Eliminativism, conceptual change and mental concepts

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Pérez, Diana
Data de Publicação: 2016
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8643613
Resumo: In this work I present the lines of argument that lead to the eliminative thesis, one that comes from considerations concerning the relationship between a psychology of meaning as a psychology / mature neuroscience, and another from metaphysical considerations about the nature of phenomena. mental problems and their causal interaction with the physical world, and try to show the inadequacy of both argumentative lines. Secondly, I mention three lines of criticism of eliminative attempts, showing their weaknesses. Finally, I offer an alternative argumentative line to support the implausibility of eliminativism based on considerations about the scope of a possible radical conceptual shift on some ordinary mentalist concepts that eliminativism seems to suppose.
id UNICAMP-17_3595c5b146c0cd2360b5ae86dbefd205
oai_identifier_str oai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8643613
network_acronym_str UNICAMP-17
network_name_str Manuscrito (Online)
repository_id_str
spelling Eliminativism, conceptual change and mental conceptsEliminativismo, cambio conceptual y conceptos mentalesConceptualEliminativismFenómenosConceptualEliminationismPhenonymsIn this work I present the lines of argument that lead to the eliminative thesis, one that comes from considerations concerning the relationship between a psychology of meaning as a psychology / mature neuroscience, and another from metaphysical considerations about the nature of phenomena. mental problems and their causal interaction with the physical world, and try to show the inadequacy of both argumentative lines. Secondly, I mention three lines of criticism of eliminative attempts, showing their weaknesses. Finally, I offer an alternative argumentative line to support the implausibility of eliminativism based on considerations about the scope of a possible radical conceptual shift on some ordinary mentalist concepts that eliminativism seems to suppose.En este trabajo presento dos líneas de argumentación que desembocan en la tesis eliminativista, una proveniente de consideraciones relativas a la relación entre nuestra psicología de sentido común y la ciencia psicológica/neurociencia madura, y otra proveniente de consideraciones metafísicas acerca de la naturaleza de los fenómenos mentales y su interacción causal con el mundo físico, y trato de mostrar la inadecuación de ambas líneas argumentativas. En segundo lugar, menciono tres líneas de crítica a los intentos eliminativistas, mostrando sus debilidades. Finalmente, ofrezco una línea argumentativa alternativa para sostener la implausibilidad del eliminativismo basada en consideraciones acerca de los alcances de un posible cambio conceptual radical en nuestros conceptos mentalistas ordinarios que el eliminativismo parece suponer.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2016-02-25info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionTextoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/otherapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8643613Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 29 n. 2 (2006): Jul./Dec.; 707-727Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 29 No. 2 (2006): Jul./Dec.; 707-727Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 29 Núm. 2 (2006): Jul./Dec.; 707-7272317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8643613/11133Brazil; ContemporaryBrasil; ContemporáneoCopyright (c) 2006 Manuscritoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessPérez, Diana2019-12-06T15:34:21Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8643613Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2019-12-06T15:34:21Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Eliminativism, conceptual change and mental concepts
Eliminativismo, cambio conceptual y conceptos mentales
title Eliminativism, conceptual change and mental concepts
spellingShingle Eliminativism, conceptual change and mental concepts
Pérez, Diana
Conceptual
Eliminativism
Fenómenos
Conceptual
Eliminationism
Phenonyms
title_short Eliminativism, conceptual change and mental concepts
title_full Eliminativism, conceptual change and mental concepts
title_fullStr Eliminativism, conceptual change and mental concepts
title_full_unstemmed Eliminativism, conceptual change and mental concepts
title_sort Eliminativism, conceptual change and mental concepts
author Pérez, Diana
author_facet Pérez, Diana
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Pérez, Diana
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Conceptual
Eliminativism
Fenómenos
Conceptual
Eliminationism
Phenonyms
topic Conceptual
Eliminativism
Fenómenos
Conceptual
Eliminationism
Phenonyms
description In this work I present the lines of argument that lead to the eliminative thesis, one that comes from considerations concerning the relationship between a psychology of meaning as a psychology / mature neuroscience, and another from metaphysical considerations about the nature of phenomena. mental problems and their causal interaction with the physical world, and try to show the inadequacy of both argumentative lines. Secondly, I mention three lines of criticism of eliminative attempts, showing their weaknesses. Finally, I offer an alternative argumentative line to support the implausibility of eliminativism based on considerations about the scope of a possible radical conceptual shift on some ordinary mentalist concepts that eliminativism seems to suppose.
publishDate 2016
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2016-02-25
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Texto
info:eu-repo/semantics/other
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8643613
url https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8643613
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8643613/11133
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2006 Manuscrito
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2006 Manuscrito
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv Brazil; Contemporary
Brasil; Contemporáneo
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 29 n. 2 (2006): Jul./Dec.; 707-727
Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 29 No. 2 (2006): Jul./Dec.; 707-727
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 29 Núm. 2 (2006): Jul./Dec.; 707-727
2317-630X
reponame:Manuscrito (Online)
instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron:UNICAMP
instname_str Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron_str UNICAMP
institution UNICAMP
reponame_str Manuscrito (Online)
collection Manuscrito (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br
_version_ 1800216566102491136

Registros relacionados