BIFURCATIONS ON THE ROAD: CONFLICTING INTENTIONS AND DEMONSTRATIVE REFERENCE
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2020 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452020000400116 |
Resumo: | Abstract This is a critical notice of Mario Gómez-Torrente's novel account of demonstrative reference presented in chapter 2 of the recently published book Roads to Reference. After presenting the main tenets of his view (including the existence of a multitude of cases where demonstrative reference is indeterminate), I go on to critically examine a couple of its features. In section 2, I assess Gómez-Torrente’s assumption that demonstrative thought based on perception is less likely to succumb to indeterminacy than the others. I show that this aspect of his view invites unwelcome consequences regarding the transparency of thought. I do however suggest that this problem could be overcome by individuating perceptual intentions dynamically. In section 3, I express a distinct worry regarding a case, introduced en passant by Gómez-Torrente, that involves successful demonstrative reference regardless of its utterer's conflicting intentions, a result that seems to contradict his general theory. Instead of conceiving the case as exceptional, I use it to motivate the necessity of distinguishing between a subject’s referential intentions and a subject’s merely collateral beliefs about the target of his utterance. |
id |
UNICAMP-17_7c21e017e051645e0e0be1b8e9795aaf |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:scielo:S0100-60452020000400116 |
network_acronym_str |
UNICAMP-17 |
network_name_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository_id_str |
|
spelling |
BIFURCATIONS ON THE ROAD: CONFLICTING INTENTIONS AND DEMONSTRATIVE REFERENCEReferenceConflicting IntentionsDemonstrativesIndexicals ContentAbstract This is a critical notice of Mario Gómez-Torrente's novel account of demonstrative reference presented in chapter 2 of the recently published book Roads to Reference. After presenting the main tenets of his view (including the existence of a multitude of cases where demonstrative reference is indeterminate), I go on to critically examine a couple of its features. In section 2, I assess Gómez-Torrente’s assumption that demonstrative thought based on perception is less likely to succumb to indeterminacy than the others. I show that this aspect of his view invites unwelcome consequences regarding the transparency of thought. I do however suggest that this problem could be overcome by individuating perceptual intentions dynamically. In section 3, I express a distinct worry regarding a case, introduced en passant by Gómez-Torrente, that involves successful demonstrative reference regardless of its utterer's conflicting intentions, a result that seems to contradict his general theory. Instead of conceiving the case as exceptional, I use it to motivate the necessity of distinguishing between a subject’s referential intentions and a subject’s merely collateral beliefs about the target of his utterance.UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência2020-12-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452020000400116Manuscrito v.43 n.4 2020reponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMP10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.mlinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessVALENTE,MATHEUSeng2020-11-05T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S0100-60452020000400116Revistahttp://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_serial&pid=0100-6045&lng=pt&nrm=isoPUBhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.phpmwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2020-11-05T00:00Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
BIFURCATIONS ON THE ROAD: CONFLICTING INTENTIONS AND DEMONSTRATIVE REFERENCE |
title |
BIFURCATIONS ON THE ROAD: CONFLICTING INTENTIONS AND DEMONSTRATIVE REFERENCE |
spellingShingle |
BIFURCATIONS ON THE ROAD: CONFLICTING INTENTIONS AND DEMONSTRATIVE REFERENCE VALENTE,MATHEUS Reference Conflicting Intentions Demonstratives Indexicals Content |
title_short |
BIFURCATIONS ON THE ROAD: CONFLICTING INTENTIONS AND DEMONSTRATIVE REFERENCE |
title_full |
BIFURCATIONS ON THE ROAD: CONFLICTING INTENTIONS AND DEMONSTRATIVE REFERENCE |
title_fullStr |
BIFURCATIONS ON THE ROAD: CONFLICTING INTENTIONS AND DEMONSTRATIVE REFERENCE |
title_full_unstemmed |
BIFURCATIONS ON THE ROAD: CONFLICTING INTENTIONS AND DEMONSTRATIVE REFERENCE |
title_sort |
BIFURCATIONS ON THE ROAD: CONFLICTING INTENTIONS AND DEMONSTRATIVE REFERENCE |
author |
VALENTE,MATHEUS |
author_facet |
VALENTE,MATHEUS |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
VALENTE,MATHEUS |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Reference Conflicting Intentions Demonstratives Indexicals Content |
topic |
Reference Conflicting Intentions Demonstratives Indexicals Content |
description |
Abstract This is a critical notice of Mario Gómez-Torrente's novel account of demonstrative reference presented in chapter 2 of the recently published book Roads to Reference. After presenting the main tenets of his view (including the existence of a multitude of cases where demonstrative reference is indeterminate), I go on to critically examine a couple of its features. In section 2, I assess Gómez-Torrente’s assumption that demonstrative thought based on perception is less likely to succumb to indeterminacy than the others. I show that this aspect of his view invites unwelcome consequences regarding the transparency of thought. I do however suggest that this problem could be overcome by individuating perceptual intentions dynamically. In section 3, I express a distinct worry regarding a case, introduced en passant by Gómez-Torrente, that involves successful demonstrative reference regardless of its utterer's conflicting intentions, a result that seems to contradict his general theory. Instead of conceiving the case as exceptional, I use it to motivate the necessity of distinguishing between a subject’s referential intentions and a subject’s merely collateral beliefs about the target of his utterance. |
publishDate |
2020 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2020-12-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452020000400116 |
url |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452020000400116 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.ml |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
text/html |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito v.43 n.4 2020 reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
_version_ |
1748950065932664832 |