Is the problem of conflicting intentions a genuine problem? Some remarks on gómez-torrente´s “roads to reference”

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Martone, Filipe
Data de Publicação: 2021
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8664458
Resumo: In this brief discussion piece I try to offer some considerations in favor of the so-called Simple Intention Theory of demonstratives, which is rejected by Gómez-Torrente. I try to show that the main argument offered against the Simple Intention Theory appears to be based on false data.
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spelling Is the problem of conflicting intentions a genuine problem? Some remarks on gómez-torrente´s “roads to reference”Is the problem of conflicting intentions a genuine problem? Some remarks on gómez-torrente´s “roads to reference”Is the problem of conflicting intentions a genuine problem? Some remarks on gómez-torrente´s “roads to reference”ReferenceDemonstrativesIndexicalsPhilosophy of languageReferenciaDemostrativosIndexicalesFilosofía del lenguajeReferênciaDemonstrativosIndexicaisFilosofia da linguagemIn this brief discussion piece I try to offer some considerations in favor of the so-called Simple Intention Theory of demonstratives, which is rejected by Gómez-Torrente. I try to show that the main argument offered against the Simple Intention Theory appears to be based on false data.In this brief discussion piece I try to offer some considerations in favor of the so-called Simple Intention Theory of demonstratives, which is rejected by Gómez-Torrente. I try to show that the main argument offered against the Simple Intention Theory appears to be based on false data.In this brief discussion piece I try to offer some considerations in favor of the so-called Simple Intention Theory of demonstratives, which is rejected by Gómez-Torrente. I try to show that the main argument offered against the Simple Intention Theory appears to be based on false data.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2021-02-15info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionTextoTextoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/otherapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8664458Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 43 n. 4 (2020): out./dez.; 49-58Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 43 No. 4 (2020): out./dez.; 49-58Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 43 Núm. 4 (2020): out./dez.; 49-582317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPenghttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8664458/26084Brazil; ContemporaryBrasil; ContemporáneoBrasil; ContemporâneoCopyright (c) 2020 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofiahttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessMartone, Filipe2021-02-15T20:51:01Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8664458Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2021-02-15T20:51:01Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Is the problem of conflicting intentions a genuine problem? Some remarks on gómez-torrente´s “roads to reference”
Is the problem of conflicting intentions a genuine problem? Some remarks on gómez-torrente´s “roads to reference”
Is the problem of conflicting intentions a genuine problem? Some remarks on gómez-torrente´s “roads to reference”
title Is the problem of conflicting intentions a genuine problem? Some remarks on gómez-torrente´s “roads to reference”
spellingShingle Is the problem of conflicting intentions a genuine problem? Some remarks on gómez-torrente´s “roads to reference”
Martone, Filipe
Reference
Demonstratives
Indexicals
Philosophy of language
Referencia
Demostrativos
Indexicales
Filosofía del lenguaje
Referência
Demonstrativos
Indexicais
Filosofia da linguagem
title_short Is the problem of conflicting intentions a genuine problem? Some remarks on gómez-torrente´s “roads to reference”
title_full Is the problem of conflicting intentions a genuine problem? Some remarks on gómez-torrente´s “roads to reference”
title_fullStr Is the problem of conflicting intentions a genuine problem? Some remarks on gómez-torrente´s “roads to reference”
title_full_unstemmed Is the problem of conflicting intentions a genuine problem? Some remarks on gómez-torrente´s “roads to reference”
title_sort Is the problem of conflicting intentions a genuine problem? Some remarks on gómez-torrente´s “roads to reference”
author Martone, Filipe
author_facet Martone, Filipe
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Martone, Filipe
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Reference
Demonstratives
Indexicals
Philosophy of language
Referencia
Demostrativos
Indexicales
Filosofía del lenguaje
Referência
Demonstrativos
Indexicais
Filosofia da linguagem
topic Reference
Demonstratives
Indexicals
Philosophy of language
Referencia
Demostrativos
Indexicales
Filosofía del lenguaje
Referência
Demonstrativos
Indexicais
Filosofia da linguagem
description In this brief discussion piece I try to offer some considerations in favor of the so-called Simple Intention Theory of demonstratives, which is rejected by Gómez-Torrente. I try to show that the main argument offered against the Simple Intention Theory appears to be based on false data.
publishDate 2021
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2021-02-15
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Texto
Texto
info:eu-repo/semantics/other
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8664458
url https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8664458
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8664458/26084
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2020 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2020 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv Brazil; Contemporary
Brasil; Contemporáneo
Brasil; Contemporâneo
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 43 n. 4 (2020): out./dez.; 49-58
Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 43 No. 4 (2020): out./dez.; 49-58
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 43 Núm. 4 (2020): out./dez.; 49-58
2317-630X
reponame:Manuscrito (Online)
instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron:UNICAMP
instname_str Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron_str UNICAMP
institution UNICAMP
reponame_str Manuscrito (Online)
collection Manuscrito (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br
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