A SECOND OPINION ON RELATIVE TRUTH
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2015 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8641920 |
Resumo: | In ‘An undermining diagnosis of relativism about truth’, Horwich claims that the notion of relative truth is either explanatorily sterile or explanatorily superfluous. In the present paper, I argue that Horwich’s explanatory demands set the bar unwarrantedly high: given the philosophical import of the theorems of a truth-theoretic semantic theory, Horwich’s proposed explananda, what he calls acceptance facts, are too indirect for us to expect a complete explanation of them in terms of the deliverances of a theory of meaning based on the notion of relative truth. And, to the extent that there might be such an explanation in certain cases, there is no reason to expect relative truth to play an essential, ineliminable role, nor to endorse the claim that it should play such a role in order to be a theoretically useful notion. |
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A SECOND OPINION ON RELATIVE TRUTHTruth relativism. Radical relativism. Truth-theoretic semanticsIn ‘An undermining diagnosis of relativism about truth’, Horwich claims that the notion of relative truth is either explanatorily sterile or explanatorily superfluous. In the present paper, I argue that Horwich’s explanatory demands set the bar unwarrantedly high: given the philosophical import of the theorems of a truth-theoretic semantic theory, Horwich’s proposed explananda, what he calls acceptance facts, are too indirect for us to expect a complete explanation of them in terms of the deliverances of a theory of meaning based on the notion of relative truth. And, to the extent that there might be such an explanation in certain cases, there is no reason to expect relative truth to play an essential, ineliminable role, nor to endorse the claim that it should play such a role in order to be a theoretically useful notion.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2015-11-25info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8641920Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 38 n. 2 (2015): Jul./Dec.; 65-88Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 38 No. 2 (2015): Jul./Dec.; 65-88Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 38 Núm. 2 (2015): Jul./Dec.; 65-882317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8641920/9418Copyright (c) 2015 Manuscritoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessCaso, Ramiro2015-12-11T14:15:19Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8641920Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2015-12-11T14:15:19Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
A SECOND OPINION ON RELATIVE TRUTH |
title |
A SECOND OPINION ON RELATIVE TRUTH |
spellingShingle |
A SECOND OPINION ON RELATIVE TRUTH Caso, Ramiro Truth relativism. Radical relativism. Truth-theoretic semantics |
title_short |
A SECOND OPINION ON RELATIVE TRUTH |
title_full |
A SECOND OPINION ON RELATIVE TRUTH |
title_fullStr |
A SECOND OPINION ON RELATIVE TRUTH |
title_full_unstemmed |
A SECOND OPINION ON RELATIVE TRUTH |
title_sort |
A SECOND OPINION ON RELATIVE TRUTH |
author |
Caso, Ramiro |
author_facet |
Caso, Ramiro |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Caso, Ramiro |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Truth relativism. Radical relativism. Truth-theoretic semantics |
topic |
Truth relativism. Radical relativism. Truth-theoretic semantics |
description |
In ‘An undermining diagnosis of relativism about truth’, Horwich claims that the notion of relative truth is either explanatorily sterile or explanatorily superfluous. In the present paper, I argue that Horwich’s explanatory demands set the bar unwarrantedly high: given the philosophical import of the theorems of a truth-theoretic semantic theory, Horwich’s proposed explananda, what he calls acceptance facts, are too indirect for us to expect a complete explanation of them in terms of the deliverances of a theory of meaning based on the notion of relative truth. And, to the extent that there might be such an explanation in certain cases, there is no reason to expect relative truth to play an essential, ineliminable role, nor to endorse the claim that it should play such a role in order to be a theoretically useful notion. |
publishDate |
2015 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2015-11-25 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8641920 |
url |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8641920 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8641920/9418 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2015 Manuscrito info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2015 Manuscrito |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 38 n. 2 (2015): Jul./Dec.; 65-88 Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 38 No. 2 (2015): Jul./Dec.; 65-88 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 38 Núm. 2 (2015): Jul./Dec.; 65-88 2317-630X reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
_version_ |
1800216565210152960 |