Illuminating the chinese room

• Autor(a) principal: Dartnall, Terry
• Data de Publicação: 1996
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
• Texto Completo: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8669090
• topic: Quarto chinês; Filosofia da mente; Inteligência artificial

In this paper I provide a solution to the problem of the Chinese Room. The problem is to determine whether the Chinese Room Argument goes through, and if it does, to explain why symbol handling does not give us cognition. I argue that the real issue is not about symbols, but about the relationship between cognition and content. Artificial Intelligence (AI) does not distinguish between these, and naively believes that internalising the public symbolisms that express the content of cognition will generate cognition itself. Not only does it do this in practise: the main manifestos of AI explicitly state that the internalised symbolisms are interpretted and contentful. This confusion between cognition and content is the same confusion that underlies psychologism, which says that we can find out about content by studying cognition. What I call "reverse psychologism" says that we can find out about cognition by studying content, and in its stronger form, that we can generate cognition by internalis ing content. This is the real fallacy that is exposed by the Chinese Room Argument.