Are conflicting reference-fixing intentions possible? Reply to martone

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Gómez-Torrente, Mario
Data de Publicação: 2021
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8664459
Resumo: Filipe Martone argues that reference-fixing intentions where the intended object is represented by means of a description can never fix the reference of a demonstrative, and that a speaker, as a matter of empirical fact, never has simultaneous perceptual and non-perceptual reference-fixing intentions that she can intend as fixing the reference of a demonstrative. In this note I reject Martone’s arguments for these claims.
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spelling Are conflicting reference-fixing intentions possible? Reply to martoneAre conflicting reference-fixing intentions possible? Reply to martoneAre conflicting reference-fixing intentions possible? Reply to martoneIntenções de fixação de referênciaDemonstrativosIntenções conflitantesIntenciones de fijación de referenciasDemostrativosIntenciones en conflictoReference-fixing intentionsDemonstrativesConflicting intentionsFilipe Martone argues that reference-fixing intentions where the intended object is represented by means of a description can never fix the reference of a demonstrative, and that a speaker, as a matter of empirical fact, never has simultaneous perceptual and non-perceptual reference-fixing intentions that she can intend as fixing the reference of a demonstrative. In this note I reject Martone’s arguments for these claims.Filipe Martone argues that reference-fixing intentions where the intended object is represented by means of a description can never fix the reference of a demonstrative, and that a speaker, as a matter of empirical fact, never has simultaneous perceptual and non-perceptual reference-fixing intentions that she can intend as fixing the reference of a demonstrative. In this note I reject Martone’s arguments for these claims.Filipe Martone argues that reference-fixing intentions where the intended object is represented by means of a description can never fix the reference of a demonstrative, and that a speaker, as a matter of empirical fact, never has simultaneous perceptual and non-perceptual reference-fixing intentions that she can intend as fixing the reference of a demonstrative. In this note I reject Martone’s arguments for these claims.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2021-02-15info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionTextoTextoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/otherapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8664459Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 43 n. 4 (2020): out./dez.; 59-73Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 43 No. 4 (2020): out./dez.; 59-73Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 43 Núm. 4 (2020): out./dez.; 59-732317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPenghttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8664459/26085Brazil; ContemporaryBrasil; ContemporáneoBrasil; ContemporâneoCopyright (c) 2020 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofiahttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessGómez-Torrente, Mario2021-02-15T20:51:01Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8664459Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2021-02-15T20:51:01Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Are conflicting reference-fixing intentions possible? Reply to martone
Are conflicting reference-fixing intentions possible? Reply to martone
Are conflicting reference-fixing intentions possible? Reply to martone
title Are conflicting reference-fixing intentions possible? Reply to martone
spellingShingle Are conflicting reference-fixing intentions possible? Reply to martone
Gómez-Torrente, Mario
Intenções de fixação de referência
Demonstrativos
Intenções conflitantes
Intenciones de fijación de referencias
Demostrativos
Intenciones en conflicto
Reference-fixing intentions
Demonstratives
Conflicting intentions
title_short Are conflicting reference-fixing intentions possible? Reply to martone
title_full Are conflicting reference-fixing intentions possible? Reply to martone
title_fullStr Are conflicting reference-fixing intentions possible? Reply to martone
title_full_unstemmed Are conflicting reference-fixing intentions possible? Reply to martone
title_sort Are conflicting reference-fixing intentions possible? Reply to martone
author Gómez-Torrente, Mario
author_facet Gómez-Torrente, Mario
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Gómez-Torrente, Mario
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Intenções de fixação de referência
Demonstrativos
Intenções conflitantes
Intenciones de fijación de referencias
Demostrativos
Intenciones en conflicto
Reference-fixing intentions
Demonstratives
Conflicting intentions
topic Intenções de fixação de referência
Demonstrativos
Intenções conflitantes
Intenciones de fijación de referencias
Demostrativos
Intenciones en conflicto
Reference-fixing intentions
Demonstratives
Conflicting intentions
description Filipe Martone argues that reference-fixing intentions where the intended object is represented by means of a description can never fix the reference of a demonstrative, and that a speaker, as a matter of empirical fact, never has simultaneous perceptual and non-perceptual reference-fixing intentions that she can intend as fixing the reference of a demonstrative. In this note I reject Martone’s arguments for these claims.
publishDate 2021
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2021-02-15
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Texto
Texto
info:eu-repo/semantics/other
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8664459
url https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8664459
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8664459/26085
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2020 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2020 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv Brazil; Contemporary
Brasil; Contemporáneo
Brasil; Contemporâneo
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 43 n. 4 (2020): out./dez.; 59-73
Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 43 No. 4 (2020): out./dez.; 59-73
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 43 Núm. 4 (2020): out./dez.; 59-73
2317-630X
reponame:Manuscrito (Online)
instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron:UNICAMP
instname_str Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron_str UNICAMP
institution UNICAMP
reponame_str Manuscrito (Online)
collection Manuscrito (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br
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