“Music to the ears of weaklings”: moral hydraulics and the unseating of desire

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Chapman, Louise Rebecca
Data de Publicação: 2018
Outros Autores: Sandis, Constantine
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654125
Resumo: Psychological eudaimonism (PE) is the view that we are constituted by a desire to avoid the harmful. This entails that coming to see a prospective or actual object of pursuit as harmful to us will unseat our positive evaluative belief about (and co-instantiated desire for) that object (§I). There is more than one way that such an 'unseating' of desire may be caused on an intellectualist picture (§II). This paper arbitrates between two readings of Socrates' 'attack on laziness' in the Meno, with the aim of constructing a model of moral education based on PE's implied moral psychology. In particular, we argue against the view that when we come to see – through prudential reasoning – that our blatant evaluative beliefs and desires disserve eudaimonism, we will no longer perceive their intentional objects as choice-worthy. We suggest, instead, that it is by experiencing shame that we cease to see the intentional objects of our evaluative beliefs and desires as worthy of pursuit (§III). This form of 'hydraulic education' bypasses reason-responsiveness altogether. As such, it only allows for practical norms to be derived from the nature of agency indirectly, namely by enabling the use of discursive practical reasoning.
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spelling “Music to the ears of weaklings”: moral hydraulics and the unseating of desireMoral hydraulics. Practical reasoning. Moral education. Psychological eudaimonism. Plato's meno.Psychological eudaimonism (PE) is the view that we are constituted by a desire to avoid the harmful. This entails that coming to see a prospective or actual object of pursuit as harmful to us will unseat our positive evaluative belief about (and co-instantiated desire for) that object (§I). There is more than one way that such an 'unseating' of desire may be caused on an intellectualist picture (§II). This paper arbitrates between two readings of Socrates' 'attack on laziness' in the Meno, with the aim of constructing a model of moral education based on PE's implied moral psychology. In particular, we argue against the view that when we come to see – through prudential reasoning – that our blatant evaluative beliefs and desires disserve eudaimonism, we will no longer perceive their intentional objects as choice-worthy. We suggest, instead, that it is by experiencing shame that we cease to see the intentional objects of our evaluative beliefs and desires as worthy of pursuit (§III). This form of 'hydraulic education' bypasses reason-responsiveness altogether. As such, it only allows for practical norms to be derived from the nature of agency indirectly, namely by enabling the use of discursive practical reasoning.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2018-12-04info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionNot applicableapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654125Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 41 n. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 71-112Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 41 No. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 71-112Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 41 Núm. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 71-1122317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654125/18848Copyright (c) 2018 Manuscritoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessChapman, Louise RebeccaSandis, Constantine2018-12-04T09:48:51Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8654125Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2018-12-04T09:48:51Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv “Music to the ears of weaklings”: moral hydraulics and the unseating of desire
title “Music to the ears of weaklings”: moral hydraulics and the unseating of desire
spellingShingle “Music to the ears of weaklings”: moral hydraulics and the unseating of desire
Chapman, Louise Rebecca
Moral hydraulics. Practical reasoning. Moral education. Psychological eudaimonism. Plato's meno.
title_short “Music to the ears of weaklings”: moral hydraulics and the unseating of desire
title_full “Music to the ears of weaklings”: moral hydraulics and the unseating of desire
title_fullStr “Music to the ears of weaklings”: moral hydraulics and the unseating of desire
title_full_unstemmed “Music to the ears of weaklings”: moral hydraulics and the unseating of desire
title_sort “Music to the ears of weaklings”: moral hydraulics and the unseating of desire
author Chapman, Louise Rebecca
author_facet Chapman, Louise Rebecca
Sandis, Constantine
author_role author
author2 Sandis, Constantine
author2_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Chapman, Louise Rebecca
Sandis, Constantine
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Moral hydraulics. Practical reasoning. Moral education. Psychological eudaimonism. Plato's meno.
topic Moral hydraulics. Practical reasoning. Moral education. Psychological eudaimonism. Plato's meno.
description Psychological eudaimonism (PE) is the view that we are constituted by a desire to avoid the harmful. This entails that coming to see a prospective or actual object of pursuit as harmful to us will unseat our positive evaluative belief about (and co-instantiated desire for) that object (§I). There is more than one way that such an 'unseating' of desire may be caused on an intellectualist picture (§II). This paper arbitrates between two readings of Socrates' 'attack on laziness' in the Meno, with the aim of constructing a model of moral education based on PE's implied moral psychology. In particular, we argue against the view that when we come to see – through prudential reasoning – that our blatant evaluative beliefs and desires disserve eudaimonism, we will no longer perceive their intentional objects as choice-worthy. We suggest, instead, that it is by experiencing shame that we cease to see the intentional objects of our evaluative beliefs and desires as worthy of pursuit (§III). This form of 'hydraulic education' bypasses reason-responsiveness altogether. As such, it only allows for practical norms to be derived from the nature of agency indirectly, namely by enabling the use of discursive practical reasoning.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018-12-04
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
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format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654125
url https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654125
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654125/18848
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2018 Manuscrito
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2018 Manuscrito
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 41 n. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 71-112
Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 41 No. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 71-112
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 41 Núm. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 71-112
2317-630X
reponame:Manuscrito (Online)
instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron:UNICAMP
instname_str Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron_str UNICAMP
institution UNICAMP
reponame_str Manuscrito (Online)
collection Manuscrito (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br
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