Impossible premises and correct argument

• Autor(a) principal: Blum, Alex
• Data de Publicação: 1997
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
• Texto Completo: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8665534
• topic: Premissas; Argumento; Persuasão

We offer a defense of the controversial thesis that arguments with impossible premises are valid. Classically na argument is valid iff it cannot both be that its premises are true and its conclusion false. Thus in any complete classical system we can derive any conclusion from any set of premises which contains inconsistente premises. Many have felt that something is wrong, and as a result have constructed various non-“explosive” systems acting as “corrective” to the classical system. But we may look at an argument as asserting that there is no  better reason to accept the premises than there is for accepting the conclusion. Let us call an argument of which this is true a correct argument. Hence any argument where the probability of its conclusion being true is no less than that of the premisses jointly held correct.