From the begriffsschrift to “uber sinn und bedeutung”: frege as epistemologist and ontologist
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2017 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8647846 |
Resumo: | Frege presents the eponymous distinction of “Über Sinn und Bedeutung” (USB) as a correction to the theory of identity he held in the Begriffsschrift.1 His retrospective assessment has prompted different reactions from commentators. Many have simply taken him at his word.2 Others, who have lingered over the relevant texts, have encountered a difficulty: in the Begriffsschrift Frege appears to raise the same problem with which he begins USB and to respond to it in words that are strikingly similar to those found in the later work.3 Thus, a number of important scholars have been led to argue that Frege misrepresents his earlier view: contrary to what he says in USB, the Begriffsschrift already contains the distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung.4 Despite their obvious differences, the logic of both interpretations requires that the two works be responsive to the same problem. In this paper I challenge that fundamental premise.5 If I might be allowed to express my thesis tersely but suggestively: the problem of the Begriffsschrift is epistemological; that of USB, |
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From the begriffsschrift to “uber sinn und bedeutung”: frege as epistemologist and ontologistFrege. Sinn. OntologyFrege presents the eponymous distinction of “Über Sinn und Bedeutung” (USB) as a correction to the theory of identity he held in the Begriffsschrift.1 His retrospective assessment has prompted different reactions from commentators. Many have simply taken him at his word.2 Others, who have lingered over the relevant texts, have encountered a difficulty: in the Begriffsschrift Frege appears to raise the same problem with which he begins USB and to respond to it in words that are strikingly similar to those found in the later work.3 Thus, a number of important scholars have been led to argue that Frege misrepresents his earlier view: contrary to what he says in USB, the Begriffsschrift already contains the distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung.4 Despite their obvious differences, the logic of both interpretations requires that the two works be responsive to the same problem. In this paper I challenge that fundamental premise.5 If I might be allowed to express my thesis tersely but suggestively: the problem of the Begriffsschrift is epistemological; that of USB,Universidade Estadual de Campinas2017-03-07info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionAnálise lógicaapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8647846Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 39 n. 3 (2016): jul./set.; 29-90Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 39 No. 3 (2016): jul./set.; 29-90Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 39 Núm. 3 (2016): jul./set.; 29-902317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8647846/14621Copyright (c) 2016 Manuscritoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessRosenkrantz, Max2017-11-09T09:17:52Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8647846Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2017-11-09T09:17:52Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
From the begriffsschrift to “uber sinn und bedeutung”: frege as epistemologist and ontologist |
title |
From the begriffsschrift to “uber sinn und bedeutung”: frege as epistemologist and ontologist |
spellingShingle |
From the begriffsschrift to “uber sinn und bedeutung”: frege as epistemologist and ontologist Rosenkrantz, Max Frege. Sinn. Ontology |
title_short |
From the begriffsschrift to “uber sinn und bedeutung”: frege as epistemologist and ontologist |
title_full |
From the begriffsschrift to “uber sinn und bedeutung”: frege as epistemologist and ontologist |
title_fullStr |
From the begriffsschrift to “uber sinn und bedeutung”: frege as epistemologist and ontologist |
title_full_unstemmed |
From the begriffsschrift to “uber sinn und bedeutung”: frege as epistemologist and ontologist |
title_sort |
From the begriffsschrift to “uber sinn und bedeutung”: frege as epistemologist and ontologist |
author |
Rosenkrantz, Max |
author_facet |
Rosenkrantz, Max |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Rosenkrantz, Max |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Frege. Sinn. Ontology |
topic |
Frege. Sinn. Ontology |
description |
Frege presents the eponymous distinction of “Über Sinn und Bedeutung” (USB) as a correction to the theory of identity he held in the Begriffsschrift.1 His retrospective assessment has prompted different reactions from commentators. Many have simply taken him at his word.2 Others, who have lingered over the relevant texts, have encountered a difficulty: in the Begriffsschrift Frege appears to raise the same problem with which he begins USB and to respond to it in words that are strikingly similar to those found in the later work.3 Thus, a number of important scholars have been led to argue that Frege misrepresents his earlier view: contrary to what he says in USB, the Begriffsschrift already contains the distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung.4 Despite their obvious differences, the logic of both interpretations requires that the two works be responsive to the same problem. In this paper I challenge that fundamental premise.5 If I might be allowed to express my thesis tersely but suggestively: the problem of the Begriffsschrift is epistemological; that of USB, |
publishDate |
2017 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2017-03-07 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Análise lógica |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8647846 |
url |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8647846 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8647846/14621 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2016 Manuscrito info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2016 Manuscrito |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 39 n. 3 (2016): jul./set.; 29-90 Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 39 No. 3 (2016): jul./set.; 29-90 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 39 Núm. 3 (2016): jul./set.; 29-90 2317-630X reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
_version_ |
1800216566640410624 |