The harsanyi-rawls debate: political philosophy as decision theory under uncertainty
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2021 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8667159 |
Resumo: | Social decisions are often made under great uncertainty - in situations where political principles, and even standard subjective expected utility, do not apply smoothly. In the first section, we argue that the core of this problem lies in decision theory itself - it is about how to act when we do not have an adequate representation of the context of the action and of its possible consequences. Thus, we distinguish two criteria to complement decision theory under ignorance - Laplace’s principle of insufficient reason and Wald’s maximin criterion. After that, we apply this analysis to political philosophy, by contrasting Harsanyi’s and Rawls’s theories of justice, respectively based on Laplace’s principle of insufficient reason and Wald’s maximin rule - and we end up highlighting the virtues of Rawls’s principle on practical grounds (it is intuitively attractive because of its computational simplicity, so providing a salient point for convergence) - and connect this argument to our moral intuitions and social norms requiring prudence in the case of decisions made for the sake of others. |
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The harsanyi-rawls debate: political philosophy as decision theory under uncertaintyThe harsanyi-rawls debate: political philosophy as decision theory under uncertaintyThe harsanyi-rawls debate: political philosophy as decision theory under uncertaintyIncertezaFilosofia politicaPrincípio da diferençaUtilitarismoIncertidumbreFilosofia politicaPrincipio de diferenciaUtilitarismoUncertaintyPolitical philosophyDifference principleUtilitarianismSocial decisions are often made under great uncertainty - in situations where political principles, and even standard subjective expected utility, do not apply smoothly. In the first section, we argue that the core of this problem lies in decision theory itself - it is about how to act when we do not have an adequate representation of the context of the action and of its possible consequences. Thus, we distinguish two criteria to complement decision theory under ignorance - Laplace’s principle of insufficient reason and Wald’s maximin criterion. After that, we apply this analysis to political philosophy, by contrasting Harsanyi’s and Rawls’s theories of justice, respectively based on Laplace’s principle of insufficient reason and Wald’s maximin rule - and we end up highlighting the virtues of Rawls’s principle on practical grounds (it is intuitively attractive because of its computational simplicity, so providing a salient point for convergence) - and connect this argument to our moral intuitions and social norms requiring prudence in the case of decisions made for the sake of others.Social decisions are often made under great uncertainty - in situations where political principles, and even standard subjective expected utility, do not apply smoothly. In the first section, we argue that the core of this problem lies in decision theory itself - it is about how to act when we do not have an adequate representation of the context of the action and of its possible consequences. Thus, we distinguish two criteria to complement decision theory under ignorance - Laplace’s principle of insufficient reason and Wald’s maximin criterion. After that, we apply this analysis to political philosophy, by contrasting Harsanyi’s and Rawls’s theories of justice, respectively based on Laplace’s principle of insufficient reason and Wald’s maximin rule - and we end up highlighting the virtues of Rawls’s principle on practical grounds (it is intuitively attractive because of its computational simplicity, so providing a salient point for convergence) - and connect this argument to our moral intuitions and social norms requiring prudence in the case of decisions made for the sake of others.Social decisions are often made under great uncertainty - in situations where political principles, and even standard subjective expected utility, do not apply smoothly. In the first section, we argue that the core of this problem lies in decision theory itself - it is about how to act when we do not have an adequate representation of the context of the action and of its possible consequences. Thus, we distinguish two criteria to complement decision theory under ignorance - Laplace’s principle of insufficient reason and Wald’s maximin criterion. After that, we apply this analysis to political philosophy, by contrasting Harsanyi’s and Rawls’s theories of justice, respectively based on Laplace’s principle of insufficient reason and Wald’s maximin rule - and we end up highlighting the virtues of Rawls’s principle on practical grounds (it is intuitively attractive because of its computational simplicity, so providing a salient point for convergence) - and connect this argument to our moral intuitions and social norms requiring prudence in the case of decisions made for the sake of others.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2021-09-29info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionTextoTextoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/otherapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8667159Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 44 n. 2 (2021): abr./jun.; 89-127Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 44 No. 2 (2021): abr./jun.; 89-127Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 44 Núm. 2 (2021): abr./jun.; 89-1272317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPenghttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8667159/27369Brazil; ContemporaryBrasil; ContemporáneoBrasil; ContemporâneoCopyright (c) 2021 Ramiro Ávila Pereshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Peres, Ramiro Ávila2022-04-27T17:16:22Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8667159Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2022-04-27T17:16:22Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
The harsanyi-rawls debate: political philosophy as decision theory under uncertainty The harsanyi-rawls debate: political philosophy as decision theory under uncertainty The harsanyi-rawls debate: political philosophy as decision theory under uncertainty |
title |
The harsanyi-rawls debate: political philosophy as decision theory under uncertainty |
spellingShingle |
The harsanyi-rawls debate: political philosophy as decision theory under uncertainty Peres, Ramiro Ávila Incerteza Filosofia politica Princípio da diferença Utilitarismo Incertidumbre Filosofia politica Principio de diferencia Utilitarismo Uncertainty Political philosophy Difference principle Utilitarianism |
title_short |
The harsanyi-rawls debate: political philosophy as decision theory under uncertainty |
title_full |
The harsanyi-rawls debate: political philosophy as decision theory under uncertainty |
title_fullStr |
The harsanyi-rawls debate: political philosophy as decision theory under uncertainty |
title_full_unstemmed |
The harsanyi-rawls debate: political philosophy as decision theory under uncertainty |
title_sort |
The harsanyi-rawls debate: political philosophy as decision theory under uncertainty |
author |
Peres, Ramiro Ávila |
author_facet |
Peres, Ramiro Ávila |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Peres, Ramiro Ávila |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Incerteza Filosofia politica Princípio da diferença Utilitarismo Incertidumbre Filosofia politica Principio de diferencia Utilitarismo Uncertainty Political philosophy Difference principle Utilitarianism |
topic |
Incerteza Filosofia politica Princípio da diferença Utilitarismo Incertidumbre Filosofia politica Principio de diferencia Utilitarismo Uncertainty Political philosophy Difference principle Utilitarianism |
description |
Social decisions are often made under great uncertainty - in situations where political principles, and even standard subjective expected utility, do not apply smoothly. In the first section, we argue that the core of this problem lies in decision theory itself - it is about how to act when we do not have an adequate representation of the context of the action and of its possible consequences. Thus, we distinguish two criteria to complement decision theory under ignorance - Laplace’s principle of insufficient reason and Wald’s maximin criterion. After that, we apply this analysis to political philosophy, by contrasting Harsanyi’s and Rawls’s theories of justice, respectively based on Laplace’s principle of insufficient reason and Wald’s maximin rule - and we end up highlighting the virtues of Rawls’s principle on practical grounds (it is intuitively attractive because of its computational simplicity, so providing a salient point for convergence) - and connect this argument to our moral intuitions and social norms requiring prudence in the case of decisions made for the sake of others. |
publishDate |
2021 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2021-09-29 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Texto Texto info:eu-repo/semantics/other |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8667159 |
url |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8667159 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8667159/27369 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Ramiro Ávila Peres http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Ramiro Ávila Peres http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv |
Brazil; Contemporary Brasil; Contemporáneo Brasil; Contemporâneo |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 44 n. 2 (2021): abr./jun.; 89-127 Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 44 No. 2 (2021): abr./jun.; 89-127 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 44 Núm. 2 (2021): abr./jun.; 89-127 2317-630X reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
_version_ |
1800216568046551040 |