Gómez-Torrente on reference to ordinary substances

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Abreu Zavaleta, Martín
Data de Publicação: 2021
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8664462
Resumo: According to the Kripke-Putnam orthodoxy, a term like 'water' refers to samples of the same substance as the items on the basis of which the term was introduced. However, observations due to Needham (2000) and Leslie (2013) cast doubt on the idea that there is a uniquely privileged notion of substance relevant to the determination of reference, in which case it would seem at best indeterminate what the word `water' refers to. In response to this problem, Gómez-Torrente (2019) has argued that there is a privileged notion of substance that plays a role in the determination of reference, namely, the ordinary notion of substance. This paper argues that Gómez-Torrente's proposal is not successful. Contrary to what Gómez-Torrente supposes, there is no uniquely privileged ordinary notion of substance; rather, there are many notions of substance compatible with the meaning of 'substance' none of which seems privileged over the rest.
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spelling Gómez-Torrente on reference to ordinary substancesGómez-Torrente on reference to ordinary substancesGómez-Torrente on reference to ordinary substancesReferenciaTérminos de tipo naturalReferênciaTermos de tipo naturalReferenceNatural kind termsAccording to the Kripke-Putnam orthodoxy, a term like 'water' refers to samples of the same substance as the items on the basis of which the term was introduced. However, observations due to Needham (2000) and Leslie (2013) cast doubt on the idea that there is a uniquely privileged notion of substance relevant to the determination of reference, in which case it would seem at best indeterminate what the word `water' refers to. In response to this problem, Gómez-Torrente (2019) has argued that there is a privileged notion of substance that plays a role in the determination of reference, namely, the ordinary notion of substance. This paper argues that Gómez-Torrente's proposal is not successful. Contrary to what Gómez-Torrente supposes, there is no uniquely privileged ordinary notion of substance; rather, there are many notions of substance compatible with the meaning of 'substance' none of which seems privileged over the rest.According to the Kripke-Putnam orthodoxy, a term like 'water' refers to samples of the same substance as the items on the basis of which the term was introduced. However, observations due to Needham (2000) and Leslie (2013) cast doubt on the idea that there is a uniquely privileged notion of substance relevant to the determination of reference, in which case it would seem at best indeterminate what the word `water' refers to. In response to this problem, Gómez-Torrente (2019) has argued that there is a privileged notion of substance that plays a role in the determination of reference, namely, the ordinary notion of substance. This paper argues that Gómez-Torrente's proposal is not successful. Contrary to what Gómez-Torrente supposes, there is no uniquely privileged ordinary notion of substance; rather, there are many notions of substance compatible with the meaning of 'substance' none of which seems privileged over the rest.According to the Kripke-Putnam orthodoxy, a term like 'water' refers to samples of the same substance as the items on the basis of which the term was introduced. However, observations due to Needham (2000) and Leslie (2013) cast doubt on the idea that there is a uniquely privileged notion of substance relevant to the determination of reference, in which case it would seem at best indeterminate what the word `water' refers to. In response to this problem, Gómez-Torrente (2019) has argued that there is a privileged notion of substance that plays a role in the determination of reference, namely, the ordinary notion of substance. This paper argues that Gómez-Torrente's proposal is not successful. Contrary to what Gómez-Torrente supposes, there is no uniquely privileged ordinary notion of substance; rather, there are many notions of substance compatible with the meaning of 'substance' none of which seems privileged over the rest.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2021-02-15info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionTextoTextoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/otherapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8664462Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 43 n. 4 (2020): out./dez.; 97-107Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 43 No. 4 (2020): out./dez.; 97-107Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 43 Núm. 4 (2020): out./dez.; 97-1072317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPenghttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8664462/26088Brazil; ContemporaryBrasil; ContemporáneoBrasil; ContemporâneoCopyright (c) 2020 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofiahttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessAbreu Zavaleta, Martín2021-02-15T20:50:59Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8664462Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2021-02-15T20:50:59Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Gómez-Torrente on reference to ordinary substances
Gómez-Torrente on reference to ordinary substances
Gómez-Torrente on reference to ordinary substances
title Gómez-Torrente on reference to ordinary substances
spellingShingle Gómez-Torrente on reference to ordinary substances
Abreu Zavaleta, Martín
Referencia
Términos de tipo natural
Referência
Termos de tipo natural
Reference
Natural kind terms
title_short Gómez-Torrente on reference to ordinary substances
title_full Gómez-Torrente on reference to ordinary substances
title_fullStr Gómez-Torrente on reference to ordinary substances
title_full_unstemmed Gómez-Torrente on reference to ordinary substances
title_sort Gómez-Torrente on reference to ordinary substances
author Abreu Zavaleta, Martín
author_facet Abreu Zavaleta, Martín
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Abreu Zavaleta, Martín
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Referencia
Términos de tipo natural
Referência
Termos de tipo natural
Reference
Natural kind terms
topic Referencia
Términos de tipo natural
Referência
Termos de tipo natural
Reference
Natural kind terms
description According to the Kripke-Putnam orthodoxy, a term like 'water' refers to samples of the same substance as the items on the basis of which the term was introduced. However, observations due to Needham (2000) and Leslie (2013) cast doubt on the idea that there is a uniquely privileged notion of substance relevant to the determination of reference, in which case it would seem at best indeterminate what the word `water' refers to. In response to this problem, Gómez-Torrente (2019) has argued that there is a privileged notion of substance that plays a role in the determination of reference, namely, the ordinary notion of substance. This paper argues that Gómez-Torrente's proposal is not successful. Contrary to what Gómez-Torrente supposes, there is no uniquely privileged ordinary notion of substance; rather, there are many notions of substance compatible with the meaning of 'substance' none of which seems privileged over the rest.
publishDate 2021
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2021-02-15
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Texto
Texto
info:eu-repo/semantics/other
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8664462
url https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8664462
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8664462/26088
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2020 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2020 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv Brazil; Contemporary
Brasil; Contemporáneo
Brasil; Contemporâneo
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 43 n. 4 (2020): out./dez.; 97-107
Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 43 No. 4 (2020): out./dez.; 97-107
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 43 Núm. 4 (2020): out./dez.; 97-107
2317-630X
reponame:Manuscrito (Online)
instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron:UNICAMP
instname_str Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron_str UNICAMP
institution UNICAMP
reponame_str Manuscrito (Online)
collection Manuscrito (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br
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