A MEMORY-BASED ARGUMENT FOR NON-REDUCTIONISM ABOUT THE TRANSTEMPORAL IDENTITY OF PERSONS

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: INAN,DANIEL
Data de Publicação: 2022
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
Texto Completo: http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452022000200161
Resumo: Abstract Does memory constitue diachronic identity? Or does it presuppose it? Butler has claimed that it is the latter, and, in this paper, I will side with him. My argumentation, however, will take a different route. My claim is not that memory presupposes transtemporal identity because I can only remember episodes that have happened to me. Rather, I will probe the idea that some properties of episodic remembering may be such that accounting for them requires us to posit a subject the transtemporal identity of which can't be reduced to continuity. These properties are the pastness of the recollected episode coupled with its first-personal accessibility. The argument will make heavy use of the experience of temporality.
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spelling A MEMORY-BASED ARGUMENT FOR NON-REDUCTIONISM ABOUT THE TRANSTEMPORAL IDENTITY OF PERSONSDirect RealismMemoryPersonal IdentityNon-ReductionismTemporal ExperienceAbstract Does memory constitue diachronic identity? Or does it presuppose it? Butler has claimed that it is the latter, and, in this paper, I will side with him. My argumentation, however, will take a different route. My claim is not that memory presupposes transtemporal identity because I can only remember episodes that have happened to me. Rather, I will probe the idea that some properties of episodic remembering may be such that accounting for them requires us to posit a subject the transtemporal identity of which can't be reduced to continuity. These properties are the pastness of the recollected episode coupled with its first-personal accessibility. The argument will make heavy use of the experience of temporality.UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência2022-04-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452022000200161Manuscrito v.45 n.2 2022reponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMP10.1590/0100-6045.2022.v45n2.diinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessINAN,DANIELeng2022-05-09T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S0100-60452022000200161Revistahttp://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_serial&pid=0100-6045&lng=pt&nrm=isoPUBhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.phpmwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2022-05-09T00:00Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv A MEMORY-BASED ARGUMENT FOR NON-REDUCTIONISM ABOUT THE TRANSTEMPORAL IDENTITY OF PERSONS
title A MEMORY-BASED ARGUMENT FOR NON-REDUCTIONISM ABOUT THE TRANSTEMPORAL IDENTITY OF PERSONS
spellingShingle A MEMORY-BASED ARGUMENT FOR NON-REDUCTIONISM ABOUT THE TRANSTEMPORAL IDENTITY OF PERSONS
INAN,DANIEL
Direct Realism
Memory
Personal Identity
Non-Reductionism
Temporal Experience
title_short A MEMORY-BASED ARGUMENT FOR NON-REDUCTIONISM ABOUT THE TRANSTEMPORAL IDENTITY OF PERSONS
title_full A MEMORY-BASED ARGUMENT FOR NON-REDUCTIONISM ABOUT THE TRANSTEMPORAL IDENTITY OF PERSONS
title_fullStr A MEMORY-BASED ARGUMENT FOR NON-REDUCTIONISM ABOUT THE TRANSTEMPORAL IDENTITY OF PERSONS
title_full_unstemmed A MEMORY-BASED ARGUMENT FOR NON-REDUCTIONISM ABOUT THE TRANSTEMPORAL IDENTITY OF PERSONS
title_sort A MEMORY-BASED ARGUMENT FOR NON-REDUCTIONISM ABOUT THE TRANSTEMPORAL IDENTITY OF PERSONS
author INAN,DANIEL
author_facet INAN,DANIEL
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv INAN,DANIEL
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Direct Realism
Memory
Personal Identity
Non-Reductionism
Temporal Experience
topic Direct Realism
Memory
Personal Identity
Non-Reductionism
Temporal Experience
description Abstract Does memory constitue diachronic identity? Or does it presuppose it? Butler has claimed that it is the latter, and, in this paper, I will side with him. My argumentation, however, will take a different route. My claim is not that memory presupposes transtemporal identity because I can only remember episodes that have happened to me. Rather, I will probe the idea that some properties of episodic remembering may be such that accounting for them requires us to posit a subject the transtemporal identity of which can't be reduced to continuity. These properties are the pastness of the recollected episode coupled with its first-personal accessibility. The argument will make heavy use of the experience of temporality.
publishDate 2022
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2022-04-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452022000200161
url http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452022000200161
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 10.1590/0100-6045.2022.v45n2.di
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv text/html
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência
publisher.none.fl_str_mv UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Manuscrito v.45 n.2 2022
reponame:Manuscrito (Online)
instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron:UNICAMP
instname_str Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron_str UNICAMP
institution UNICAMP
reponame_str Manuscrito (Online)
collection Manuscrito (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br
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