“Music to the ears of weaklings”: moral hydraulics and the unseating of desire
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2018 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654125 |
Resumo: | Psychological eudaimonism (PE) is the view that we are constituted by a desire to avoid the harmful. This entails that coming to see a prospective or actual object of pursuit as harmful to us will unseat our positive evaluative belief about (and co-instantiated desire for) that object (§I). There is more than one way that such an 'unseating' of desire may be caused on an intellectualist picture (§II). This paper arbitrates between two readings of Socrates' 'attack on laziness' in the Meno, with the aim of constructing a model of moral education based on PE's implied moral psychology. In particular, we argue against the view that when we come to see – through prudential reasoning – that our blatant evaluative beliefs and desires disserve eudaimonism, we will no longer perceive their intentional objects as choice-worthy. We suggest, instead, that it is by experiencing shame that we cease to see the intentional objects of our evaluative beliefs and desires as worthy of pursuit (§III). This form of 'hydraulic education' bypasses reason-responsiveness altogether. As such, it only allows for practical norms to be derived from the nature of agency indirectly, namely by enabling the use of discursive practical reasoning. |
id |
UNICAMP-17_0aac0e1757804b186f53bc65774aeff0 |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8654125 |
network_acronym_str |
UNICAMP-17 |
network_name_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository_id_str |
|
spelling |
“Music to the ears of weaklings”: moral hydraulics and the unseating of desireMoral hydraulics. Practical reasoning. Moral education. Psychological eudaimonism. Plato's meno.Psychological eudaimonism (PE) is the view that we are constituted by a desire to avoid the harmful. This entails that coming to see a prospective or actual object of pursuit as harmful to us will unseat our positive evaluative belief about (and co-instantiated desire for) that object (§I). There is more than one way that such an 'unseating' of desire may be caused on an intellectualist picture (§II). This paper arbitrates between two readings of Socrates' 'attack on laziness' in the Meno, with the aim of constructing a model of moral education based on PE's implied moral psychology. In particular, we argue against the view that when we come to see – through prudential reasoning – that our blatant evaluative beliefs and desires disserve eudaimonism, we will no longer perceive their intentional objects as choice-worthy. We suggest, instead, that it is by experiencing shame that we cease to see the intentional objects of our evaluative beliefs and desires as worthy of pursuit (§III). This form of 'hydraulic education' bypasses reason-responsiveness altogether. As such, it only allows for practical norms to be derived from the nature of agency indirectly, namely by enabling the use of discursive practical reasoning.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2018-12-04info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionNot applicableapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654125Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 41 n. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 71-112Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 41 No. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 71-112Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 41 Núm. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 71-1122317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654125/18848Copyright (c) 2018 Manuscritoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessChapman, Louise RebeccaSandis, Constantine2018-12-04T09:48:51Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8654125Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2018-12-04T09:48:51Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
“Music to the ears of weaklings”: moral hydraulics and the unseating of desire |
title |
“Music to the ears of weaklings”: moral hydraulics and the unseating of desire |
spellingShingle |
“Music to the ears of weaklings”: moral hydraulics and the unseating of desire Chapman, Louise Rebecca Moral hydraulics. Practical reasoning. Moral education. Psychological eudaimonism. Plato's meno. |
title_short |
“Music to the ears of weaklings”: moral hydraulics and the unseating of desire |
title_full |
“Music to the ears of weaklings”: moral hydraulics and the unseating of desire |
title_fullStr |
“Music to the ears of weaklings”: moral hydraulics and the unseating of desire |
title_full_unstemmed |
“Music to the ears of weaklings”: moral hydraulics and the unseating of desire |
title_sort |
“Music to the ears of weaklings”: moral hydraulics and the unseating of desire |
author |
Chapman, Louise Rebecca |
author_facet |
Chapman, Louise Rebecca Sandis, Constantine |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Sandis, Constantine |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Chapman, Louise Rebecca Sandis, Constantine |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Moral hydraulics. Practical reasoning. Moral education. Psychological eudaimonism. Plato's meno. |
topic |
Moral hydraulics. Practical reasoning. Moral education. Psychological eudaimonism. Plato's meno. |
description |
Psychological eudaimonism (PE) is the view that we are constituted by a desire to avoid the harmful. This entails that coming to see a prospective or actual object of pursuit as harmful to us will unseat our positive evaluative belief about (and co-instantiated desire for) that object (§I). There is more than one way that such an 'unseating' of desire may be caused on an intellectualist picture (§II). This paper arbitrates between two readings of Socrates' 'attack on laziness' in the Meno, with the aim of constructing a model of moral education based on PE's implied moral psychology. In particular, we argue against the view that when we come to see – through prudential reasoning – that our blatant evaluative beliefs and desires disserve eudaimonism, we will no longer perceive their intentional objects as choice-worthy. We suggest, instead, that it is by experiencing shame that we cease to see the intentional objects of our evaluative beliefs and desires as worthy of pursuit (§III). This form of 'hydraulic education' bypasses reason-responsiveness altogether. As such, it only allows for practical norms to be derived from the nature of agency indirectly, namely by enabling the use of discursive practical reasoning. |
publishDate |
2018 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-12-04 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Not applicable |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654125 |
url |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654125 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654125/18848 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2018 Manuscrito info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2018 Manuscrito |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 41 n. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 71-112 Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 41 No. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 71-112 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 41 Núm. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 71-112 2317-630X reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
_version_ |
1800216567048306688 |