Quine’s proxy-function argument for the indeterminacy of reference and frege’s caesar problem
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2021 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8667171 |
Resumo: | In his logical foundation of arithmetic, Frege faced the problem that the semantic interpretation of his system does not determine the reference of the abstract terms completely. The contextual definition of number, for instance, does not decide whether the number 5 is identical to Julius Caesar. In a late writing, Quine claimed that the indeterminacy of reference established by Frege’s Caesar problem is a special case of the indeterminacy established by his proxy-function argument. The present paper aims to show that Frege’s Caesar problem does not really support the conclusions that Quine draws from the proxy-function argument. On the contrary, it reveals that Quine’s argument is a non sequitur: it does not establish that there are alternative interpretations of our terms that are equally correct, but only that these terms are ambiguous. The latter kind of referential indeterminacy implies that almost all sentences of our overall theory of the world are either false or neither true nor false, because they contain definite descriptions whose uniqueness presupposition is not fulfilled. The proxy-function argument must therefore be regarded as a reductio ad absurdum of Quine’s behaviorist premise that the reference of terms is determined only by our linguistic behavior. |
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Quine’s proxy-function argument for the indeterminacy of reference and frege’s caesar problemQuine’s proxy-function argument for the indeterminacy of reference and frege’s caesar problemQuine’s proxy-function argument for the indeterminacy of reference and frege’s caesar problemQuineFregeProblema de CésarFunção proxyQuineFregeProblema de CésarFunción de proxyQuineFregeCaesar problemProxy functionIn his logical foundation of arithmetic, Frege faced the problem that the semantic interpretation of his system does not determine the reference of the abstract terms completely. The contextual definition of number, for instance, does not decide whether the number 5 is identical to Julius Caesar. In a late writing, Quine claimed that the indeterminacy of reference established by Frege’s Caesar problem is a special case of the indeterminacy established by his proxy-function argument. The present paper aims to show that Frege’s Caesar problem does not really support the conclusions that Quine draws from the proxy-function argument. On the contrary, it reveals that Quine’s argument is a non sequitur: it does not establish that there are alternative interpretations of our terms that are equally correct, but only that these terms are ambiguous. The latter kind of referential indeterminacy implies that almost all sentences of our overall theory of the world are either false or neither true nor false, because they contain definite descriptions whose uniqueness presupposition is not fulfilled. The proxy-function argument must therefore be regarded as a reductio ad absurdum of Quine’s behaviorist premise that the reference of terms is determined only by our linguistic behavior.In his logical foundation of arithmetic, Frege faced the problem that the semantic interpretation of his system does not determine the reference of the abstract terms completely. The contextual definition of number, for instance, does not decide whether the number 5 is identical to Julius Caesar. In a late writing, Quine claimed that the indeterminacy of reference established by Frege’s Caesar problem is a special case of the indeterminacy established by his proxy-function argument. The present paper aims to show that Frege’s Caesar problem does not really support the conclusions that Quine draws from the proxy-function argument. On the contrary, it reveals that Quine’s argument is a non sequitur: it does not establish that there are alternative interpretations of our terms that are equally correct, but only that these terms are ambiguous. The latter kind of referential indeterminacy implies that almost all sentences of our overall theory of the world are either false or neither true nor false, because they contain definite descriptions whose uniqueness presupposition is not fulfilled. The proxy-function argument must therefore be regarded as a reductio ad absurdum of Quine’s behaviorist premise that the reference of terms is determined only by our linguistic behavior.In his logical foundation of arithmetic, Frege faced the problem that the semantic interpretation of his system does not determine the reference of the abstract terms completely. The contextual definition of number, for instance, does not decide whether the number 5 is identical to Julius Caesar. In a late writing, Quine claimed that the indeterminacy of reference established by Frege’s Caesar problem is a special case of the indeterminacy established by his proxy-function argument. The present paper aims to show that Frege’s Caesar problem does not really support the conclusions that Quine draws from the proxy-function argument. On the contrary, it reveals that Quine’s argument is a non sequitur: it does not establish that there are alternative interpretations of our terms that are equally correct, but only that these terms are ambiguous. The latter kind of referential indeterminacy implies that almost all sentences of our overall theory of the world are either false or neither true nor false, because they contain definite descriptions whose uniqueness presupposition is not fulfilled. The proxy-function argument must therefore be regarded as a reductio ad absurdum of Quine’s behaviorist premise that the reference of terms is determined only by our linguistic behavior.