THE DE JURE OBJECTION AGAINST BELIEF IN MIRACLES

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: SILVA,GESIEL DA
Data de Publicação: 2021
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
Texto Completo: http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452021000400434
Resumo: Abstract Alvin Plantinga (1993a, 1993b, 2000) argues that de jure objections to theism depend on de facto objections: in order to say that belief in God is not warranted, one should first assume that this belief is false. Assuming Plantinga’s epistemology and his de facto/de jure distinction, In this essay, I argue that to show that belief in miracles is not warranted, one must suppose that belief in miracles is always false. Therefore, a person who holds a skeptical position regarding miracles must choose either to find evidence that all of the supposed miracles are false, or admit that one is assuming an areligious commitment as a starting point.
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spelling THE DE JURE OBJECTION AGAINST BELIEF IN MIRACLESMiraclesDe Jure objectionsEpistemic WarrantReligious EpistemologyAlvin PlantingaAbstract Alvin Plantinga (1993a, 1993b, 2000) argues that de jure objections to theism depend on de facto objections: in order to say that belief in God is not warranted, one should first assume that this belief is false. Assuming Plantinga’s epistemology and his de facto/de jure distinction, In this essay, I argue that to show that belief in miracles is not warranted, one must suppose that belief in miracles is always false. Therefore, a person who holds a skeptical position regarding miracles must choose either to find evidence that all of the supposed miracles are false, or admit that one is assuming an areligious commitment as a starting point.UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência2021-12-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452021000400434Manuscrito v.44 n.4 2021reponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMP10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n4.gsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessSILVA,GESIEL DAeng2021-12-08T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S0100-60452021000400434Revistahttp://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_serial&pid=0100-6045&lng=pt&nrm=isoPUBhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.phpmwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2021-12-08T00:00Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv THE DE JURE OBJECTION AGAINST BELIEF IN MIRACLES
title THE DE JURE OBJECTION AGAINST BELIEF IN MIRACLES
spellingShingle THE DE JURE OBJECTION AGAINST BELIEF IN MIRACLES
SILVA,GESIEL DA
Miracles
De Jure objections
Epistemic Warrant
Religious Epistemology
Alvin Plantinga
title_short THE DE JURE OBJECTION AGAINST BELIEF IN MIRACLES
title_full THE DE JURE OBJECTION AGAINST BELIEF IN MIRACLES
title_fullStr THE DE JURE OBJECTION AGAINST BELIEF IN MIRACLES
title_full_unstemmed THE DE JURE OBJECTION AGAINST BELIEF IN MIRACLES
title_sort THE DE JURE OBJECTION AGAINST BELIEF IN MIRACLES
author SILVA,GESIEL DA
author_facet SILVA,GESIEL DA
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv SILVA,GESIEL DA
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Miracles
De Jure objections
Epistemic Warrant
Religious Epistemology
Alvin Plantinga
topic Miracles
De Jure objections
Epistemic Warrant
Religious Epistemology
Alvin Plantinga
description Abstract Alvin Plantinga (1993a, 1993b, 2000) argues that de jure objections to theism depend on de facto objections: in order to say that belief in God is not warranted, one should first assume that this belief is false. Assuming Plantinga’s epistemology and his de facto/de jure distinction, In this essay, I argue that to show that belief in miracles is not warranted, one must suppose that belief in miracles is always false. Therefore, a person who holds a skeptical position regarding miracles must choose either to find evidence that all of the supposed miracles are false, or admit that one is assuming an areligious commitment as a starting point.
publishDate 2021
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2021-12-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452021000400434
url http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452021000400434
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n4.gs
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv text/html
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência
publisher.none.fl_str_mv UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Manuscrito v.44 n.4 2021
reponame:Manuscrito (Online)
instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron:UNICAMP
instname_str Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron_str UNICAMP
institution UNICAMP
reponame_str Manuscrito (Online)
collection Manuscrito (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br
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