Frege’s puzzle is here to stay: triviality and informativity in natural languages

• Autor(a) principal: Valente, Matheus
• Data de Publicação: 2020
• Outros Autores: Boccardi, Emiliano
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
• Texto Completo: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8659495
• topic: Frege's Puzzle; Syntactic form; Logical form; Natural language; Triviality; Frege's Puzzle; Syntactic form; Logical form; Natural language; Triviality; Frege's Puzzle; Syntactic form; Logical form; Natural language; Triviality

Frege’s puzzling remarks on the beginning of On Sense and Reference challenge us to explain how true identity sentences of the form a = a can differ in cognitive value from sentences of the form a = b when they are made true by the same object’s self-identity. Some philosophers (e.g. Almog, Glezakos and Paganini) suggest that the puzzle cannot be set up in the context of natural languages since natural sentences, unlike those of regimented formal ones, do not wear their logical properties on their sleeves. In this paper we argue that, on the contrary, there exists a notion of coordination between names which is apt to track the relevant logical properties of natural sentences and therefore to set up the puzzle in natural languages. Frege’s puzzle is here to stay.