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2021-09-30info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionTextoTextoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/otherapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8667171Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 44 n. 3 (2021): jul./set.; 70-108Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 44 No. 3 (2021): jul./set.; 70-108Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 44 Núm. 3 (2021): jul./set.; 70-1082317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPenghttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8667171/27378Brazil; ContemporaryBrasil; ContemporáneoBrasil; ContemporâneoCopyright (c) 2021 Dirk Greimannhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessGreimann, Dirk 2022-04-27T17:16:35Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8667171Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2022-04-27T17:16:35Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Quine’s proxy-function argument for the indeterminacy of reference and frege’s caesar problem Quine’s proxy-function argument for the indeterminacy of reference and frege’s caesar problem Quine’s proxy-function argument for the indeterminacy of reference and frege’s caesar problem |
title |
Quine’s proxy-function argument for the indeterminacy of reference and frege’s caesar problem |
spellingShingle |
Quine’s proxy-function argument for the indeterminacy of reference and frege’s caesar problem Greimann, Dirk Quine Frege Problema de César Função proxy Quine Frege Problema de César Función de proxy Quine Frege Caesar problem Proxy function |
title_short |
Quine’s proxy-function argument for the indeterminacy of reference and frege’s caesar problem |
title_full |
Quine’s proxy-function argument for the indeterminacy of reference and frege’s caesar problem |
title_fullStr |
Quine’s proxy-function argument for the indeterminacy of reference and frege’s caesar problem |
title_full_unstemmed |
Quine’s proxy-function argument for the indeterminacy of reference and frege’s caesar problem |
title_sort |
Quine’s proxy-function argument for the indeterminacy of reference and frege’s caesar problem |
author |
Greimann, Dirk |
author_facet |
Greimann, Dirk |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Greimann, Dirk |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Quine Frege Problema de César Função proxy Quine Frege Problema de César Función de proxy Quine Frege Caesar problem Proxy function |
topic |
Quine Frege Problema de César Função proxy Quine Frege Problema de César Función de proxy Quine Frege Caesar problem Proxy function |
description |
In his logical foundation of arithmetic, Frege faced the problem that the semantic interpretation of his system does not determine the reference of the abstract terms completely. The contextual definition of number, for instance, does not decide whether the number 5 is identical to Julius Caesar. In a late writing, Quine claimed that the indeterminacy of reference established by Frege’s Caesar problem is a special case of the indeterminacy established by his proxy-function argument. The present paper aims to show that Frege’s Caesar problem does not really support the conclusions that Quine draws from the proxy-function argument. On the contrary, it reveals that Quine’s argument is a non sequitur: it does not establish that there are alternative interpretations of our terms that are equally correct, but only that these terms are ambiguous. The latter kind of referential indeterminacy implies that almost all sentences of our overall theory of the world are either false or neither true nor false, because they contain definite descriptions whose uniqueness presupposition is not fulfilled. The proxy-function argument must therefore be regarded as a reductio ad absurdum of Quine’s behaviorist premise that the reference of terms is determined only by our linguistic behavior. |
publishDate |
2021 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2021-09-30 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Texto Texto info:eu-repo/semantics/other |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8667171 |
url |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8667171 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8667171/27378 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Dirk Greimann http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Dirk Greimann http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv |
Brazil; Contemporary Brasil; Contemporáneo Brasil; Contemporâneo |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 44 n. 3 (2021): jul./set.; 70-108 Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 44 No. 3 (2021): jul./set.; 70-108 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 44 Núm. 3 (2021): jul./set.; 70-108 2317-630X reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
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1800216568057036800 |