A Rate of Passage
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2017 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8648787 |
Resumo: | In “Temporal Passage and the ‘No Alternate Possibilities Argument’”, Jonathan Tallant takes up one objection based on the observation that if time passes at the rate of one second per second there is no other possible rate at which it could pass. The argument rests on the premise that if time passes at some rate then it could have passed at some other rate. Since no alternative rate seems to be coherent, one concludes that time cannot pass at all. The obvious weak point of the NAP is the premise itself. |
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A Rate of PassagePassage of time. Rate of passage. Jonathan Tallant. 'No alternate possibility' argument.In “Temporal Passage and the ‘No Alternate Possibilities Argument’”, Jonathan Tallant takes up one objection based on the observation that if time passes at the rate of one second per second there is no other possible rate at which it could pass. The argument rests on the premise that if time passes at some rate then it could have passed at some other rate. Since no alternative rate seems to be coherent, one concludes that time cannot pass at all. The obvious weak point of the NAP is the premise itself.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2017-04-24info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPesquisa teóricaapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8648787Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 40 n. 1 (2017): jan./mar.; 75-79Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 40 No. 1 (2017): jan./mar.; 75-79Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 40 Núm. 1 (2017): jan./mar.; 75-792317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8648787/15368Copyright (c) 2017 Manuscritoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessMaudlin, Tim2017-11-09T09:24:26Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8648787Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2017-11-09T09:24:26Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
A Rate of Passage |
title |
A Rate of Passage |
spellingShingle |
A Rate of Passage Maudlin, Tim Passage of time. Rate of passage. Jonathan Tallant. 'No alternate possibility' argument. |
title_short |
A Rate of Passage |
title_full |
A Rate of Passage |
title_fullStr |
A Rate of Passage |
title_full_unstemmed |
A Rate of Passage |
title_sort |
A Rate of Passage |
author |
Maudlin, Tim |
author_facet |
Maudlin, Tim |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Maudlin, Tim |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Passage of time. Rate of passage. Jonathan Tallant. 'No alternate possibility' argument. |
topic |
Passage of time. Rate of passage. Jonathan Tallant. 'No alternate possibility' argument. |
description |
In “Temporal Passage and the ‘No Alternate Possibilities Argument’”, Jonathan Tallant takes up one objection based on the observation that if time passes at the rate of one second per second there is no other possible rate at which it could pass. The argument rests on the premise that if time passes at some rate then it could have passed at some other rate. Since no alternative rate seems to be coherent, one concludes that time cannot pass at all. The obvious weak point of the NAP is the premise itself. |
publishDate |
2017 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2017-04-24 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Pesquisa teórica |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8648787 |
url |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8648787 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8648787/15368 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2017 Manuscrito info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2017 Manuscrito |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 40 n. 1 (2017): jan./mar.; 75-79 Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 40 No. 1 (2017): jan./mar.; 75-79 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 40 Núm. 1 (2017): jan./mar.; 75-79 2317-630X reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
_version_ |
1800216566671867904 |