the results of neuroscience? I propose the notion of projection [also used by Williford et al. (2012)] as a bridge principle connecting the neurobiological systems of knowing, feeling and acting with the bipolar structure. The projective process is considered responsible for the generation of the sense of self and the sense of the world, composing an informational phenomenal field generated by the nervous system and experienced in the first-person perspective. After presenting the projective hypothesis, I discuss its philosophical status, relating it to the phenomenal (BLOCK, 1995, 2008, 2011) and high-order thought (ROSENTHAL, 2006; BROWN, 2014) approaches, and a mathematical model of projection (RUDRAUF et al., 2017). Eight ways of testing the status of the projective hypothesis are briefly mentioned. |
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The projective theory of consciousness: from neuroscience to philosophical psychologyProjectionConsciousnessCognitiveNon-ConceptualFeelingThe development of the interdisciplinary areas of cognitive, affective and action neurosciences contributes to the identification of neurobiological bases of conscious experience. The structure of consciousness was philosophically conceived a century ago (HUSSERL, 1913) as consisting of a subjective pole, the bearer of experiences, and an objective pole composed of experienced contents. In more recent formulations, Nagel (1974) refers to a “point of view”, in which qualitative experiences are anchored, while Velmans (1990, 1993, 2009, 2017) understands that phenomenal content is composed of mental representations “projected” to the space external to the brains that construct them. In Freudian psychology, the conscious mind contains a tension between the Id and the Ego (FREUD, 1913). How to relate this bipolar structure with the results of neuroscience? I propose the notion of projection [also used by Williford et al. (2012)] as a bridge principle connecting the neurobiological systems of knowing, feeling and acting with the bipolar structure. The projective process is considered responsible for the generation of the sense of self and the sense of the world, composing an informational phenomenal field generated by the nervous system and experienced in the first-person perspective. After presenting the projective hypothesis, I discuss its philosophical status, relating it to the phenomenal (BLOCK, 1995, 2008, 2011) and high-order thought (ROSENTHAL, 2006; BROWN, 2014) approaches, and a mathematical model of projection (RUDRAUF et al., 2017). Eight ways of testing the status of the projective hypothesis are briefly mentioned.Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências2023-02-10info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdftext/htmlapplication/x-mobipocket-ebookapplication/epub+ziphttps://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/8298TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia da Unesp; v. 41 n. Special Issue: Número Especial; 199-232TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 41 No. Special Issue: Special Issue/2018; 199-232TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 41 Núm. Special Issue: Número Especial; 199-232TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 41 No. Special Issue: Número Especial; 199-232TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia; V. 41 N. Special Issue: Número Especial; 199-2321980-539X0101-3173reponame:Trans/Form/Ação (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)instacron:UNESPenghttps://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/8298/10513https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/8298/10514https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/8298/12897https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/8298/12898Copyright (c) 2018 TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofiahttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessPereira Junior, Alfredo2023-04-28T13:38:52Zoai:ojs.revistas.marilia.unesp.br:article/8298Revistahttps://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/PUBhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.phptransformacao@marilia.unesp.br1980-539X0101-3173opendoar:2023-04-28T13:38:52Trans/Form/Ação (Online) - Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
The projective theory of consciousness: from neuroscience to philosophical psychology |
title |
The projective theory of consciousness: from neuroscience to philosophical psychology |
spellingShingle |
The projective theory of consciousness: from neuroscience to philosophical psychology Pereira Junior, Alfredo Projection Consciousness Cognitive Non-Conceptual Feeling |
title_short |
The projective theory of consciousness: from neuroscience to philosophical psychology |
title_full |
The projective theory of consciousness: from neuroscience to philosophical psychology |
title_fullStr |
The projective theory of consciousness: from neuroscience to philosophical psychology |
title_full_unstemmed |
The projective theory of consciousness: from neuroscience to philosophical psychology |
title_sort |
The projective theory of consciousness: from neuroscience to philosophical psychology |
author |
Pereira Junior, Alfredo |
author_facet |
Pereira Junior, Alfredo |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Pereira Junior, Alfredo |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Projection Consciousness Cognitive Non-Conceptual Feeling |
topic |
Projection Consciousness Cognitive Non-Conceptual Feeling |
description |
The development of the interdisciplinary areas of cognitive, affective and action neurosciences contributes to the identification of neurobiological bases of conscious experience. The structure of consciousness was philosophically conceived a century ago (HUSSERL, 1913) as consisting of a subjective pole, the bearer of experiences, and an objective pole composed of experienced contents. In more recent formulations, Nagel (1974) refers to a “point of view”, in which qualitative experiences are anchored, while Velmans (1990, 1993, 2009, 2017) understands that phenomenal content is composed of mental representations “projected” to the space external to the brains that construct them. In Freudian psychology, the conscious mind contains a tension between the Id and the Ego (FREUD, 1913). How to relate this bipolar structure with the results of neuroscience? I propose the notion of projection [also used by Williford et al. (2012)] as a bridge principle connecting the neurobiological systems of knowing, feeling and acting with the bipolar structure. The projective process is considered responsible for the generation of the sense of self and the sense of the world, composing an informational phenomenal field generated by the nervous system and experienced in the first-person perspective. After presenting the projective hypothesis, I discuss its philosophical status, relating it to the phenomenal (BLOCK, 1995, 2008, 2011) and high-order thought (ROSENTHAL, 2006; BROWN, 2014) approaches, and a mathematical model of projection (RUDRAUF et al., 2017). Eight ways of testing the status of the projective hypothesis are briefly mentioned. |
publishDate |
2023 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2023-02-10 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/8298 |
url |
https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/8298 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/8298/10513 https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/8298/10514 https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/8298/12897 https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/8298/12898 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2018 TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2018 TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf text/html application/x-mobipocket-ebook application/epub+zip |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia da Unesp; v. 41 n. Special Issue: Número Especial; 199-232 TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 41 No. Special Issue: Special Issue/2018; 199-232 TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 41 Núm. Special Issue: Número Especial; 199-232 TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 41 No. Special Issue: Número Especial; 199-232 TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia; V. 41 N. Special Issue: Número Especial; 199-232 1980-539X 0101-3173 reponame:Trans/Form/Ação (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP) instacron:UNESP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP) |
instacron_str |
UNESP |
institution |
UNESP |
reponame_str |
Trans/Form/Ação (Online) |
collection |
Trans/Form/Ação (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Trans/Form/Ação (Online) - Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
transformacao@marilia.unesp.br |
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1794795209817587712 |