Frege’s Puzzle on the Santa Monica Beach De Jure Co-reference and the Logical Appraisal of Rational Agents
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2018 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8652144 |
Resumo: | In this paper, I argue that a number of influential Millian responses to Frege’s puzzle, which consist in denying that Frege’s data apply to natural languages (and thinking), are not viable if logic is to play its role in legitimizing the logical appraisal of rational subjects. A notion of validity which does justice to the normativity of logic must make room for a distinction between valid inferences and enthymemes. I discuss the prospects of formal, relevant and manifest validity as candidates for a notion which complies with this desideratum. Their success, or failure is argued to hang on the viability of a semantical account of de jure co-reference, which is in tension with standard Millian tenets. I conclude that these Millian theories face the following dilemma: either accept that there is no notion of logical validity which makes logic normative for reasoning, thus jeopardizing our well entrenched practices of rational appraisal; or accept that de jure co-reference is a real semantical relation. |
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Frege’s Puzzle on the Santa Monica Beach De Jure Co-reference and the Logical Appraisal of Rational AgentsReferentialism. De jure co-reference. Frege’s puzzle. Logical validity. Reasoning.In this paper, I argue that a number of influential Millian responses to Frege’s puzzle, which consist in denying that Frege’s data apply to natural languages (and thinking), are not viable if logic is to play its role in legitimizing the logical appraisal of rational subjects. A notion of validity which does justice to the normativity of logic must make room for a distinction between valid inferences and enthymemes. I discuss the prospects of formal, relevant and manifest validity as candidates for a notion which complies with this desideratum. Their success, or failure is argued to hang on the viability of a semantical account of de jure co-reference, which is in tension with standard Millian tenets. I conclude that these Millian theories face the following dilemma: either accept that there is no notion of logical validity which makes logic normative for reasoning, thus jeopardizing our well entrenched practices of rational appraisal; or accept that de jure co-reference is a real semantical relation.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2018-04-04info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPesquisa teóricaapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8652144Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 41 n. 1 (2018): jan./mar.; 1-31Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 41 No. 1 (2018): jan./mar.; 1-31Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 41 Núm. 1 (2018): jan./mar.; 1-312317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8652144/17833Copyright (c) 2018 Manuscritoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessBoccardi, Emiliano2018-04-04T12:56:50Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8652144Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2018-04-04T12:56:50Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Frege’s Puzzle on the Santa Monica Beach De Jure Co-reference and the Logical Appraisal of Rational Agents |
title |
Frege’s Puzzle on the Santa Monica Beach De Jure Co-reference and the Logical Appraisal of Rational Agents |
spellingShingle |
Frege’s Puzzle on the Santa Monica Beach De Jure Co-reference and the Logical Appraisal of Rational Agents Boccardi, Emiliano Referentialism. De jure co-reference. Frege’s puzzle. Logical validity. Reasoning. |
title_short |
Frege’s Puzzle on the Santa Monica Beach De Jure Co-reference and the Logical Appraisal of Rational Agents |
title_full |
Frege’s Puzzle on the Santa Monica Beach De Jure Co-reference and the Logical Appraisal of Rational Agents |
title_fullStr |
Frege’s Puzzle on the Santa Monica Beach De Jure Co-reference and the Logical Appraisal of Rational Agents |
title_full_unstemmed |
Frege’s Puzzle on the Santa Monica Beach De Jure Co-reference and the Logical Appraisal of Rational Agents |
title_sort |
Frege’s Puzzle on the Santa Monica Beach De Jure Co-reference and the Logical Appraisal of Rational Agents |
author |
Boccardi, Emiliano |
author_facet |
Boccardi, Emiliano |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Boccardi, Emiliano |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Referentialism. De jure co-reference. Frege’s puzzle. Logical validity. Reasoning. |
topic |
Referentialism. De jure co-reference. Frege’s puzzle. Logical validity. Reasoning. |
description |
In this paper, I argue that a number of influential Millian responses to Frege’s puzzle, which consist in denying that Frege’s data apply to natural languages (and thinking), are not viable if logic is to play its role in legitimizing the logical appraisal of rational subjects. A notion of validity which does justice to the normativity of logic must make room for a distinction between valid inferences and enthymemes. I discuss the prospects of formal, relevant and manifest validity as candidates for a notion which complies with this desideratum. Their success, or failure is argued to hang on the viability of a semantical account of de jure co-reference, which is in tension with standard Millian tenets. I conclude that these Millian theories face the following dilemma: either accept that there is no notion of logical validity which makes logic normative for reasoning, thus jeopardizing our well entrenched practices of rational appraisal; or accept that de jure co-reference is a real semantical relation. |
publishDate |
2018 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-04-04 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Pesquisa teórica |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8652144 |
url |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8652144 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8652144/17833 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2018 Manuscrito info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2018 Manuscrito |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 41 n. 1 (2018): jan./mar.; 1-31 Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 41 No. 1 (2018): jan./mar.; 1-31 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 41 Núm. 1 (2018): jan./mar.; 1-31 2317-630X reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
_version_ |
1800216567022092288 |