Eliminativism, conceptual change and mental concepts
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2016 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8643613 |
Resumo: | In this work I present the lines of argument that lead to the eliminative thesis, one that comes from considerations concerning the relationship between a psychology of meaning as a psychology / mature neuroscience, and another from metaphysical considerations about the nature of phenomena. mental problems and their causal interaction with the physical world, and try to show the inadequacy of both argumentative lines. Secondly, I mention three lines of criticism of eliminative attempts, showing their weaknesses. Finally, I offer an alternative argumentative line to support the implausibility of eliminativism based on considerations about the scope of a possible radical conceptual shift on some ordinary mentalist concepts that eliminativism seems to suppose. |
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Eliminativism, conceptual change and mental conceptsEliminativismo, cambio conceptual y conceptos mentalesConceptualEliminativismFenómenosConceptualEliminationismPhenonymsIn this work I present the lines of argument that lead to the eliminative thesis, one that comes from considerations concerning the relationship between a psychology of meaning as a psychology / mature neuroscience, and another from metaphysical considerations about the nature of phenomena. mental problems and their causal interaction with the physical world, and try to show the inadequacy of both argumentative lines. Secondly, I mention three lines of criticism of eliminative attempts, showing their weaknesses. Finally, I offer an alternative argumentative line to support the implausibility of eliminativism based on considerations about the scope of a possible radical conceptual shift on some ordinary mentalist concepts that eliminativism seems to suppose.En este trabajo presento dos líneas de argumentación que desembocan en la tesis eliminativista, una proveniente de consideraciones relativas a la relación entre nuestra psicología de sentido común y la ciencia psicológica/neurociencia madura, y otra proveniente de consideraciones metafísicas acerca de la naturaleza de los fenómenos mentales y su interacción causal con el mundo físico, y trato de mostrar la inadecuación de ambas líneas argumentativas. En segundo lugar, menciono tres líneas de crítica a los intentos eliminativistas, mostrando sus debilidades. Finalmente, ofrezco una línea argumentativa alternativa para sostener la implausibilidad del eliminativismo basada en consideraciones acerca de los alcances de un posible cambio conceptual radical en nuestros conceptos mentalistas ordinarios que el eliminativismo parece suponer.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2016-02-25info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionTextoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/otherapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8643613Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 29 n. 2 (2006): Jul./Dec.; 707-727Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 29 No. 2 (2006): Jul./Dec.; 707-727Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 29 Núm. 2 (2006): Jul./Dec.; 707-7272317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8643613/11133Brazil; ContemporaryBrasil; ContemporáneoCopyright (c) 2006 Manuscritoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessPérez, Diana2019-12-06T15:34:21Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8643613Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2019-12-06T15:34:21Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Eliminativism, conceptual change and mental concepts Eliminativismo, cambio conceptual y conceptos mentales |
title |
Eliminativism, conceptual change and mental concepts |
spellingShingle |
Eliminativism, conceptual change and mental concepts Pérez, Diana Conceptual Eliminativism Fenómenos Conceptual Eliminationism Phenonyms |
title_short |
Eliminativism, conceptual change and mental concepts |
title_full |
Eliminativism, conceptual change and mental concepts |
title_fullStr |
Eliminativism, conceptual change and mental concepts |
title_full_unstemmed |
Eliminativism, conceptual change and mental concepts |
title_sort |
Eliminativism, conceptual change and mental concepts |
author |
Pérez, Diana |
author_facet |
Pérez, Diana |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Pérez, Diana |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Conceptual Eliminativism Fenómenos Conceptual Eliminationism Phenonyms |
topic |
Conceptual Eliminativism Fenómenos Conceptual Eliminationism Phenonyms |
description |
In this work I present the lines of argument that lead to the eliminative thesis, one that comes from considerations concerning the relationship between a psychology of meaning as a psychology / mature neuroscience, and another from metaphysical considerations about the nature of phenomena. mental problems and their causal interaction with the physical world, and try to show the inadequacy of both argumentative lines. Secondly, I mention three lines of criticism of eliminative attempts, showing their weaknesses. Finally, I offer an alternative argumentative line to support the implausibility of eliminativism based on considerations about the scope of a possible radical conceptual shift on some ordinary mentalist concepts that eliminativism seems to suppose. |
publishDate |
2016 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2016-02-25 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Texto info:eu-repo/semantics/other |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8643613 |
url |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8643613 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8643613/11133 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2006 Manuscrito info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2006 Manuscrito |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv |
Brazil; Contemporary Brasil; Contemporáneo |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 29 n. 2 (2006): Jul./Dec.; 707-727 Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 29 No. 2 (2006): Jul./Dec.; 707-727 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 29 Núm. 2 (2006): Jul./Dec.; 707-727 2317-630X reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
_version_ |
1800216566102491136 |