From the begriffsschrift to “uber sinn und bedeutung”: frege as epistemologist and ontologist

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Rosenkrantz, Max
Data de Publicação: 2017
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8647846
Resumo: Frege presents the eponymous distinction of “Über Sinn und Bedeutung” (USB) as a correction to the theory of identity he held in the Begriffsschrift.1 His retrospective assessment has prompted different reactions from commentators. Many have simply taken him at his word.2 Others, who have lingered over the relevant texts, have encountered a difficulty: in the Begriffsschrift Frege appears to raise the same problem with which he begins USB and to respond to it in words that are strikingly similar to those found in the later work.3 Thus, a number of important scholars have been led to argue that Frege misrepresents his earlier view: contrary to what he says in USB, the Begriffsschrift already contains the distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung.4 Despite their obvious differences, the logic of both interpretations requires that the two works be responsive to the same problem. In this paper I challenge that fundamental premise.5 If I might be allowed to express my thesis tersely but suggestively: the problem of the Begriffsschrift is epistemological; that of USB,
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spelling From the begriffsschrift to “uber sinn und bedeutung”: frege as epistemologist and ontologistFrege. Sinn. OntologyFrege presents the eponymous distinction of “Über Sinn und Bedeutung” (USB) as a correction to the theory of identity he held in the Begriffsschrift.1 His retrospective assessment has prompted different reactions from commentators. Many have simply taken him at his word.2 Others, who have lingered over the relevant texts, have encountered a difficulty: in the Begriffsschrift Frege appears to raise the same problem with which he begins USB and to respond to it in words that are strikingly similar to those found in the later work.3 Thus, a number of important scholars have been led to argue that Frege misrepresents his earlier view: contrary to what he says in USB, the Begriffsschrift already contains the distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung.4 Despite their obvious differences, the logic of both interpretations requires that the two works be responsive to the same problem. In this paper I challenge that fundamental premise.5 If I might be allowed to express my thesis tersely but suggestively: the problem of the Begriffsschrift is epistemological; that of USB,Universidade Estadual de Campinas2017-03-07info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionAnálise lógicaapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8647846Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 39 n. 3 (2016): jul./set.; 29-90Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 39 No. 3 (2016): jul./set.; 29-90Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 39 Núm. 3 (2016): jul./set.; 29-902317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8647846/14621Copyright (c) 2016 Manuscritoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessRosenkrantz, Max2017-11-09T09:17:52Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8647846Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2017-11-09T09:17:52Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv From the begriffsschrift to “uber sinn und bedeutung”: frege as epistemologist and ontologist
title From the begriffsschrift to “uber sinn und bedeutung”: frege as epistemologist and ontologist
spellingShingle From the begriffsschrift to “uber sinn und bedeutung”: frege as epistemologist and ontologist
Rosenkrantz, Max
Frege. Sinn. Ontology
title_short From the begriffsschrift to “uber sinn und bedeutung”: frege as epistemologist and ontologist
title_full From the begriffsschrift to “uber sinn und bedeutung”: frege as epistemologist and ontologist
title_fullStr From the begriffsschrift to “uber sinn und bedeutung”: frege as epistemologist and ontologist
title_full_unstemmed From the begriffsschrift to “uber sinn und bedeutung”: frege as epistemologist and ontologist
title_sort From the begriffsschrift to “uber sinn und bedeutung”: frege as epistemologist and ontologist
author Rosenkrantz, Max
author_facet Rosenkrantz, Max
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Rosenkrantz, Max
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Frege. Sinn. Ontology
topic Frege. Sinn. Ontology
description Frege presents the eponymous distinction of “Über Sinn und Bedeutung” (USB) as a correction to the theory of identity he held in the Begriffsschrift.1 His retrospective assessment has prompted different reactions from commentators. Many have simply taken him at his word.2 Others, who have lingered over the relevant texts, have encountered a difficulty: in the Begriffsschrift Frege appears to raise the same problem with which he begins USB and to respond to it in words that are strikingly similar to those found in the later work.3 Thus, a number of important scholars have been led to argue that Frege misrepresents his earlier view: contrary to what he says in USB, the Begriffsschrift already contains the distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung.4 Despite their obvious differences, the logic of both interpretations requires that the two works be responsive to the same problem. In this paper I challenge that fundamental premise.5 If I might be allowed to express my thesis tersely but suggestively: the problem of the Begriffsschrift is epistemological; that of USB,
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017-03-07
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Análise lógica
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8647846
url https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8647846
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8647846/14621
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2016 Manuscrito
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2016 Manuscrito
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 39 n. 3 (2016): jul./set.; 29-90
Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 39 No. 3 (2016): jul./set.; 29-90
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 39 Núm. 3 (2016): jul./set.; 29-90
2317-630X
reponame:Manuscrito (Online)
instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron:UNICAMP
instname_str Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron_str UNICAMP
institution UNICAMP
reponame_str Manuscrito (Online)
collection Manuscrito (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br
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